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PREFERENCES FOR PROCESSES:  
THE PROCESS/PRODUCT DISTINCTION  
AND THE REGULATION OF CONSUMER CHOICE 
Douglas A. Kysar∗ 
 This Article examines a conceptual distinction between product-related information (such 
as whether a consumer good threatens to harm its user) and process-related information 
(such as whether a good’s production harmed workers, animals, or the environment) that 
has appeared in various guises within international trade law; domestic environmental, 
health, and safety regulation; and constitutional commercial speech jurisprudence.  This 
process/product distinction tends to dismiss information concerning processes as 
unworthy of attention from consumers or regulators, at least so long as the processes at 
issue do not manifest themselves in the physical or compositional characteristics of 
resulting end products.  Proponents have offered the process/product distinction as a 
useful device for determining when consumer product regulations are likely to have drifted 
beyond the satisfaction of significant consumer interest into areas of unjustified alarm, 
disguised protectionism, or excessive encroachment onto competing interests, such as the 
speech concerns of product manufacturers or the domestic sovereignty of foreign nations.  
As this Article shows, however, the process/product distinction proves far too thin and 
formalistic of a conceptual device, once one examines the full panoply of reasons why 
consumers might express preferences for processes.  Thus, rather than dismissing process 
preferences as especially likely to be ill-informed or otherwise objectionable, this Article 
argues in favor of acknowledging and accommodating such preferences within theoretical 
frameworks for policy analysis.  Indeed, in view of several growing phenomena — 
including the cultural and political significance attached to the consumption function, the 
effort by regulatory cost-benefit analysts to ground public policies on the values revealed by 
individuals acting in their roles as market actors, and the integration of global product 
markets without similarly expansive integration of the global regulatory system — this 
Article concludes that, in the future, process preferences may serve as indispensable outlets 
for public-regarding behavior. 
INTRODUCTION 
hortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. Com-
merce Secretary Don Evans was quoted as saying, “People ask all 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.  Associate Professor of Law, Cor-
nell Law School.  For helpful comments and suggestions, I thank Robert Ahdieh, John Applegate, 
Vicki Been, William Buzbee, Eric Freyfogle, Daniel Greenwood, Marc Miller, Trevor Morrison, 
Jeffrey Rachlinski, Eric Rasmussen, Steven Shiffrin, Jeffrey Stake, Buzz Thompson, and Tom 
Ulen, as well as participants in workshops at the University of Illinois College of Law, the Indi-
ana University School of Law, Bloomington, the University of British Columbia Faculty of Law, 
the Cornell University Department of Science and Technology Studies, the University of Con-
necticut School of Law, the Cornell Law School, the S.J. Quinney College of Law at the Univer-
sity of Utah, the Chicago-Kent College of Law, the Emory University School of Law, and atten-
dees of presentations at the 2003 Harvard Environmental Law Conference, the 2004 Stanford 
Law School Environmental Workshop Seminar, and the 2004 Stanford-Yale Junior Faculty Fo-
rum.  All misjudgments, errors, and omissions are my own. 
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the time, ‘What can I do, what sacrifices can I make for my country?’”  
His answer: “Go back to the stores.”1  Although long present in politi-
cal and popular discourse,2 this conflation of patriotism with consump-
tion, of civic life with market life, became unmistakably apparent in 
the wake of the World Trade Center and Pentagon disasters.  Across 
the airwaves and in the newspapers, private consumer spending ap-
peared as the primary, and at times the exclusive, avenue for citizen 
participation in the nation’s effort to recover from 9/11.3 
A similar collapsing of citizen values and market values appears in 
the work of proponents of regulatory cost-benefit analysis.  These 
thinkers argue that public safeguarding of endangered species, air 
quality, worker safety, and a host of other noncommodified goods 
should be derived not from the willingness of citizens to support pro-
tective legislation through political activity, but from the willingness of 
individuals to reveal a “vote” in favor of such goods through their de-
cisions as consumers, laborers, or other private market actors.4  These 
choices, the argument goes, are untarnished by voter irrationality, 
agency capture, paternalistic overreaching, bureaucratic inefficiency, or 
any of the numerous other ills often associated with government ac-
tion.5  In a particularly dramatic illustration of this stance, John Gra-
ham, head of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs for 
President George W. Bush’s Office of Management and Budget, sug-
gested that revealed-preference methodologies could capture even the 
monetized value of liberty.6 
For better or worse, then, the market and the consumer are central 
to public policy at the beginning of the twenty-first century.  Indeed, 
Mark Sagoff’s careful effort to distinguish between the values that in-
dividuals express in their capacities as citizens and those that they ex-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 1 Brandon Loomis, Commerce Secretary Urges Shopping, AP ONLINE, Nov. 19, 2001, 2001 
WL 30246793 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 2 See generally LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMER’S REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF MASS 
CONSUMPTION IN POSTWAR AMERICA (2003). 
 3 Cf. Martha T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the Neoliberal At-
tack on the Welfare State, 78 IND. L.J. 783, 786 n.8 (2003) (“Another example of the neoliberal 
transformation of citizenship is the idea that Americans should express their patriotism in re-
sponse to the attacks of September 11, 2001 by going shopping.”). 
 4 Such “votes” can occur either through the “revealed preferences” of actual individual market 
behavior or through the observed responses of subjects to experimental techniques, such as con-
tingent valuation surveys, that attempt to provoke market evaluations of public goods.  See 
Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Consumer Preferences, Citizen Preferences, and the Provision of Pub-
lic Goods, 108 YALE L.J. 377, 383 (1998). 
 5 See, e.g., id. at 378 (noting that analysts “attempt to vindicate consumer behavior and often 
portray citizen preferences as misinformed, capricious, or insincere”  (emphasis added)). 
 6 See Edmund L. Andrews, New Scale for Toting Up Lost Freedom vs. Security Would Meas-
ure in Dollars, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2003, at A13 (describing a request by the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget for economic data regarding the value of privacy and liberty lost due to tighter 
security measures). 
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press as consumers7 has been challenged in fundamental ways by the 
growing dominance of market-centered liberalism within academic, 
policymaking, and public circles.  Not only have Sagoff’s powerful ar-
guments failed to slow the movement toward greater reliance on pri-
vate market decisions as the standard for government provision of 
public goods,8 but also, and perhaps more significantly, the very citizen 
voices that Sagoff aims to preserve as the basis for societal decision-
making seem endangered, as citizens come to view the government 
and the political process in primarily market terms.9  In that sense, 
even if Sagoff’s view does prevail at the level of policy development, 
such that environmental, health, and safety standards continue to be 
determined by the willingness of citizens to vote rather than the will-
ingness of consumers to pay, the distinction will have little practical 
significance if voting itself becomes simply another self-conscious 
manifestation of market preferences. 
This Article does not rehearse the well-worn, but important and 
continuing, normative debates regarding the use of cost-benefit analy-
sis in environmental, health, and safety regulation.10  Nor does it ana-
lyze the role of commercial relations and commercial activities in pub-
lic life, except to observe their increasing prominence.11  Instead, this 
Article examines recent developments in international trade law; envi-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 7 See MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 7–10 (1988); see also ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND 
ECONOMICS 144–47, 158–59, 203–10 (1993) (characterizing the market as “impersonal,” “egoistic,” 
and incapable of adequately capturing the value of shared goods such as environmental quality); 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 21–23, 44–45 (1997) (providing a vari-
ety of reasons why citizen preferences are more likely than consumer preferences to reflect con-
cern for the public good). 
 8 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY 
PROTECTION, at ix (2002) (“Gradually, and in fits and starts, American government is becoming a 
cost-benefit state.”). 
 9 Cf. COHEN, supra note 2, at 397 (noting that in the 1990s “the market relationship became 
the template for the citizen’s connection to government,” and describing consequences of this de-
velopment). 
 10 Compare FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE 
OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004) (arguing that economic cost-benefit analy-
sis is an unreliable decision technique that can never capture the full value of human life and 
health), with CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
(2002) (arguing that cost-benefit analysis should guide government regulation and that such 
analysis need not undervalue life and health).  For a summary of many of the important argu-
ments, see Douglas A. Kysar, Climate Change, Cultural Transformation, and Comprehensive Ra-
tionality, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 555, 562–89 (2004).   
 11 See ULRICH BECK, WHAT IS GLOBALIZATION? 9 (Patrick Camiller trans., Polity Press 2000) 
(1997) (defining “globalism” as “the view that the world market eliminates or supplants political 
action”); THOMAS FRANK, ONE MARKET UNDER GOD: EXTREME CAPITALISM, MARKET 
POPULISM, AND THE END OF ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY, at xv (2000) (calling “[m]arket populism” 
the “centerpiece of the new American consensus”); LESLIE SKLAIR, GLOBALIZATION: CAPITALISM 
& ITS ALTERNATIVES 108–15 (2002) (describing the “culture-ideology of consumerism” as one of 
the central pillars of neoliberal globalization). 
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ronmental, health, and safety regulation; and constitutional law, all of 
which challenge in subtle ways the notion of a stark divide between 
citizen preferences and consumer preferences.  Specifically, these de-
velopments suggest, at least with regard to some areas of choice, that 
consumer preferences may be heavily influenced by information re-
garding the manner in which goods are produced.  Such information 
— which this Article refers to as “process information”12 — can in-
clude the labor conditions of workers who produce a consumer good, 
the environmental effects of a good’s production, the use of controver-
sial engineering techniques such as genetic modification to create a 
good, or any number of other social, economic, or environmental cir-
cumstances that are related causally to a consumer product, but that 
do not necessarily manifest themselves in the product itself.  As will be 
seen, although such factors generally do not bear on the functioning, 
performance, or safety of the product, they nevertheless can, and often 
do, influence the willingness of consumers to purchase the product.  
Consumers, in other words, often have “preferences for processes.”13 
Such preferences long have been a feature of the mass consumer 
marketplace — consider, for example, once-significant levels of con-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 12 A common term from international trade discussions, “processes and production methods” 
(PPMs), highlights the “way in which products are manufactured or processed and natural re-
sources extracted or harvested.”  ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., PROCESSES AND 
PRODUCTION METHODS (PPMS): CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND CONSIDERATIONS ON USE OF 
PPM-BASED TRADE MEASURES 7 (1997), available at http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/1997doc.nsf/ 
87fae4004d4fa67ac125685d005300b3/e84ef77f9aae7954c12564f000379377/$FILE/08E73097.ENG.  
This Article conceives of process information slightly more broadly to encompass not only produc-
tion methods, but also a variety of social, economic, and ecological effects of production. 
 13 See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT: TAMING GLOBALIZATION 
THROUGH LAW REFORM (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at ch. 4, at 4–5, on file with the Har-
vard Law School Library) (recounting recent instances in which consumer awareness of labor 
conditions has led to boycotts and other market actions); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & 
DEV., ENVIRONMENTAL LABELLING IN OECD COUNTRIES 9 (1991) (observing “recent growth in 
numbers of environmentally concerned consumers throughout the OECD area”); ORG. FOR 
ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 12, at 7 (“Consumers in many countries are increas-
ingly seeking information on how the PPMs of the products they buy affect the environment.”); 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL LABELING ISSUES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 
WORLDWIDE 60 (1998) (identifying forty-nine “third-party” environmental labeling schemes 
worldwide in 1997, only seventeen of which existed in 1989), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
oppt/epp/pubs/envlab/wwlabel3.pdf; Julie A. Caswell et al., Unifying Two Frameworks for Analyz-
ing Quality and Quality Assurance for Food Products, in GLOBAL FOOD TRADE AND CONSUMER 
DEMAND FOR QUALITY 43, 55–58 (Barry Krissoff et al. eds., 2002) (identifying animal welfare, 
biotechnology, environmental impact, worker safety, and other “process attributes” as important 
components of consumer product evaluations); Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the 
Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 115, 176 (2004) (noting that “as environmental data and 
analysis become more accessible, additional buyers will be positioned to factor environmental 
considerations into their choices”); Heiner Imkamp, The Interest of Consumers in Ecological 
Product Information is Growing — Evidence from Two German Surveys, 23 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 
193, 195–99 (2000) (observing an increase between 1989 and 1998 in consumer interest in informa-
tion on the ecological impact of products). 
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sumer demand for “Union Label” goods14 —  yet the theoretical chal-
lenges that they pose have been insufficiently explored.  Given the par-
tial dependency of consumer demand on perceptions of manufacturing 
processes, lawmakers cannot determine product information disclosure 
policies strictly with reference to revealed preferences in the manner 
desired by advocates of cost-benefit analysis, at least not without en-
gaging in a form of analytical bootstrapping.15  Instead, some prior de-
cision must be made about how to manage consumer access to process 
information, a decision that in turn influences the pattern of prefer-
ences that will emerge following the regulatory decision.  For example: 
To what extent should consumers be made aware that animals may 
have suffered pain in order for a particular product to reach the mar-
ket?  Should governments require labeling of food items that have 
been developed using genetically modified (GM) ingredients?  Should 
national governments be able to require foreign producers to disclose 
information regarding production processes if the processes do not 
physically impact consumers or environmental conditions in the im-
porting nation?  Should private efforts by citizen groups to raise 
awareness about these types of process-related issues be subjected to 
regulation, liability, or other means of governmental control? 
As Part I of this Article details, questions of this nature increasingly 
are being resolved in a manner that burdens or denies consumer access 
to process information.  Broadly speaking, policymakers and litigants 
in a number of critical subject areas have argued in favor of a concep-
tual demarcation between production processes and the goods that re-
sult from them.  According to this “process/product distinction,” infor-
mation about the details of production processes, as opposed to 
information about products, is thought to constitute a presumptively 
illegitimate basis for regulatory or consumer differentiation.  Like 
process preferences themselves, this process/product distinction enjoys 
a pedigree almost as lengthy as that of the mass consumer market-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 14 See LAWRENCE B. GLICKMAN, A LIVING WAGE: AMERICAN WORKERS AND THE MAKING 
OF CONSUMER SOCIETY 108–28 (1997). 
 15 As discussed below, recent experimental psychological research suggests that process prefer-
ences are likely to be context-dependent and therefore difficult to estimate in the absence of some 
prior specification of the consumer’s information environment, see infra pp. 627–32; see also 
SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 17 (“[W]hen preferences are a function of legal rules, the government 
cannot take preferences as given . . . .  Moreover, the rules cannot be justified by reference to the 
preferences . . . .”); Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, AM. ECON. 
REV. PAPERS & PROC., May 2003, at 175, 178 (noting that, because “[w]hat people choose often 
depends on the starting point, and hence the starting point cannot be selected by asking what 
people choose,” this “problem of circularity” will sometimes make it impossible to make regulatory 
decisions based on what consumers prefer); cf. Samuel Bowles, Endogenous Preferences: The Cul-
tural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 75, 
75–78 (1998) (describing conceptual problems created for economic theory when markets “influ-
ence the evolution of values, tastes, and personalities”). 
2004] PREFERENCES FOR PROCESSES 531 
place.16  However, the more recent developments gathered in this Arti-
cle reflect a trend that is both new and consequential — namely, a pal-
pable shift toward a consumer marketplace in which consumers will 
be presumed or permitted by government regulators to regard only the 
functional characteristics of products, leaving the ethical and environ-
mental implications of process characteristics to be dealt with exclu-
sively in other forums or by other decisionmakers. 
As will be seen, the underlying concerns that drive policymakers to 
embrace the process/product distinction are not without justification.  
Just as a representative democracy is said to temper the excesses of 
popular political will,17 proponents of the process/product distinction 
believe that withholding process-based considerations from consumers 
helps to moderate market demand in cases where unfettered consumer 
choice could lead to socially undesirable outcomes.  Such outcomes 
may occur either because individuals suffer from certain informational 
and cognitive deficiencies that impair their ability to comprehend 
process information accurately, or because interest groups have strong 
incentives to exploit public perceptions of manufacturing processes for 
private purposes.18 
Despite the real significance of these underlying concerns, this Arti-
cle demonstrates that each appearance of the process/product distinc-
tion suffers from an insufficient appreciation of consumers’ full inter-
est in process characteristics, an omission that in turn masks important 
conceptual shortcomings of the distinction as a tool for legal analysis.  
Part II therefore offers three accounts of consumer process preferences 
that collectively sharpen the focus of the various substantive debates 
that the process/product distinction presently attempts to resolve. 
The first account posits that consumers demand process informa-
tion because they wish to encourage or discourage the production prac-
tice in question through their market activity.  In that sense, private 
consumption takes on a self-consciously political dimension: consumer 
behavior is directed not merely at satisfying personal needs or desires, 
but at shaping the way in which goods are produced.  From this per-
spective, the accuracy of consumer perceptions and beliefs becomes a 
crucial factor for policymakers to consider when deciding whether to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 16 See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 271–72 (1918) (striking down a federal prohibition 
on the interstate shipment of goods produced by child labor as beyond congressional authority 
under the Commerce Clause because the “goods shipped are of themselves harmless”).  The case 
was overruled explicitly by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116 (1941), which recognized 
that the process/product distinction adopted in Hammer “ha[d] long since been abandoned.”  Id.  
at 116. 
 17 See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 49–52 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1999) (arguing that the structures of representative democracy protect individuals and the public 
welfare from the self-interested demands of factions). 
 18 See infra pp. 586–89. 
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require product labeling or some other means of enabling consumers to 
act on their process preferences.  For instance, are consumers justified 
in worrying about the effects of GM agriculture, or should govern-
ments discourage consumer suspicion by making it harder to identify 
goods that have been developed using GM technologies?  As Part II 
discusses, although there is reason to agree with leading commentators 
that often “experts are right and ordinary people are wrong,”19 there is 
reason also to believe that public reactions to health and safety haz-
ards are richer and more value-laden than typical expert assessments.  
In that respect, policymakers seem to have underestimated the coher-
ence, and even occasional wisdom, of consumer process preferences.20 
Moreover, on the remaining two accounts of process preferences, 
consumer demand for process information is not viewed as entirely in-
strumental, such that its wisdom depends wholly on empirical ques-
tions about the social, economic, or environmental consequences of 
consumer actions.  Rather, consumers are seen to avoid or acquire 
goods produced through certain processes merely because their knowl-
edge, or lack of knowledge, regarding such processes affects the degree 
of benefit that they derive from their purchases.  Just as money is not 
purely fungible to social beings,21 consumer products — even when 
physically indistinguishable — are not perfect substitutes to the extent 
that they are produced using different processes about which consum-
ers have strong feelings.22  Consumers may hold such preferences be-
cause they derive procedural utility from participating in a market-
place that palpably links their purchasing decisions with important 
process-related policy issues.  Alternatively, consumers may view con-
sumption choices, at least in part, as moral acts that have personal sig-
nificance irrespective of their instrumental effects.  In either case — 
whether understood as an expressive or as an ethical act — process-
based decisionmaking appears to be largely inseparable from other as-
pects of consumer demand that traditionally have been deemed beyond 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 19 Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1119, 1146 (2002) (book review). 
 20 See generally FRANK FISCHER, CITIZENS, EXPERTS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE 
POLITICS OF LOCAL KNOWLEDGE (2000) (describing ways in which local lay knowledge can pro-
vide invaluable assistance to expert understanding and public policy formation). 
 21 See generally VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY (1994) (describing 
how socioeconomic factors influence the way that money is perceived and handled, despite its os-
tensible fungibility). 
 22 See Daniel M. Hausman & Michael S. McPherson, Taking Ethics Seriously: Economics and 
Contemporary Moral Philosophy, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 671, 686 n.24 (1993) (noting that “a 
delicious piece of apple pie that was known to be stolen would not be the same object as a physi-
cally similar piece of pie that came as a gift”); Deirdre S. Shaw & Ian Clarke, Culture, Consump-
tion and Choice: Towards a Conceptual Relationship, 22 J. CONSUMER STUD. & HOME ECON. 
163, 166 (1998) (arguing that “for many consumers ethical attributes are one among a ‘bundle’ of 
other product attributes that must be evaluated when making purchase decisions”). 
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scrutiny within the framework of market liberalism.23  In that sense, 
the process/product distinction seems to be an ill-conceived basis for 
regulating consumer choice. 
Part II concludes by considering the future significance of process 
preferences to civil society in light of both the seemingly inexorable so-
cial and economic trends of globalization and the growing theoretical 
importance of private market behavior to understandings of civic par-
ticipation and government regulation.  As will be explained, the al-
ready heroic conceptual role of the consumer within market liberalism 
seems poised to become even more heroic.  Long expected to help raise 
collective welfare through constant material accumulation,24 consum-
ers also now are being charged with determining the outcome of im-
portant policy disputes by revealing — again through private market 
behavior — their true level of support for human safety, the environ-
ment, and a host of other public goods.  Although proponents of this 
valuation methodology expect market choices to reveal purely private 
preferences, individuals acting on process preferences instead seem to 
regard consumption at least partially as an act of public significance.  
Indeed, in coming years, rising levels of affluence,25 combined with the 
continued overshadowing of civic life by market life, may lead indi-
viduals to view purposeful consumption as their surest, if not their 
only, means for public expression and engagement.  The result may be 
a novel political economy. 
To summarize, three prominent interconnected trends — the equa-
tion of civic responsibility with consumer spending, the displacement 
of politically determined regulatory policies by market-derived envi-
ronmental, health, and safety standards, and the global integration of 
consumer product markets — have been joined by a less-noted fourth 
trend: the struggle for control over consumer access to information re-
garding the processes by which products come into being.  This Article 
aims to identify and expand on this underappreciated trend in the fol-
lowing manner.  First, it demonstrates that the process/product distinc-
tion is a prominent element of the effort to resolve policy disputes that 
involve the entanglement of consumer regulation with broader social 
or environmental questions.  Second, it shows that the distinction is 
too thin and formalistic of a conceptual device to address those policy 
disputes in a stable or satisfying manner.  Finally, it argues more 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 23 See Robin L. West, Liberalism Rediscovered: A Pragmatic Definition of the Liberal Vision, 
46 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 702 (1985) (describing traditional liberal theory’s embrace of the principle 
of “equal respect for the differing preferences and visions of the good life with which individual 
consumers and producers approach the market”). 
 24 See infra pp. 632–44. 
 25 As described below, consumer preferences for processes are likely to become more signifi-
cant as rising incomes permit greater expenditures on consumer goods that are made using envi-
ronmentally or socially preferable processes, see infra pp. 638–39. 
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broadly in favor of acknowledging and accommodating process prefer-
ences within policy analysis, given the potential significance that such 
preferences may serve in the future as outlets for public-minded  
behavior. 
It is important to note that this Article makes no claim about the 
desirability or effectiveness of consumer behavior as a regulatory tool 
when viewed in isolation from the various cultural, economic, and po-
litical trends that are described alongside the growth of process prefer-
ences.26  If one does accept the existence and strength of these trends, 
however, then it follows that process preferences can be expected to 
capture the displaced moral and political sentiments of individuals 
who have been encouraged to regard the market as a more sure route 
to self-expression and efficacious activity than traditional public chan-
nels.  To that extent, product labels may become significant venues for 
the expression and evaluation of policy issues that, for better or worse, 
seem no longer to resonate in alternative forums.27  Similarly, con-
sumption communities organized around process-related issues appear 
destined to become some of the most active and visible citizens’ groups 
of global civil society,28 emerging, somewhat ironically, from the one 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 26 As described below, consumer behavior provides only an imperfect substitute for conven-
tional regulation from the standpoint of achieving specified policy goals, see infra pp. 537–39.  
Even assuming that it is necessary to view process preferences as an important policy component 
of the evolving regulatory state, as this Article does, a series of difficult policy design and imple-
mentation questions remain.  Cf. Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the 
Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 673 
(1979) (analyzing the use of customer preference and market competitiveness models to examine 
difficult regulatory questions concerning when and how to intervene in an effort to improve im-
perfect consumer information).  Relevant topics include the extent to which a market uncon-
strained by the process/product distinction would respond to consumer process preferences; the 
likelihood that manipulative process representations would undermine consumer confidence in 
the market for process-distinguished goods; the difficulty of estimating benefits from mandatory 
labeling policies given the apparent context dependence of process preferences; and a host of other 
theoretical and technical issues.  Questions of that nature are undoubtedly important, and they 
are addressed briefly below.  See infra pp. 625–28, 630–32.  For the most part, however, such 
questions are beyond the scope of this Article, which aims instead to identify and understand an 
aspect of consumer behavior that has been largely absent from theoretical frameworks for policy 
analysis, even before questions of implementation can be raised. 
 27 See BECK, supra note 11, at 146 (hypothesizing that product “biographies” might allow “the 
much-vaunted responsible citizen . . . to decide how much he or she valued making the everyday 
act of purchase a political ballot over global forms of work and life”). 
 28 Many commentators believe that commercial relations stand outside the realm of civil soci-
ety by definition.  See, e.g., Larry Diamond, Toward Democratic Consolidation, in THE GLOBAL 
RESURGENCE OF DEMOCRACY 227, 228 (Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner eds., 2d ed. 1996) 
(noting that the notion of “civil society” excludes “the profit-making enterprise of individual busi-
ness firms”).  The process-based consumer campaigns described in this Article, however, undenia-
bly involve “citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions, and 
ideas, exchange information, achieve mutual goals, make demands on the state, and hold state 
officials accountable.”  Id. (emphasis omitted).  Moreover, the communities that form around 
process-based campaigns often provide casebook studies of how global networks of diverse groups 
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force that has been most successful at cohering disparate individuals 
and entities across the globe — the faceless and impersonal producer-
consumer relationship.29 
Rather than lament or praise these trends, this Article largely ac-
cepts their existence and instead asks how they might impact future 
conceptions and practices of governance.  As Fred Aman has written, 
“the essence of democracy in the 21st century depends on the ability of 
citizens to affect the policies that globalization would now seem to dic-
tate.”30  Because process preferences provide an outlet for the expres-
sion of public values through a market medium that is being endorsed 
simultaneously as a primary locus of choice, opportunity, and respon-
sibility, individuals may well come to view such preferences as their 
most appropriate mechanism for influencing the policies and condi-
tions of a globalized world.  Accordingly, the central normative conclu-
sion of this Article is that, if private market behavior is to serve the 
expansive evaluative function that proponents of the liberal market vi-
sion have proposed for it, then consumers should receive an informa-
tional context that is appropriately robust for the role they are being 
asked to serve.  Similarly, if individuals come to perceive their civic 
role as primarily one of consumer purchase, then the state should not 
simultaneously deprive them of the information that is needed to ex-
press political values through their consumption choices.  In short, 
policymakers and commentators should discard the view that con-
sumer preferences for processes are somehow less appropriate or wor-
thy of governmental support than preferences for products. 
I.  THE PROCESS/PRODUCT DISTINCTION 
Contemporary consumer product markets are characterized by 
ever-increasing technological and geopolitical complexity.  Consumers 
now have access to goods whose very existence was scientifically uni-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
can operate effectively in domains where law has not or cannot achieve satisfactory results.  Thus, 
even companies that fall outside of “civil society” are inextricably bound up with social and envi-
ronmental welfare issues that civil society addresses.  See, e.g., Errol E. Meidinger, The New En-
vironmental Law: Forest Certification, 10 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 211, 237–41 (2002–2003) (providing 
an extended analysis of the forest certification network — a community comprising forest indus-
try companies, environmental nongovernmental organizations, indigenous groups, community 
organizations, and labeling bodies — that monitors and assesses international forestry certification 
systems).  For an important theoretical discussion of such transnational networks, see ANNELISE 
RILES, THE NETWORK INSIDE OUT (2000). 
 29 See SKLAIR, supra note 11, at 277 (detailing the growing consumer movement and calling it 
“one of the central issues around which the embryonic anti-globalization movement is coming to-
gether”). 
 30 AMAN, supra note 13 (manuscript at preface, at 1); see also BECK, supra note 11, at 13 (not-
ing that, because globalization entails “world society without a world state and without world 
government,” new forms and modes of governance must be contemplated (emphasis omitted)). 
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maginable just a few decades ago.  They also encounter goods with a 
production history that bears the imprint of countless economic actors 
from across the globe, actors whose lives and working conditions are 
enmeshed in an intricate web of economic and political interdepend-
ence.  Naturally, both the mounting technological sophistication of 
consumer products and the “cross-border interpenetration of economic 
life”31 tend to raise the stakes of consumption, expanding the uncer-
tainty and the potential magnitude of social and environmental conse-
quences that result from private consumer spending.32 
For the most part, however, individuals do not confront these con-
sequences in their capacity as consumers.  As Wendell Berry has writ-
ten, “[t]he global economy institutionalizes a global ignorance, in which 
producers and consumers cannot know or care about one another, and 
in which the histories of all products will be lost.”33  In the United 
States, such institutionalized ignorance is compounded by the fact that, 
with very few exceptions,34 product manufacturers must only ever dis-
close material health and safety risks or other attributes that inhere in 
an end product itself and that therefore threaten to harm or mislead 
the purchaser directly.35  “Disclosure of the conditions or methods of 
manufacture,” by contrast, “has long been deemed unnecessary under 
the law.”36  Thus, although the development seems to have occurred by 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 31 Katherine Van Wezel Stone, To the Yukon and Beyond: Local Laborers in a Global Labor 
Market, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 93, 95 (1999). 
 32 See Meidinger, supra note 28, at 233 (“The emergence of worldwide production and con-
sumption chains has increased the scope of both transnational interdependence and the external-
ities associated with market activities.”); cf. Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility 
in an Era of Economic Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 721–24 (2002) (surveying a mul-
titude of social and environmental responsibility issues that multinational corporations face 
within the context of their global operations).  See generally ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY (Mark 
Ritter trans., Sage Publ’ns 1992) (1986) (documenting social, economic, and technological forces 
that in combination have led to a worldwide “risk society”). 
 33 WENDELL BERRY, The Whole Horse, in THE ART OF THE COMMON-PLACE: THE 
AGRARIAN ESSAYS OF WENDELL BERRY 236, 244 (Norman Wirzba ed., 2002). 
 34 Labeling requirements pertaining to a good’s country of origin are the most prominent ex-
ception.  See 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a) (2000) (“[E]very article of foreign origin . . . imported into the 
United States shall be marked in a conspicuous place as legibly, indelibly, and permanently as the 
nature of the article . . . in such manner as to indicate to an ultimate purchaser in the United 
States . . . the country of origin of the article.”).  In recent years, Congress has struggled over the 
question whether to extend country-of-origin labeling requirements to meat and other perishable 
agricultural commodities.  See Jacquelyn Trussell, Note, The Birth Place of Food Products: Do 
You Know Where Your Food Comes From?, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 285, 285–88 (2004) (de-
tailing recent legislation requiring such labeling and subsequent congressional postponements of 
the legislation’s effective date). 
 35 For a comprehensive overview of product labeling requirements that federal, state, and 
common law have imposed, see Lars Noah, The Imperative To Warn: Disentangling the “Right To 
Know” from the “Need To Know” About Consumer Product Hazards, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 293 
(1994). 
 36 Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 179 n.10 (D.D.C. 2000); see also 
United States v. Ninety-Five Barrels, More or Less, Alleged Apple Cider Vinegar, 265 U.S. 438, 
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historical happenstance rather than by deliberate design, one neverthe-
less might say that the process/product distinction is a concept already 
central to the regulation of consumer product markets. 
Moreover, as this Part describes, an increasing formalization of the 
process/product distinction has appeared recently in diverse subject 
areas.  Consequently, product manufacturers not only remain generally 
free of mandates to disclose process information, but also are begin-
ning to enjoy legal protections both from government efforts to intro-
duce such mandates and from consumer efforts to obtain and act on 
process information through other means.  Such attempts to cordon off 
process information for special treatment are motivated by several 
overlapping concerns.  Most notably, proponents of the proc-
ess/product distinction argue that consumer decisionmaking premised 
on process information frequently will lead to harmful, self-defeating, 
or otherwise unwise choices.37  For instance, labeling of GM food 
products has been criticized by scholars who doubt the ability of con-
sumers to appreciate the environmental, health, and safety benefits 
that the new technology promises.38  Similarly, commentators have 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
444–45 (1924) (interpreting the Food and Drugs Act of 1906 not to require disclosure of process 
information because, “[w]hen considered independently of the product, the method of manufac-
ture is not material”); J. Howard Beales III, Modification and Consumer Information: Modern 
Biotechnology and the Regulation of Information, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 105, 112 (2000) (“In the 
absence of specific health concerns, or material effects on the characteristics of the resulting prod-
uct, regulatory policies have not required disclosure of processes that are used to produce a par-
ticular food.”); Karen A. Goldman, Labeling of Genetically Modified Foods: Legal and Scientific 
Issues, 12 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 717, 723–28 (2000) (describing the “dichotomy between 
labeling based on method of production and labeling based on safety concerns raised by the prod-
uct itself,” and noting that labeling requirements only tend to be imposed in the latter case). 
  Although manufacturers rarely have been forced to disclose process information, they have 
faced regulatory oversight of the accuracy of certain process-related disclosures that are made 
voluntarily.  See Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1385(b)(3), (d) (2000) 
(containing a congressional finding that “consumers would like to know if the tuna they purchase 
is falsely labeled as to the effect of the harvesting of the tuna on dolphins,” and establishing guide-
lines for “dolphin safe” labels on tuna); 18 U.S.C. § 1159(a) (2000) (declaring it unlawful to market 
goods falsely as being produced by Native Americans); Guides for the Use of Environmental 
Marketing Claims, 16 C.F.R. § 260.7 (2004) (providing detailed guidelines for environmental mar-
keting claims); “Made in USA” and Other U.S. Origin Claims, 62 Fed. Reg. 63,756, 63,756 & n.1 
(Dec. 2, 1997) (noting that the FTC has regulated claims that a product is of U.S. origin under 
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act since the 1940s).  As noted below, the constitu-
tional status of such regulations has been drawn into some question by recent litigation, see infra 
section I.C.2, pp. 574–79. 
 37 Cf. Robert A. Hillman, The Rhetoric of Legal Backfire, 43 B.C. L. REV. 819, 819–20 (2002) 
(“Consumer protection laws are said to increase prices and confuse consumers instead of arming 
them with legal rights.”). 
 38 See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 36, at 722, 760 (noting with approval industry concern that 
“consumers may not have enough information on biotechnology to fairly evaluate [GM foods]”).  
Proponents of the process/product distinction also might cite evidence of scientific illiteracy in 
support of this contention.  For instance, in one survey only forty-four percent of American re-
spondents disagreed with the statement “Ordinary tomatoes do not contain genes, while geneti-
cally modified tomatoes do.”  Gary E. Marchant & Andrew Askland, GM Foods: Potential Public 
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concluded that environmental product labeling schemes “inhibit prod-
uct development and result in the consumption of more scarce natural 
resources and more harmful emissions to the environment than would 
be the case if they were absent.”39  On the international level, envi-
ronmentally motivated trade measures — such as import bans or label-
ing requirements triggered by the use of certain production processes 
— likewise have been critiqued as tending to exacerbate, rather than 
ameliorate, environmentally destructive activities.40  Even efforts by 
developed nations to avoid the fruits of child labor have been chal-
lenged as likely to harm the very children whom nations seek to avoid 
exploiting.41 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Consultation and Participation Mechanisms, 44 JURIMETRICS 99, 108 (2003) (citing NAT’L SCI. 
BD., NAT’L SCI. FOUND., SCIENCE & ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2002, at 7-21 to 7-22).  Consum-
ers themselves report that they do not feel well-informed regarding the scientific issues surround-
ing GM foods.  See MARIO F. TEISL & JULIE A. CASWELL, INFORMATION POLICY AND 
GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD: WEIGHING THE BENEFITS AND COSTS 19 (Univ. of Mass. Am-
herst Dep’t of Res. Econ., Working Paper No. 2003-1, 2003).  Nevertheless, researchers have 
found that differences in scientific education and knowledge are only weakly correlated with dif-
ferences of opinion regarding the desirability and appropriateness of genetic engineering, a result 
that suggests many variables other than purely scientific criteria may be at stake in GM food dis-
putes.  See Susanna Hornig Priest et al., The “Trust Gap” Hypothesis: Predicting Support for Bio-
technology Across National Cultures As a Function of Trust in Actors, 23 RISK ANALYSIS 751, 757 
(2003) (reporting that less than seven percent of the country-by-country variance in biotechnology 
opinion poll results can be explained by differences in the degree of citizen knowledge). 
 39 JULIAN MORRIS, GREEN GOODS? CONSUMERS, PRODUCT LABELS AND THE ENVIRON-
MENT 98 (Inst. of Econ. Affairs, Studies on the Environment No. 8, 1997); see also Aaditya 
Mattoo & Harsha V. Singh, Eco-Labelling, the Environment and International Trade, in ECO-
LABELLING AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 37, 39 (Simonetta Zarrilli et al. eds., 1997) [hereinafter 
ECO-LABELLING] (demonstrating that under certain plausible market structure assumptions, en-
vironmental labeling campaigns may increase sales of both environmentally friendly and un-
friendly products); Peter S. Menell, Structuring a Market-Oriented Federal Eco-Information Pol-
icy, 54 MD. L. REV. 1435, 1445 (1995) (raising doubts about the efficacy of unregulated 
environmental labeling in light of “consumers’ generally naïve understanding of the environment, 
the lack of clear standards regarding the relationship between human activities and the environ-
ment, and the difficulty of verifying many environmental claims” (footnote omitted)). 
 40 See HÅKAN NÖRDSTROM & SCOTT VAUGHAN, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT 3 (WTO, Spe-
cial Studies No. 4, 1999) (arguing that “tackling [environmental] problems by targeting some indi-
rect linkage, such as imports or exports, may divert attention from the underlying problems” and 
that “[i]n some cases, putative trade remedies may even aggravate the problems”); Brian R. Cope-
land & M. Scott Taylor, Trade, Growth, and the Environment, 42 J. ECON. LITERATURE 7, 67 
(2004) (arguing that restrictions on imports from developing countries may have negative envi-
ronmental effects by lowering incomes in developing nations, by reducing the value of natural 
resources, or by prompting the adoption of “an even dirtier slate of production”). 
 41 See, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati, Afterword: The Question of Linkage, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 126, 132 
(2002) (arguing that the mere threat of a ban on products using child labor “led to the discharge of 
female children [in the textile industry], who were often forced instead into prostitution by desti-
tute parents”).  Similar arguments have been made regarding the use of “sweatshop-free” labeling 
to enable consumers to avoid products made under working conditions that are deemed objec-
tionable by certifying bodies.  See DRUSILLA K. BROWN ET AL., THE EFFECTS OF 
MULTINATIONAL PRODUCTION ON WAGES AND WORKING CONDITIONS IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 21 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9669, 2003) (“There is a real 
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This belief that process preferences lead to unintended or self-
defeating consequences is driven by two underlying concerns.  First, 
scholars and lawmakers worry that individuals are ill-positioned to 
recognize and resolve the tradeoffs entailed by modern production 
processes in a globally integrated, technology-rich economy.  Given 
their inexpertise and the paucity of information available to them, as 
well as the psychological tendencies that hinder their ability to assess 
information that is made available to them,42 individual consumers are 
believed to make especially unreliable evaluations of process-related 
issues such as the propriety of GM agriculture.  Second, and perhaps 
more importantly, proponents of the process/product distinction worry 
that individuals are vulnerable to exploitation by factions that ma-
nipulate process-related concerns in service of their private interests.  
For instance, consumers may readily fall victim to cascade-like social 
reactions, in which the vocal concerns of a few interested activists give 
rise to unfounded, self-escalating public fears over stigmatized produc-
tion processes.43  Industrial interests similarly may capitalize on public 
fears in order to achieve protectionist goals through facially nondis-
criminatory environmental, health, and safety regulations.44 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
danger therefore that well-intentioned efforts to raise the wages and working conditions of work-
ers in developing countries may work to the detriment of these workers and their families.”). 
 42 For an important work surveying cognitive and social psychological research relating to risk 
perception and examining the legal implications of individuals’ tendency to neglect probabilistic 
information in favor of more emotionally charged reactions to risk, see Cass R. Sunstein, Prob-
ability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61 (2002); see also Cass R. Sun-
stein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059, 1059 (2000) (arguing that a 
technocratic approach to risk regulation such as cost-benefit analysis “is most plausibly justi-
fied . . . as a way of counteracting predictable problems in individual and social cognition”); Sun-
stein, supra note 19, at 1123 (using psychological evidence of how individuals perceive and proc-
ess risk information to conclude that “sensible policymakers should generally follow science and 
evidence, not the public”). 
 43 See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. 
L. REV. 683, 685 (1999) (arguing that exploitation by interest groups of cognitive heuristics might 
lead to “mass delusions” and demands for “wasteful or even detrimental laws and policies”).  In a 
recent opinion, Justice Breyer similarly worried that “a purely ideological plaintiff” might wage a 
“political battle” through litigation if a California consumer protection statute were applied to 
process representations by product manufacturers without stringent constitutional safeguards.  
See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554, 2567 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the dismissal of 
certiorari); see also infra pp. 613–14.  In an especially nuanced variation of this concern, Howard 
Chang notes that while a comprehensive welfare analysis must account for the disutility caused 
by individuals’ fears — even if scientifically unfounded — it also should consider the risk that 
governmental acknowledgment of such fears might exacerbate the incentive of interest groups to 
whip up further unfounded public concerns.  See Howard F. Chang, Risk Regulation, Endogenous 
Public Concerns, and the Hormones Dispute: Nothing To Fear But Fear Itself?, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 
743, 761–62 (2004). 
 44 See Gustavo Grunbaum, Dispute Settlement and U.S. Environmental Laws, in THE 
GREENING OF TRADE LAW: INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
ISSUES 51, 51 (Richard H. Steinberg ed., 2002) (describing the “success, increasing importance, 
and mechanics of Baptist-bootlegger coalitions of environmental nongovernmental organiza-
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In light of these concerns, the process/product distinction has 
emerged in several distinct legal areas as a mechanism for protecting 
consumers from costly error and for reducing the harmful effects of in-
terest-group manipulation.  Specifically, the distinction has been em-
ployed in (1) international trade negotiations, as member nations of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor in-
stitution, the World Trade Organization (WTO), have struggled to de-
termine the extent to which foreign product imports may be condi-
tioned on compliance with domestic regulatory standards for processes 
and production methods; (2) U.S. regulation of GM organisms, which 
has maintained that “biotechnology should not be regulated as a proc-
ess, but rather that the products of biotechnology should be regulated 
in the same way as products of other technologies”;45 and (3) the de-
velopment of a constitutional free speech position that regards con-
sumer process preferences as insufficient either to support mandatory 
state disclosure rules concerning process information or to subject vol-
untary manufacturer speech regarding processes to conventional ad-
vertising regulation.  Together, these developments suggest a narrow-
ing sphere of authority for individuals within the framework of market 
liberalism: consumers remain sovereign with regard to products, but in 
an era of profound market complexity and interest-group politics, gov-
ernments must regulate processes according to science and other tech-
nical considerations, excluding the demands of consumers. 
A.  International Trade and “Products As Such” 
Among legal academics, the most widely discussed modern articu-
lation of the process/product distinction comes from the 1991 GATT 
Tuna/Dolphin dispute panel report, which examined the permissibility 
of U.S. import restrictions on tuna producers that failed to comply 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
tions . . . and industry in promoting U.S. environmental laws that also act as import restrictions”); 
John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 
521–25 (2000) (providing an overview of protectionist political influences in domestic policymak-
ing); Richard W. Parker, The Case for Environmental Trade Sanctions, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 21, 
28 (2001) (noting that “the danger of abuse” of environmental trade sanctions for protectionist 
purposes “appears to be generic”); Kal Raustiala, Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1 CHI. J. INT’L 
L. 401, 415 (2000) (finding “a certain truth” to the application of the Baptist-bootleggers metaphor 
to environmental trade measures); David G. Victor, The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement of 
the World Trade Organization: An Assessment After Five Years, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 865, 
922 (2000) (describing a “coalition of consumer and protectionist interests” supporting the Euro-
pean import ban on hormone-treated beef).  But see Copeland & Taylor, supra note 40, at 59–60 
(noting that “environmental policy is less effective and more costly” than alternative instruments 
for distorting trade to benefit domestic industries). 
 45 Thomas O. McGarity, Seeds of Distrust: Federal Regulation of Genetically Modified Foods, 
35 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 403, 431 (2002) (quoting COMM. ON GENETICALLY MODIFIED PEST-
PROTECTED PLANTS, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, GENETICALLY MODIFIED PEST-PROTECTED 
PLANTS: SCIENCE AND REGULATION 22, 26 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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with the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA).46  Although 
the panel’s ruling was never adopted by the relevant countries and 
therefore enjoys only limited jurisprudential force, the process/product 
distinction that it announced has become a subject of intense debate 
among member nations of the WTO.  On the one hand, as John Jack-
son notes, “[t]rade policy experts are concerned that if a nation is al-
lowed to use [a] process characteristic as the basis for trade-restrictive 
measures, then the result would be to open a Pandora’s box of prob-
lems that could open large loopholes in the GATT.”47  On the other 
hand, most commentators recognize that process-based trade measures 
also are capable of expressing well-grounded and sincerely held con-
cerns of consumers, such that restricting their use would prevent not 
only disguised protectionism, but also a host of legitimate democratic 
aims.  Caught between these seemingly irreconcilable concerns, the in-
ternational legal status of domestic efforts to support the satisfaction of 
process preferences remains in doubt. 
1.  Process-Based Trade Measures Under GATT/WTO Jurispru-
dence. — Although the history of international trade reveals many ex-
amples of trade restrictions based on the manner in which foreign 
goods are produced,48 in recent years the legitimacy of such measures 
has come under intense scrutiny.  Controversy has been sparked 
chiefly by the Tuna/Dolphin panel’s response to Mexico’s challenge to 
a U.S. ban on imports of Mexican yellowfin tuna under the MMPA.49  
In this dispute, Mexico had failed to obtain U.S. certification that the 
harvesting methods of its tuna industry resulted in an incidental dol-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 46 Panel Report, United States — Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991), 
GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993) [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin I]; see also General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Im-
ports of Tuna, 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994).  Although the GATT/WTO regime has provided the most 
prominent articulation, the process/product distinction also has appeared in other trade agree-
ments.  See Marc R. Poirier, The NAFTA Chapter 11 Expropriation Debate Through the Eyes of a 
Property Theorist, 33 ENVTL. L. 851, 863 n.47 (2003) (noting that, under the North American Free 
Trade Agreement, “an importing country may not impose restrictions based on the way a good 
was manufactured in another country”). 
 47 John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?, 
49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1227, 1243 (1992); see also Gen. Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Trade 
and the Environment, at http://www.ciesin.org/docs/008-082/008-082.html (1992) (“Changing the 
world trading rules so as to permit the suspension of trading rights of others by individual con-
tracting parties, based simply on the unilateral and extra-territorial assertion of their environ-
mental priorities, . . . [would risk] a big step down a slippery slope.”). 
 48 See Steve Charnovitz, Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade: Defogging the Debate, 27 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 459, 493–98 (1994) (providing a thorough history of environmentally moti-
vated unilateral trade measures, many of which restrict goods based on their methods of manu-
facture); Alan Isaac Zreczny, The Process/Product Distinction and the Tuna/Dolphin Controversy: 
Greening the GATT Through International Agreement, 1 BUFF. J. INT’L L. 79, 120 (1994) (describ-
ing a 1906 convention, a 1911 treaty, and a 1921 regional agreement, all regarding the regulation 
of production processes). 
 49 See Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 46, at 156–60. 
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phin kill rate comparable to that of the U.S. tuna industry.50  Such cer-
tification was required under the MMPA, which established a morato-
rium on the taking and importation of marine mammals and marine 
mammal products, with only limited exceptions.51 
The MMPA trade provisions discriminated in practice against for-
eign producers, most notably by defining the permissible level of inci-
dental dolphin mortality in a manner that prevented advance planning 
by foreign fishing interests.52  Nevertheless, the GATT dispute panel 
chose to rest its ruling on a much broader ground: it found that be-
cause the MMPA import restriction did not regulate “products as 
such,” it did not constitute an internal product regulation that could be 
analyzed and accepted under Article III of the GATT,53 which prohib-
its domestic product regulations that discriminate between “like prod-
ucts” of domestic and foreign origin.54  The United States had argued 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 50 See id. at 156–58. 
 51 Id. at 156; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (2000) (listing statutory exceptions).   
 52 See Richard W. Parker, The Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage To Protect the Global Com-
mons: What We Can Learn from the Tuna/Dolphin Conflict, 12 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 
112–20 (1999).  Perhaps for this reason, the executive branch of the United States had been reluc-
tant to enforce the import ban provisions of the MMPA.  Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit forced 
its hand with a decision upholding a court-imposed injunction against U.S. importation of tuna 
from Mexico.  See Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 929 F.2d 1449, 1453 (9th Cir. 1991), aff’g 746 F. 
Supp. 964 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (finding that the U.S. Secretary of Commerce had not certified that 
Mexico complied with MMPA incidental takings standards, and imposing an injunction against 
importation of yellowfin tuna from Mexico). 
 53 Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 46, at 195. 
 54 Article III provides in part: 
 1.  The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges, 
and laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, pur-
chase, transportation, distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative regula-
tions requiring the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or pro-
portions, should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford 
protection to domestic production.  
   . . . . 
 4.  The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory 
of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that 
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and re-
quirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, dis-
tribution, or use. 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. III, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 
[hereinafter GATT].  Product “likeness” under this Article conventionally involves four criteria: 
the properties, nature, and quality of the products; the products’ end uses in a given market; con-
sumers’ tastes and habits; and international tariff classifications.  See Appellate Body Report, 
European Communities — Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products para. 
85, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter Appellate Body Asbestos Report].  The Appel-
late Body Asbestos Report, however, indicated that other relevant criteria, such as direct health or 
safety risks posed by a product, also may be considered.  Id. paras. 149–54.  Additionally, some 
panels in the past have treated the “likeness” determination as primarily a question of whether the 
products at issue are “directly competitive or substitutable.”  Panel Report, Japan — Customs Du-
ties, Taxes and Labelling Practices on Imported Wines and Alcoholic Beverages, L/6216 (Nov. 10, 
1987), GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 83, 93 (1988).  For an insightful discussion of the “likeness” 
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for a more inclusive definition of “like products” under Article III, 
which would have permitted governments to make nonprotectionist 
distinctions among products based on production and processing 
methods.  Because the dispute panel believed that such process charac-
teristics “could not possibly affect tuna as a product,” the panel instead 
regarded the MMPA trade prohibition as an unadorned ban on tuna 
imports simply because they came from Mexico.55 
Nor did the Tuna/Dolphin panel believe that the MMPA import 
provisions could be justified under the general exceptions clause of Ar-
ticle XX of the GATT, which authorizes otherwise impermissible trade 
restrictions when they are “necessary to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health” or “relat[e] to the conservation of exhaustible natu-
ral resources.”56  In the panel’s view, the general exceptions clause did 
not apply to trade measures apparently designed to influence “extra-
jurisdictional” practices.57  Because process-based trade measures ap-
pear, almost inherently, to seek transformation of conditions outside 
the importing nation’s territory, the panel’s reasoning seemed to render 
such measures irretrievably suspect under the GATT.  Indeed, follow-
ing the Tuna/Dolphin ruling, trade specialists widely accepted the view 
that the GATT disallows product importation regulations not directly 
related to physical or other tangible characteristics of a product.58 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
determination and the many complexities that it raises, see Robert E. Hudec, “Like Product”: The 
Differences in Meaning in GATT Articles I and III, in REGULATORY BARRIERS AND THE 
PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE LAW 101 (Thomas Cottier & Petros C. 
Mavroidis eds., 2000). 
 55 See Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 46, at 195.  Accordingly, the panel believed that the U.S. 
regulation constituted a simple quantitative restriction on importation that was impermissible 
under Article XI.  See id.  Article XI seeks to eliminate quantitative trade restrictions in general: 
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made 
effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted 
or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the terri-
tory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any prod-
uct destined for the territory of any other contracting party. 
GATT, supra note 54, art. XI, para. 1.  This distinction is critical because, under an interpretive 
note to Article III, GATT member nations have agreed that product measures applying to domes-
tic and imported “like products” are to be analyzed only under Article III and its national treat-
ment requirements.  See John H. Knox, The Judicial Resolution of Conflicts Between Trade and 
the Environment, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 6 (2004).  By excluding process-based distinctions 
from a consideration of the “likeness” of various products, the Tuna/Dolphin panel effectively 
condemned process-based trade measures as per se violations of Article XI that must be justified, 
if at all, under the exacting provisions of Article XX. 
 56 GATT, supra note 54, art. XX(b), (g). 
 57 See Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 46, at 198–200. 
 58 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 12, at 27 (asserting that “[p]resent 
trading rules do not allow one country to use trade measures for the purpose of unilaterally en-
forcing its own environmental preferences or requirements on other countries in cases where the 
production externality has no spill-over effects”); Jagdish Bhagwati, After Seattle: Free Trade and 
the WTO, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM 
AT THE MILLENNIUM 50, 60–61 (Roger B. Porter et al. eds., 2001) (noting “long-standing jurispru-
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Notwithstanding this apparent consensus, numerous academic 
commentators criticized the process/product distinction as conceptually 
flawed,59 and nongovernmental organizations excoriated it as an em-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
dence on process and production methods” that regarded such methods as unlawful); James Cam-
eron & Karen Campbell, A Reluctant Global Policymaker, in THE GREENING OF TRADE LAW: 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, supra note 44, at 23, 41 
(“[C]urrent WTO doctrine does not permit considering the means by which a product is made to 
distinguish between products and to determine whether they are ‘like products.’”); Alicia Morris 
Groos, International Trade and Development: Exploring the Impact of Fair Trade Organizations in 
the Global Economy and the Law, 34 TEX. INT’L L.J. 379, 408 (1999) (stating that “WTO rules 
mandate that goods cannot be subject to statutory labeling requirements or differentiated on the 
basis of how they are produced”); Robert E. Hudec, GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regula-
tion: Requiem for an “Aim and Effects” Test, 32 INT’L LAW. 619, 624 (1998) [hereinafter Hudec, 
GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation] (noting that “product distinctions based on 
characteristics of the production process, or of the producer, that are not determinants of product 
characteristics are simply viewed as a priori illegitimate”); Robert E. Hudec, The Product-Process 
Doctrine in GATT/WTO Jurisprudence, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JOHN H. JACKSON 187, 187 (Marco Bronckers & Reinhard Quick 
eds., 2000) (noting that “the effect of [the process/product] doctrine was to make it prima facie 
GATT-illegal for governments to impose tax or regulatory disadvantages on imported products 
because of the way they were produced — except where the manner of production had some im-
pact on the characteristics of the product itself”); Tanyarat Mungkalarungsi, The Trade and Envi-
ronment Debate, 10 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 361, 370 (2002) (claiming that “[p]roduct distinc-
tions based on characteristics of the production process or of the producer that are not 
determinants of product characteristics are viewed as illegitimate”); Peter W.B. Phillips & William 
A. Kerr, Alternative Paradigms: The WTO Versus the Biosafety Protocol for Trade in Genetically 
Modified Organisms, J. WORLD TRADE, Aug. 2002, at 63, 70 (“The WTO does not allow trade 
barriers to be put in place on the basis of production and processing methods.  Only product 
characteristics can be used.”); see also Steve Charnovitz, Environmental Harmonization and Trade 
Policy, in TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLICY 267, 280 (Durwood 
Zaelke et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT] (observing that “[i]t is 
dogma in trade policy circles that unilateral import standards should relate to products only — 
not processes”); Steve Charnovitz, The Law of Environmental “PPMs” in the WTO: Debunking 
the Myth of Illegality, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 59, 76–77 (2002) (gathering quotations from commenta-
tors indicating widespread belief in the view that “WTO rules do not permit importing govern-
ments to make distinctions based on the production process”); Robert Howse & Donald Regan, 
The Product/Process Distinction — An Illusory Basis for Disciplining ‘Unilateralism’ in Trade 
Policy, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 249, 251 (2000) (noting that “it is widely thought that all process-based 
measures not directly related to physical characteristics of the product itself are prima facie viola-
tions of GATT”). 
 59 See, e.g., DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE 
FUTURE 134 (1994) (urging departure from the process/product distinction); Steve Charnovitz, 
Green Roots, Bad Pruning: GATT Rules and Their Application to Environmental Trade Measures, 
7 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 299, 320 (1994) (arguing that the Tuna/Dolphin ruling was “seriously flawed”); 
Steve Charnovitz, Solving the Production and Processing Methods (PPMs) Puzzle, in THE 
EARTHSCAN READER ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 229, 250 
(Kevin P. Gallagher & Jacob Werksman eds., 2002) (arguing that the process/product distinction in 
international trade law “has prevented a reasoned discourse about how to distinguish appropriate 
from inappropriate [regulations aimed at processes and production methods]”); Ilona Cheyne, En-
vironmental Unilateralism and the WTO/GATT System, 24 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 433, 450 
(1995) (arguing that the concept of “‘products as such’ . . . imposes an inappropriately narrow 
limitation and unnecessarily excludes unilateral measures”); David Pearce, The Greening of the 
GATT: Some Economic Considerations, in 1 TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE SEARCH FOR 
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blem of the international trading regime’s alleged disregard for public 
concerns such as environmental protection, labor standards, or human 
rights.60  Believing that the doctrine would not hold in the wake of this 
mounting criticism,61 a number of commentators offered theoretical 
and textual exit strategies for future dispute settlement panels.  Several 
scholars, for instance, formulated more or less elaborate typologies of 
process-based trade measures, hoping to isolate those measures that 
are most susceptible to abuse as protectionist devices, and therefore 
most in need of the exacting scrutiny applied in Tuna/Dolphin.62  Oth-
ers argued, as the United States had in the original Tuna/Dolphin dis-
pute, that the GATT should not subject process-based regulations to 
stricter scrutiny than it does to other product regulations, and therefore 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
BALANCE 20, 28–29 (James Cameron et al. eds., 1994) (criticizing Tuna/Dolphin I on the ground 
that both products and production methods can cause negative externalities in the form of envi-
ronmental damage in the exporting country and welfare loss in the importing country); see also 
Douglas J. Caldwell & David A. Wirth, Trade and the Environment: Equilibrium or Imbalance?, 
17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 563, 573 (1996) (observing widespread agreement that the process/product 
distinction is problematic and arguing that “[t]he level of consensus among these authors on this 
important question appears to be sufficiently widespread that policymakers might well take 
note”). 
 60 See Robert Howse, The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal 
Baseline for the Trade and Environment Debate, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 491, 494 (2002) (“[A]fter 
Tuna/Dolphin, environmentalists — and others with concerns about how the trading system bal-
ances competing values — saw the GATT as a regime dedicated to the triumph of free trade over 
all other human concerns.”). 
 61 See John H. Jackson, The Limits of International Trade: Workers’ Protection, the Environ-
ment and Other Human Rights, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 222, 224 (2000) (“[T]he product-
process distinction will probably not survive and perhaps should not survive.”). 
 62 See, e.g., ESTY, supra note 59, at 121–22 (describing, in descending order of urgency and 
legitimacy, a hierarchy of environmental measures aimed at curtailing activity that generates, 
from environmental effects within a country’s own borders, to transboundary effects originating 
abroad but causing harm within a country’s borders, to effects that cause harm to the atmosphere, 
oceans, or other aspects of the global commons, to effects that occur purely within a foreign coun-
try’s borders); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 12, at 15–16 (classifying non–
product-related PPMs by the character of the harm against which they are directed, including 
transboundary pollution, effects on the management of transboundary living resources, global 
environmental concerns, and effects limited to the territory of the exporting country); Charnovitz, 
The Law of Environmental “PPMs” in the WTO: Debunking the Myth of Illegality, supra note 58, 
at 67–69 (distinguishing between “how-produced,” “government policy,” and “producer character-
istics” process-based trade measures and arguing that “how-produced” measures are the least sus-
ceptible to abuse); Sanford E. Gaines, Processes and Production Methods: How to Produce Sound 
Policy for Environmental PPM-Based Trade Measures?, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 383, 390 (2002) 
(distinguishing among “product regulations,” which target “the design, characteristics, and uses of 
particular products”; “resource access regulations,” which govern the manner and extent to which 
publicly owned resources such as timber and minerals may be extracted; and “PPM regulations,” 
which set standards for the environmental impact of production facilities and processes); Henry L. 
Thaggert, A Closer Look at the Tuna-Dolphin Case: “Like Products” and “Extrajurisdictionality” 
in the Trade and Environment Context, in 1 TRADE & THE ENVIRONMENT: THE SEARCH FOR 
BALANCE, supra note 59, at 69, 82 (arguing that nondiscriminatory environmental regulations 
should be valid if they target activity causing harm to the domestic environment, the global com-
mons, or a migratory species that passes through the domestic jurisdiction). 
546 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 118:525  
that the Article III “like products” analysis should include process 
characteristics.63 
Although much uncertainty still clouds the debate over process-
based trade measures, one nevertheless can state with confidence that 
the Tuna/Dolphin dispute would be analyzed differently today.  Most 
notably, the Appellate Body of the WTO appears to have rejected the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 63 See, e.g., Christopher A. Cherry, Comment, Environmental Regulation Within the GATT 
Regime: A New Definition of “Product”, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1061, 1093, 1096–98 (1993) (arguing 
that the notion of “product” in Article III should encompass the entire history of a product’s 
manufacture, consumption, and disposal); Michael C. Strauss, The Logic of Accommodating 
Process-Based Environmental Trade Measures Within the GATT: Welfare Principles from Law & 
Economics 21 (Aug. 30, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Li-
brary) (arguing in favor of the notion of “the ‘essential’ product,” which acknowledges that “the 
production and consumption of [a] product tangibly [a]ffect [people’s] lives at the point of produc-
tion, the point of consumption and between”), available at http://www.stanford.edu/group/rats/ 
wtoPaper.html; see also Thaggert, supra note 62, at 72–73 (arguing that there is evidence in the 
drafting history of the GATT to suggest that “otherwise like products may be deemed ‘unlike’ 
based upon differences in production”). 
  In a particularly well-crafted version of the “like products” argument, Robert Howse and 
Donald Regan argue that “[i]f we assign ‘like’ its ordinary meaning in context, ‘not differing in 
any respect relevant to an actual non-protectionist regulatory policy’, then physically identical 
products that differ only in their processing histories may be ‘unlike’, because the processing dif-
ferences may be relevant to such a policy.”  Howse & Regan, supra note 58, at 261.  Accordingly, if 
one views dolphin-safe and dolphin-unsafe tuna as “unlike” products based on their different 
processing histories, then the MMPA’s import provisions come to resemble a pairing of two dis-
tinct nondiscriminatory internal product regulations — one that applies to all dolphin-safe tuna, 
irrespective of origin, and one that applies to all dolphin-unsafe tuna, again irrespective of origin.  
Howse and Regan’s argument, however, has been criticized for downplaying the greater risk of 
disguised protectionism posed by process-based trade measures, as opposed to product-based 
measures.  See Gaines, supra note 62, at 426 (“Trade policymakers are known for their hard-bitten 
skepticism that environmental protections are just an excuse for ‘green’ protectionism and dis-
crimination.  The realism deficit in environmental terms of the Howse/Regan [analysis] . . . means 
that their policy prescriptions fall short of the level of security and predictability that trade policy 
demands against subterfuge and deceit.”); John H. Jackson, Comments on Shrimp/Turtle and the 
Product/Process Distinction, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 303, 304 (2000) (“With respect to the prod-
uct/process problem, the issue is not so much whether this distinction can be justified in all con-
texts . . . , but rather how to develop some constraints on the potential misuse of process-oriented 
trade barriers . . . .”).  Moreover, even if Howse and Regan are correct that the Tuna/Dolphin 
panel fashioned the process/product distinction without an adequate textual basis, it is difficult to 
put the genie back in the bottle.  Some trade advocates appear to believe that, whether or not the 
process/product distinction exists as a matter of formal trade doctrine, it will continue to exist as a 
matter of practice.  See Charnovitz, The Law of Environmental “PPMs” in the WTO: Debunking 
the Myth of Illegality, supra note 58, at 91–92 (“Whatever the validity of [Howse and Regan’s] 
legal analysis, any optimism that future WTO panels will tolerate origin-neutral PPMs in the con-
text of Article III would be unfounded.”); Gaines, supra note 62, at 405 (noting the position of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) that “[p]resent trading rules 
do not allow one country to use trade measures for the purpose of unilaterally enforcing its own 
environmental preferences or requirements on other countries . . . where the production external-
ity has no spill-over effects,” and arguing that the position is “an accurate statement of current 
WTO practice and sentiment” even if not “an accurate statement of WTO law” (second alteration 
in original) (quoting ORG. OF ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., supra note 12, at 27) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
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view that the process/product distinction gives rise to a per se ban on 
process-based trade measures.  In two decisions regarding the permis-
sibility of certain U.S. trade restrictions designed to protect endangered 
turtle species that may be harmed by shrimp harvesting,64 the Appel-
late Body made clear that process-based trade measures are eligible for 
salvation under Article XX under appropriate circumstances.  As long 
as the importing nation has a “sufficient nexus” with the environ-
mental ill targeted by the measure, the measure is “not disproportion-
ately wide in its scope and reach,” the “means and ends relationship” 
between the measure and its espoused policy goal is “close and  
real,” and certain other conditions are satisfied, the Appellate Body 
appears prepared to accept that the GATT permits process-based trade 
measures.65 
The Shrimp/Turtle rulings do not disturb previous GATT jurispru-
dence or commentary regarding the coverage of Article III.  Thus, be-
cause process-based trade measures still must qualify for exceptional 
treatment under Article XX and are not analyzed as internal product 
regulations under Article III, the process/product distinction survives 
in modified form within international trade law.  This continuing ef-
fect of the distinction is significant because, as Sanford Gaines has 
emphasized, Article XX tends to be read stringently in the context of 
environmental trade measures.66  In particular, nations defending 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 64 Appellate Body Report, United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp/Turtle I]; Appellate Body Report, 
United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 
21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001) [hereinafter Shrimp/Turtle II]. 
 65 Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 64, at paras. 133, 141.  The other conditions are described be-
low, see infra pp. 549–51.  As Robert Howse notes, the Appellate Body avoided deciding whether 
an actual territorial nexus was needed by noting that the endangered turtles targeted by U.S. im-
port restrictions migrate at one time or another through U.S. territorial waters.  See Howse, supra 
note 60, at 504.  In Howse’s view, the nexus requirement likely will serve in future WTO rulings 
to prohibit process-based trade measures when the targeted process or condition does not exist in 
the importing nation and therefore does not require a comparable domestic restriction.  See id. 
(arguing that “it should be sufficient, as required by the text of Article XX(g), that the U.S. meas-
ure was even-handed, imposing a conservation burden on its own producers and consumers, and 
not merely attempting to externalize the costs of environmental protection to the producers of 
other countries”).  Austria provided a well-known example of such an asymmetric, process-based 
trade restriction in the early 1990s when it attempted to ban the importation of tropical timber 
products that had not been sustainably harvested.  See Atsuko Okubo, Environmental Labeling 
Programs and the GATT/WTO Regime, 11 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 599, 611–12 (1999).  Be-
cause Austria lacked a tropical forest of its own to conserve, developing nations argued that such 
actions were impermissibly discriminatory.  See id. at 612. 
 66 See Sanford Gaines, The WTO’s Reading of the GATT Article XX Chapeau: A Disguised Re-
striction on Environmental Measures, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 739, 743–44 (2001); see also 
Donald M. McRae, GATT Article XX and the WTO Appellate Body, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JOHN H. JACKSON, supra note 58, at 
219, 230 (noting interpretive decisions that “have led the Appellate Body to adopt a restrictive 
approach to . . . the chapeau — an approach that results in a very limited role for the Article XX 
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process-based regulations must show that the challenged regulation fits 
within one of Article XX’s enumerated exceptions and that the regula-
tion passes muster under Article XX’s prefatory “chapeau.”67  Thus, 
the process/product distinction still poses a serious obstacle to process-
based trade measures, even if they are not per se impermissible follow-
ing the Shrimp/Turtle rulings.68 
2.  The Special Case of Product Labeling. — Frequently lost amidst 
the furor over the Tuna/Dolphin ruling is the fact that the panel had 
no difficulty at all with the United States’ labeling program for dol-
phin-safe tuna.  Under the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
exceptions”); Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection of the Environment: 
The Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 268, 277 (1997) (noting that the 
stringent interpretation of “necessary” under Article XX(b) “constitutes too great an infringement 
on the sovereign powers of states to take decisions (one hopes) by democratic means so as to solve 
problems and satisfy their constituents”); David A. Wirth, International Trade Agreements: Vehi-
cles for Regulatory Reform?, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 331, 336 (noting that Article XX paragraphs 
(b) and (g) have been “interpreted rather restrictively”). 
 67 See ARTHUR EDMOND APPLETON, ENVIRONMENTAL LABELLING PROGRAMMES: 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW IMPLICATIONS 162 (1997).  The Article XX chapeau requires that 
trade restrictions “are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised 
restriction on international trade.”  GATT, supra note 54, art. XX. 
 68 See Hudec, The Product-Process Doctrine in GATT/WTO Jurisprudence, supra note 58, at 
188 (observing that “the product-process doctrine still remains a potentially lethal threat to proc-
ess-based regulation”).  Perhaps seeking to strike a final blow to the process/product distinction, 
Howse recently has pointed to language in the Appellate Body Asbestos Report that suggests both 
that the definition of “like products” should encompass a wide variety of characteristics, including 
nonphysical ones, and that the analysis under Article III should take account of subcategories of 
products, even when they are otherwise determined to be “like” products on a more general level.  
See Howse, supra note 60, at 515–16 (citing and discussing Appellate Body Asbestos Report, supra 
note 54).  Based on these two interpretive points, Howse argues that future dispute settlement 
panels might choose to characterize an MMPA-type trade restriction as an internal product regu-
lation affecting turtle-friendly and turtle-unfriendly shrimp in a manner that is “no less favorable” 
to foreign producers as a group.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The process-based trade 
restriction therefore would be treated no differently from a product-based one, and the proc-
ess/product distinction would all but disappear from international trade law.  Id. 
  Other commentators are skeptical of Howse’s argument.  They point chiefly to the fact that, 
because the health risks posed by asbestos include threats to product users themselves, France’s 
trade measure banning the importation of asbestos-containing products clearly can be character-
ized as a product-focused regulation, rather than a process-focused one.  See Gaines, supra note 
62, at 418; Manoj Joshi, Are Eco-Labels Consistent with World Trade Organization Agreements?, 
38 J. WORLD TRADE 69, 77 (2004).  Whether the Appellate Body would be similarly generous in 
the context of a purely process-based trade measure, these critics point out, is a far less certain 
proposition.  See Gaines, supra note 62, at 418 (noting that “[i]t is one thing to argue that two 
slightly different products with similar characteristics and uses might nevertheless be different, as 
the Appellate Body did in the EC-Asbestos case,” but that “[i]t is altogether a different matter to 
propose . . . that physically indistinguishable products might nevertheless be treated as not ‘like’ 
based only on the circumstances of their manufacture”); Joshi, supra, at 77 (noting that, although 
the Appellate Body Asbestos Report may have “left the field open for interpretation in future 
cases[,] . . . as of now there has been no case of a Panel finding two products unlike merely based 
on [process characteristics that do not tangibly affect the end product]”). 
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Act (DPCIA),69 both foreign and domestic producers are prohibited 
from using the term “dolphin safe” or its equivalent on tuna packaging 
if their product is harvested using driftnets, purse seine nets, or other 
processes likely to injure or kill dolphins.70  Additionally, DPCIA di-
rects the Secretary of Commerce to establish “an official mark that 
may be used to label tuna products as dolphin safe” in accordance 
with federal guidelines.71  In rather sharp contrast to its ruling with 
regard to the MMPA, the Tuna/Dolphin panel found the U.S. “dolphin 
safe” labeling regulations to be consistent with the GATT.72  Notably, 
the panel rested its ruling on the fact that “[a]ny advantage which 
might possibly result from access to this label depends on the free 
choice by consumers to give preference to tuna carrying the ‘Dolphin 
Safe’ label.”73 
Notwithstanding the Tuna/Dolphin panel’s acceptance of the 
DPCIA program, many commentators in the years following the report 
have viewed both voluntary and mandatory government labeling pro-
grams as illegal, or at least vulnerable, under the GATT if they are 
premised on environmental or other process-related conditions.74  To 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 69 16 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000). 
 70 16 U.S.C.A. § 1385(d)(1) (West Supp. 2004).  In the case of purse seine nets and other har-
vesting methods “identified by the Secretary as having a regular and significant mortality or seri-
ous injury of dolphins,” producers still can use the “dolphin safe” label if they provide adequate 
assurance that “no dolphins were killed or seriously injured in the sets or other gear deployments 
in which the tuna were caught.”  Id. § 1385(d)(1)(D).  In 2002, the Secretary of Commerce decided 
to permit “dolphin safe” labeling for tuna harvested by purse seine netting in the Eastern Tropical 
Pacific.  Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals, 68 Fed. Reg. 2010, 2010–11 (Jan. 15, 2003).  
Critics attacked the regulation in court, charging that the Secretary’s action would contribute to 
significantly higher levels of dolphin mortality and was at odds with the terms of the DPCIA.  See 
Earth Island Inst. v. Evans, 256 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1068, 1075–76 (N.D. Cal. 2003).  In 2004, a fed-
eral district court agreed with the critics:  
[The administrative record] reflects an agency that (1) continued to drag its feet on con-
ducting critical mandated research, (2) continued to ignore the fact that the best scien-
tific evidence that was available, while not conclusive, pointed toward the fishery as the 
cause of the dolphins’ failure to recover as expected, and (3) compromised the integrity 
of its finding by allowing trade policy considerations to infect the decision-making proc-
ess. 
Earth Island Inst. v. Evans, No. C 03-0007 TEH, 2004 WL 1774221, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 
2004). 
 71 16 U.S.C.A. § 1385(d)(3)(A). 
 72 Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 46, at 204. 
 73 Id. at 203. 
 74 See Groos, supra note 58, at 408 (“WTO rules mandate that goods cannot be subject to 
statutory labeling requirements or differentiated on the basis of how they are produced . . . .”); 
Okubo, supra note 65, at 600 (“One thing that all environmental labeling schemes have in com-
mon . . . is their uncertain status in relation to free trade.”); see also Caldwell & Wirth, supra note 
59, at 588 (observing that “ecolabelling schemes” have become “a major flash point in the current 
debate” regarding trade and the environment); Erik P. Bartenhagen, Note, The Intersection of 
Trade and the Environment: An Examination of the Impact of the TBT Agreement on Ecolabeling 
Programs, 17 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 51, 68 (1997) (“[T]he current GATT regime creates much uncer-
tainty about the future viability of voluntary, PPM-based ecolabeling schemes.”). 
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complicate matters further, product labeling schemes also now must be 
evaluated in light of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement)75 and the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement),76 both of which were 
adopted as part of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations.  The SPS 
Agreement applies to all product regulations that are designed to pro-
tect human, animal, or plant life from “pests, diseases, disease-carrying 
organisms or disease-causing organisms,” or from “additives, contami-
nants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in food, beverages or feed-
stuffs.”77  The TBT Agreement covers all other mandatory or volun-
tary technical product standards.  In simple terms, one can think of 
the TBT and SPS Agreements as more detailed and precise elabora-
tions of the types of requirements that have been imposed within 
GATT jurisprudence through Article XX.78  It is important to note, 
however, that the two Agreements apply to product standards, regula-
tions, and procedures, whether or not such measures are alleged to dis-
criminate against imported products.  Thus, whereas previously coun-
tries did not violate GATT rules “as long as product standards [were] 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  The argument against mandatory labeling programs would be similar to the Tuna/Dolphin 
panel’s analysis of the MMPA import provisions: because process information does not affect a 
“product as such,” a national measure that blocked entry of unlabeled products would constitute a 
simple import ban that would have to be justified, if at all, under Article XX.  See APPLETON, 
supra note 67, at 161–62.  WTO panel members then might conclude that a voluntary labeling 
program provides a less trade-restrictive alternative to a mandatory system, rendering the latter 
program illegal under the Article XX chapeau.  Voluntary programs, however, might still be chal-
lenged as disguised restrictions on trade, particularly in those instances where there is dispute 
about scientific evidence relating to the harmfulness or significance of the process at issue or 
where the regulating jurisdiction lacks a strong connection to the process or condition that the 
measure targets.  See, e.g., Philip Bentley Q.C., A Re-Assessment of Article XX, Paragraphs (b) 
and (g) of GATT 1994 in the Light of Growing Consumer and Environmental Concern About Bio-
technology, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 107, 128–29 (2000) (arguing that voluntary use of non-GM 
labeling could create a barrier to trade unless an accompanying disclaimer informed consumers 
that “no significant difference has yet been shown between foods with and without GMOs” (quot-
ing C. Ford Runge & Lee Ann Jackson, Labelling, Trade and Genetically Modified Organisms — 
A Proposed Solution, 34 J. WORLD TRADE 111, 119 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Gaines, supra note 62, at 400 (characterizing certain PPM measures as “an effort by one country 
simply to impose its environmental norms extraterritorially on uninterested or unwilling foreign 
sovereigns”). 
 75 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO 
Agreement, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS — RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, vol. 27 
(1994), http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/15-sps.pdf [hereinafter SPS AGREEMENT]. 
 76 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, 
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS — RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, vol. 27 (1994), http://www.wto. 
org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt.pdf [hereinafter TBT AGREEMENT]. 
 77 SPS AGREEMENT, supra note 75, Annex A § 1(a), (b). 
 78 See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE 142–43 (2d ed. 1999) (stating that the TBT Agreement “is really a more expansive formu-
lation of Article XX”). 
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applied nondiscriminatorily,”79 now such standards must conform to 
the dictates of the TBT and SPS Agreements even when they are ap-
plied in a nondiscriminatory manner. 
Member states may challenge product labeling regulations under 
either the TBT or the SPS Agreement.  If the TBT Agreement gov-
erns, then such regulations must avoid imposing “unnecessary obsta-
cles to international trade” and must not be “more trade-restrictive 
than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective.”80  In addition, product 
regulations must be based on available international standards unless 
the regulating nation can show that such standards are “ineffective or 
inappropriate.”81  If the SPS Agreement applies, then regulations must 
be “based on scientific principles,” supported by “sufficient scientific 
evidence,” and applied “only to the extent necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health.”82  To fulfill this mandate, member na-
tions must either rely on international standards when establishing 
sanitary and phytosanitary regulations or defend their selection of a 
higher level of protection by identifying a “scientific justification” in 
accordance with risk assessment procedures.83  Finally, member na-
tions must “ensure that such measures are not more trade-restrictive 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 79 John J. Barceló III, Product Standards To Protect the Local Environment — the GATT and 
the Uruguay Round Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement, 27 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 755, 761 
(1994). 
 80 TBT AGREEMENT, supra note 76, art. 2.2.  The TBT Agreement governs voluntary product 
labeling regulations with slightly less stringency than it oversees mandatory regulations.  See 
Okubo, supra note 65, at 623.  This more relaxed standard, however, has not prevented the devel-
opment of doubt and controversy regarding the permissibility of voluntary process-related label-
ing programs under the Agreement.  See id. at 621 (noting “debate over whether voluntary envi-
ronmental labeling or eco-labeling acts as a de facto non-tariff trade barrier”).  In addition, there 
has been some confusion regarding whether the TBT Agreement reaches voluntary labeling 
schemes that target process-related information, as opposed to product-related information.  See 
Gaines, supra note 62, at 396–97 (noting that, due to a drafting ambiguity in the TBT Agreement, 
“there has been furious discussion but no consensus view within the WTO about how closely non-
mandatory PPM measures such as eco-labels must be ‘related’ to the product to fall within the 
scope of the TBT Agreement”).  Another interesting and potentially far-reaching aspect of the 
TBT Agreement is the requirement that nations supervise the design and implementation of even 
private, nongovernmental labeling programs.  See Okubo, supra note 65, at 633–34. 
 81 TBT AGREEMENT, supra note 76, art. 2.4.  Important sources of international standards 
include the Codex Alimentarius Commission for food safety, the International Office of Epizootics 
for animal health, and the International Plant Protection Convention for plant health.  See Steve 
Charnovitz, The Supervision of Health and Biosafety Regulation by World Trade Rules, 13 TUL. 
ENVTL. L.J. 271, 286 (2000).  In addition, although it is not strictly speaking an intergovernmental 
organization, the International Organization for Standardization provides another significant fo-
rum for devising consensus product standards.  See Wirth, supra note 66, at 347. 
 82 SPS AGREEMENT, supra note 75, art. 2.2.  The SPS Agreement creates an exception to this 
rule for cases in which scientific evidence is insufficient.  See id. art. 5.7.  In such cases, nations 
may adopt precautionary measures on a temporary basis, but these countries remain under an 
ongoing duty to revisit the state of scientific knowledge and the basis for precaution.  See id.   
 83 Id. arts. 3.3, 5. 
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than required to achieve their appropriate level of sanitary or phyto-
sanitary protection.”84 
Defenders of the SPS Agreement believe that it will enhance the 
quality of democratic deliberation by forcing countries explicitly to 
identify scientific and empirical support for their domestic policy 
choices.85  Others conclude, as Alan Sykes has, that the Agreement 
“unmistakably elevates the policing of trade restrictive measures above 
the ability of national governments to address risk in the face of scien-
tific uncertainty.”86  Whether the SPS Agreement and related aspects 
of GATT/WTO law truly promote democratic outcomes, rather than 
displace them, may well turn on the untested questions of whether and 
to what extent process-related labeling requirements are permissible 
under the SPS Agreement.  That is, even granting that the rules of the 
international trading system can improve “democratic rationality” by 
discouraging regulatory actions premised on “popular prejudice and 
alarm,”87 what is to be made of public concern that persists despite a 
lack of scientific evidence to support it?  In such situations, may gov-
ernments adopt labeling requirements as an intermediate position be-
tween, on the one hand, acceding to scientifically groundless policy 
demands and, on the other hand, ignoring altogether the sincerely ex-
pressed concerns of citizens?88  As the next section describes, no dis-
pute presents these questions in more stark or contentious form than 
the recently filed U.S. trade complaint over European regulation of 
GM foods.89 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 84 Id. arts. 5.5, 5.6. 
 85 See Robert Howse, Democracy, Science, and Free Trade: Risk Regulation on Trial at the 
World Trade Organization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2329, 2330 (2000) (“If rational deliberation is an im-
portant element in making democratic outcomes legitimate, then providing some role for scientific 
principles and evidence in the regulatory process may enhance, rather than undermine, democ-
ratic control of risk.”); cf. McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 44, at 577 (“An objective evidence 
requirement . . . would weaken the power of protectionist interest groups, thereby reinforcing do-
mestic democracy.”). 
 86 Alan O. Sykes, Domestic Regulation, Sovereignty, and Scientific Evidence Requirements: A 
Pessimistic View, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 353, 368 (2002); see also Vern R. Walker, Keeping the WTO 
from Becoming the “World Trans-science Organization”: Scientific Uncertainty, Science Policy, 
and Factfinding in the Growth Hormones Dispute, 31 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 251, 319 (1998) (con-
cluding that “[c]ases under the SPS Agreement implicate the momentous clash between the inter-
est in efficient international trade and the sovereign duty to protect health”). 
 87 Howse, supra note 85, at 2330, 2336. 
 88 See Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, supra note 42, at 101–
02 (describing the difficulty of evaluating appropriate governmental responses to “a quasi-rational 
public panic, based on an intense emotional reaction to a low-probability risk”). 
 89 During the long-festering trade dispute over Europe’s refusal to permit importation of U.S. 
meat due to the use of hormone treatment, Europe rejected an offer by the United States to settle 
the dispute by labeling U.S. meat exports.  See Sean D. Murphy, Does the World Need a New In-
ternational Environmental Court?, 32 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 333, 339 (2000) (noting 
that settlement discussions broke down over the precise wording of the proposed label); Michele 
D. Carter, Note, Selling Science Under the SPS Agreement: Accommodating Consumer Preference 
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B.  Genetic Engineering and “Substantial Equivalence” 
For close to ten thousand years, humankind has relied on hybridi-
zation and other methods of biotechnology to improve plants and ani-
mals for use in food production.90  More recently, however, geneticists 
have developed a cluster of bioengineering techniques that allow the 
introduction of desired traits into host species with a speed and flexi-
bility previously unknown to science.91  Many American consumers 
report that they oppose the use of these techniques in agricultural pro-
duction,92 and that they strongly support mandatory labeling of retail 
products derived from GM organisms.93  Nevertheless, industry esti-
mates suggest that as many as sixty percent of all processed food items 
on U.S. supermarket shelves contain undisclosed GM ingredients.94  
The manner in which this curious juxtaposition came about provides 
one of the most telling illustrations of the process/product distinction 
and its growing importance within government regulation of environ-
mental, health, and safety risks.95 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
in the Growth Hormones Controversy, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 625, 654 (1997).  Although such 
a compromise would have resolved “one of the longest running trade disputes in the modern trad-
ing system,” Sykes, supra note 86, at 358, it would not have shed light on the vexing questions 
whether and to what extent process-related labeling requirements are consistent with interna-
tional trade law in the absence of a voluntary settlement. 
 90 See CALESTOUS JUMA, THE GENE HUNTERS: BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE SCRAMBLE FOR 
SEEDS 108–09 (1989) (noting that agricultural biotechnology dates back at least to the use of fer-
mentation in 7000 BC).  According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, agricultural biotech-
nology consists of “a collection of scientific techniques . . . that are used to create, improve, or 
modify plants, animals, and microorganisms.”  U.S. Dep’t Agric., Biotechnology and U.S. Agricul-
tural Trade: Questions and Answers, at http://www.fas.usda.gov/itp/biotech/Q&As.html (last modi-
fied Nov. 7, 2003).  Commentators in GM agriculture debates frequently use the term “biotech-
nology” to refer more specifically to modern genetic engineering techniques such as recombinant 
DNA isolation, cloning, and sequencing.  See Michael John Gulliford, Comment, Much Ado 
About Gene Patents: The Role of Foreseeability, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 711, 715 (2004). 
 91 Specifically, by allowing genetic material to be “spliced” into a host organism directly at the 
level of DNA, such techniques permit “the formation of new combinations of heritable mate-
rial . . . [that are] incorporat[ed] into a host organism in which they do not naturally occur but in 
which they are capable of continued propagation.”  JOHN E. SMITH, BIOTECHNOLOGY 38 (Cam-
bridge Univ. Press, 3d ed. 1996). 
 92 See, e.g., Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, Americans Are Far More Comfortable 
with Genetic Modifications of Plants Than Animals, Public Sentiment About Genetically Modified 
Food: September 2003 Update, at http://pewagbiotech.org/research/2003update/4.php (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2004) (reporting that forty-one percent of survey respondents believed it was “somewhat 
bad” or “very bad” to use genetic modification of plants to make produce last longer).  Even more 
Americans reportedly opposed the genetic modification of animals.  See id. 
 93 See TEISL & CASWELL, supra note 38, at 2 (citing results from multiple polls). 
 94 See Henrique Freire de Oliveira Souza, Genetically Modified Plants: A Need for Interna-
tional Regulation, 6 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 129, 131 (2000); Julie Teel, Student Article, 
Regulating Genetically Modified Products and Processes: An Overview of Approaches, 8 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 649, 649 (2000). 
 95 For more comprehensive analyses of U.S. regulation of genetically engineered agricultural 
products, see Rebecca Bratspies, The Illusion of Care: Regulation, Uncertainty, and Genetically 
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1.  Modern Genetic Engineering Processes. — Neither the potential 
benefits nor the potential risks of modern genetic engineering are in-
significant.  On the positive side, supporters of GM technologies em-
phasize that GM crops can reduce the need for external pesticide ap-
plications by incorporating insect and disease resistance traits directly 
into a plant’s genetic makeup.96  Similarly, plants can be engineered to 
tolerate herbicide applications in a manner that potentially enables the 
use of fewer chemicals to achieve a desired level of weed control.97  
Other potential enhancements for agricultural crops include improved 
plant tolerance to unfavorable growing conditions,98 and various 
means of improving the handling, distribution, and processing of food 
products.99  Finally, although such products have yet to make a signifi-
cant appearance in the consumer marketplace, proponents of GM 
foods also envision a future in which agricultural products express de-
sirable output characteristics, such as improved nutritional content or 
a more aesthetically pleasing texture and appearance.100 
On the negative side, opponents worry that GM food products may 
pose human health risks that, given the novelty of GM technologies, 
scientists will have difficulty identifying.  Opponents voice concerns 
about the potential toxicity and allergenicity of GM food products,101 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Modified Food Crops, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 297 (2002); Gregory N. Mandel, Gaps, Inexperience, 
Inconsistencies, and Overlaps: Crisis in the Regulation of Genetically Modified Plants and Ani-
mals, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2167 (2004); Emily Marden, Risk and Regulation: U.S. Regulatory 
Policy on Genetically Modified Food and Agriculture, 44 B.C. L. REV. 733 (2003); McGarity, su-
pra note 45. 
 96 See Indur M. Goklany, The Future of Food, F. FOR APPLIED RES. & PUB. POL’Y, Summer 
2001, at 59, 60.  Indeed, according to USDA researchers, pesticide use has fallen measurably fol-
lowing widespread U.S. adoption of GM corn, cotton, and soybean crops.  See JORGE 
FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO & WILLIAM D. MCBRIDE, ADOPTION OF BIOENGINEERED CROPS 27 
(U.S. Dep’t Agric., Agricultural Economic Report No. 810, 2002) (estimating a reduction, related 
to the adoption of genetically engineered crops, of 6.2% of total pesticide treatments), available at 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aer810/aer810.pdf. 
 97 See Mandel, supra note 95, at 2181.  To date, the overwhelming majority of both field-tested 
and marketed GM organisms have been engineered to express either or both of these two traits.  
See McGarity, supra note 45, at 410 (“Of the thousands of field trials that biotechnology compa-
nies have completed to date, 83 percent have involved plants genetically engineered for pest resis-
tance or herbicide tolerance and only 22 percent tested plants with improved quality traits.”). 
 98 See Mandel, supra note 95, at 2181. 
 99 The first GM food organism submitted to the FDA for approval was a tomato that had 
been engineered to stay firm and fresh for longer periods of time after being picked than conven-
tional tomatoes.  McGarity, supra note 45, at 413–14.  Although this product was commercially 
unsuccessful, biotechnology advocates continue to view increased fruit and vegetable shelf life as 
an important input trait for research and development.  See id. at 414. 
 100 See Mandel, supra note 95, at 2183. 
 101 Although GM crops frequently are engineered to contain pesticidal substances, the toxicity 
of resulting food products is difficult to predict or detect because the products do not lend them-
selves to traditional methods of risk assessment.  See I.R. Rowland, Genetically Modified Foods, 
Science, Consumers and the Media, 61 PROC. NUTRITION SOC’Y 25, 27 (2002) (noting that toxic-
ity assessment typically involves exposing laboratory animals to high levels of isolated chemicals, 
 
2004] PREFERENCES FOR PROCESSES 555 
the impact of genetic engineering techniques on antibiotic effective-
ness,102 the possibility that modified genetic material might transfer 
“horizontally” to humans through ingestion or other bio-
mechanisms,103 and the potential for GM processes to have adverse ef-
fects on important nutrient levels in food products.104  With regard to 
ecological consequences, evidence suggests that GM crops may 
threaten desirable nontarget species such as monarch butterflies or 
beneficial predatory insects,105 may cause unpredictable ecological dis-
turbances as engineered traits spread to neighboring species,106 and 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
and that “complex mixtures of complex chemicals,” such as novel GM foods, cannot be adminis-
tered to animal subjects in this conventional manner).  Similarly, because bioengineers sometimes 
incorporate proteins from nonfood sources whose allergenic potential is presently unknown, re-
sulting GM food products pose at least a possibility of serious allergic reactions for some consum-
ers.  See id. at 28 (noting that “[a]ssessing the allergenic potential of novel foods presents major 
problems, since there are no reliable tests for predicting allergenicity”). 
 102 Scientists sometimes link manipulated genes with a “marker gene” that is resistant to antibi-
otics, thereby raising the possibility that antibiotics will treat humans less effectively as this resis-
tance spreads.  See id.  This concern should dissipate, however, as scientists respond to pressure to 
phase out the use of antibiotic-resistant marker genes.  See Anthony J. Conner et al., The Release 
of Genetically Modified Crops into the Environment — Part II. Overview of Ecological Risk As-
sessment, 33 PLANT J. 19, 28 (2003). 
 103 See Conner et al., supra note 102, at 27. 
 104 See McGarity, supra note 45, at 422–23. 
 105 In 1999, a preliminary study in Nature demonstrated lethal effects of pollen from Bacillus 
thuringiensis (Bt) corn on monarch butterfly larvae.  See John E. Losey et al., Transgenic Pollen 
Harms Monarch Larvae, 399 NATURE 214, 214 (1999).  Follow-up research in the wake of the 
media attention generated by this study determined that most GM corn did not express the Bt 
toxin at sufficiently high levels to threaten monarchs in actual field environments, as opposed to 
the conditions evaluated in the initial laboratory study.  See Genetically Engineered Organisms — 
Public Issues Education Project, Impact of Bt-Corn on Monarch Butterflies, at http://www.geo-
pie.cornell.edu/issues/monarchs.html (last updated Aug. 16, 2004).  Notably, however, researchers 
did find that one variety of Bt corn approved for commercial use was capable of increasing larvae 
mortality in field environments.  See id.  This variety had not been widely adopted — and has 
since been discontinued — and thus the monarch butterfly species was never seriously threatened.  
See id.  Nevertheless, the risk of adverse effects of GM crops demonstrated by this example re-
mains a serious concern.  See David E. Ervin et al., Towards an Ecological Systems Approach in 
Public Research for Environmental Regulation of Transgenic Crops, 99 AGRIC., ECOSYSTEMS & 
ENV’T 1, 6 (2003) (noting that “there are still questions being raised about the effects of long-term 
and low-level exposure to Bt in corn pollen on monarch larvae survival and fitness”); see also 
A.N.E. Birch et al., Interactions Between Plant Resistance Genes, Pest Aphid Populations and 
Beneficial Aphid Predators, in SCOTTISH CROP RESEARCH INST., ANNUAL REPORT 1996/97, at 
68, 71–72 (1997) (reporting the development of reproductive difficulties in ladybugs that had been 
fed aphids reared on GM potatoes), available at http://www.scri.sari.ac.uk/SCRI/web/FILES/ 
AnRp967.pdf; Angelika Hilbeck et al., Effects of Transgenic Bacillus thuringiensis Corn-Fed Prey 
on Mortality and Development Time of Immature Chrysoperla carnea (Neuroptera: Chrysopidae), 
27 ENVTL. ENTOMOLOGY 480, 482–84 (1998) (demonstrating negative health effects among lace-
wings reared on prey that had been fed Bt maize). 
 106 See Ervin et al., supra note 105, at 5 (noting that “[t]here is little doubt in the scientific com-
munity that genes will move from crops into the wild” and that “[g]ene transfer could become a 
problem if the transferred genes do not have deleterious effects on the crop-wild hybrids, but in-
stead confer an ecological advantage”). 
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may hasten the development of resistance among target pest species.107  
Finally, in addition to these concerns about human health and the en-
vironment, some individuals object to GM technologies on cultural, re-
ligious, ethical, or other nontechnical grounds.  For instance, some be-
lieve that GM agriculture exacerbates the trend toward concentrated, 
monocultural production, thereby threatening national food security 
and traditional agrarian culture.108 
Because many of the foregoing positive and negative effects are 
highly speculative,109 policymakers have been required to resort to de-
fault assumptions when developing regulatory frameworks for GM 
crops and products.  Many jurisdictions, for instance, have employed 
the precautionary principle, a decisionmaking heuristic that “counsels 
serious contemplation of regulatory action in the face of evidence of 
health and environmental risk, even before the magnitude of risk is 
necessarily known or any harm manifested.”110  Consistent with this 
precautionary approach, Europe requires manufacturers both to dem-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 107 See Bratspies, supra note 95, at 300 n.14 (“[T]here is some degree of scientific certainty that 
it is a question of when — not if — insects will develop resistance to [GM] plants engineered to 
produce pesticides, herbicides or other ‘plant-incorporated proctectorants.’”).  The EPA has ac-
knowledged this risk by requiring non-GM biological “refuge” areas to be planted around GM 
crops, although it is doubtful that these requirements have much practical effect due to the EPA’s 
lack of a strong enforcement regime.  See Rebecca M. Bratspies, Bridging the Genetic Divide: 
Confidence-Building Measures for Genetically Modified Crops, 44 JURIMETRICS J. 63, 72–73 
(2003) (concluding that the EPA’s system for regulating GM crops containing pesticides is “full of 
holes”).  The risk of resistance is of special concern to organic producers, who long have relied on 
the Bt bacteria as a last resort to combat pests, but who now see the Bt gene being expressed di-
rectly in GM maize crops on millions of acres across the United States.  Indeed, a study by the 
National Research Council concluded that “[i]nsect resistance to Bt crops is considered inevita-
ble.”  COMM. ON ENVTL. IMPACTS ASSOCIATED WITH COMMERCIALIZATION OF TRANSGENIC 
PLANTS, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF TRANSGENIC PLANTS: 
THE SCOPE AND ADEQUACY OF REGULATION 76 (2002).   
 108 See Melissa L. Finucane, Mad Cows, Mad Corn and Mad Communities: The Role of Socio-
Cultural Factors in the Perceived Risk of Genetically-Modified Food, 61 PROC. NUTRITION 
SOC’Y 31, 31, 33 (2002); Marden, supra note 95, at 761 (noting that demands for mandatory label-
ing of GM foods reflect “the desire to safeguard the purity of the food, prevent potential allergic 
reactions, avoid a process that interferes with religion or moral views, and promote traditional 
farming”).  
 109 See, e.g., ROYAL SOC’Y OF CANADA, ELEMENTS OF PRECAUTION: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
THE REGULATION OF FOOD BIOTECHNOLOGY IN CANADA 132 (2001) (concluding that “the quan-
tity and the quality of research on the potential environmental impacts of [GM organisms] is not 
sufficient to address many of [the field’s most] pressing questions”), available at http://www.rsc.ca/ 
foodbiotechnology/GMreportEN.pdf. 
 110 David A. Dana, A Behavioral Economic Defense of the Precautionary Principle, 97 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1315, 1315 (2003).  For an overview of the precautionary principle in international and 
domestic environmental law, as well as an exploration of the principle’s implications for interna-
tional trade, see Joint Working Party on Trade & Env’t, Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Un-
certainty and Precaution: Implications for Trade and Environment, COM/ENV/TD(2000)114/ 
FINAL (Sept. 5, 2002). 
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onstrate the safety of GM crops and food products before they are 
marketed, and to label such products even after they are approved.111 
The United States, in contrast, has embraced the doctrine of “sub-
stantial equivalence,” under which regulators subject GM food prod-
ucts to no greater regulatory oversight than the unmodified products 
that they are shown to strongly resemble.112  Of course, given that a 
GM product almost certainly has been altered to an extent that is suf-
ficiently “novel” to earn intellectual property protection for its devel-
oper,113 one naturally might wonder how such a product could ever be 
deemed substantially equivalent to an unmodified product.  The an-
swer lies in the highly stylized definition of “substantial equivalence.”  
Most notably, the substantial equivalence determination accords no 
significance to the fact that a product has been developed using mod-
ern genetic engineering processes.114  Rather, substantial equivalence  
is determined solely with reference to the compositional and other tan-
gible characteristics of the modified organism and its conventional 
counterparts.115 
The substantial equivalence doctrine is built upon a variation of 
the process/product distinction: absent some identifiable alteration in 
the physical features and characteristics of the end product, the doc-
trine assumes that modification of a plant’s or animal’s genetic 
makeup is an inconsequential process about which neither regulators 
nor consumers should concern themselves.  Similarly, a recent draft 
risk assessment from the USDA addressing the hazards of cloned live-
stock advocates a “compositional analysis method” of risk assessment, 
under which regulators assume that “food products from healthy ani-
mal clones and their progeny that are not materially different from 
corresponding products from conventional animals are as safe to con-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 111 Europe’s regulation of GM food products is briefly described below, see infra pp. 562–63. 
 112 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., SAFETY EVALUATION OF FOODS DERIVED 
BY MODERN BIOTECHNOLOGY: CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES 14–16 (1993) (introducing the “sub-
stantial equivalence” concept).  For an overview of U.S. use of the substantial equivalence doc-
trine in GM regulation, see infra section I.B.2, pp. 558–62.   
 113 For a discussion of intellectual property issues in the context of agricultural biotechnology, 
including the controversial “terminator” gene technology that was developed to enforce patent 
rights by rendering GM seeds sterile, see Cullen N. Pendleton, The Peculiar Case of “Terminator” 
Technology: Agricultural Biotechnology and Intellectual Property Protection at the Crossroads of 
the Third Green Revolution, 23 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 1 (2004). 
 114 See McGarity, supra note 45, at 429 (“[T]he baseline assumption of the substantial equiva-
lence doctrine is that there is nothing inherently novel about plant breeding through modern ge-
netic engineering.”). 
 115 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 112, at 11.  An obvious theoretical 
problem then becomes how to determine the class of compositional and other tangible characteris-
tics that provide the benchmark for the substantial equivalence determination.  See Rowland, 
supra note 101, at 27. 
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sume as their conventional counterparts.”116  The process of cloning 
itself, in other words, lacks conceptual significance, just as the process 
of genetic manipulation carries no significance under the substantial 
equivalence doctrine.  As shown by the discussion of U.S. GM food 
regulation in the following subsection, these various uses of the proc-
ess/product distinction can have significant implications for the man-
ner in which regulators address novel technologies. 
2.  U.S. Regulation of Genetically Modified Food Products. — In 
the early years of recombinant DNA research in the United States, the 
National Institute of Health categorically banned all releases of the 
products of recombinant DNA technology into the environment.117  
This ban was lifted in 1982 and, following years of delays caused by 
litigation and community challenges, the first U.S. field testing of a 
GM organism began in April, 1987, near Brentwood, California.118  At 
the time, the United States had adopted a regulatory stance toward ag-
ricultural biotechnology that declined to single out GM organisms for 
enhanced scrutiny based solely on their method of production.  Spe-
cifically, in June of 1986, a working group convened by President 
Reagan’s Domestic Policy Council published a policy document, “Co-
ordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology,” establishing 
the fundamental premise that modern genetic engineering did not ipso 
facto warrant any more regulation than “traditional genetic manipula-
tion techniques” such as hybridization.119   
Because the Coordinated Framework and subsequent executive 
branch position statements embraced the substantial equivalence doc-
trine in this manner,120 policymakers determined that no new laws 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 116 U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., ANIMAL CLONING: A RISK ASSESSMENT: DRAFT EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY 6 (Oct. 21, 2003), available at http://www.fda.gov/cvm/index/cloning/CLRAES.pdf.  
 117 SHELDON KRIMSKY & ROGER P. WRUBEL, AGRICULTURAL BIOLOGY AND THE ENVIRON-
MENT: SCIENCE, POLICY, AND SOCIAL ISSUES 159 (1996). 
 118 See PAUL B. THOMPSON, THE SPIRIT OF THE SOIL: AGRICULTURE AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
ETHICS 35 (1995). 
 119 Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302, 23,303 (June 
26, 1986); see also Proposal for a Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 49 
Fed. Reg. 50,856, 50,857, 50,859–77 (Dec. 31, 1984) (summarizing laws that may regulate GM 
products). 
 120 In 1990, the first Bush administration elaborated on the 1986 Coordinated Framework 
through its articulation of “Four Principles of Regulatory Review for Biotechnology.”  See Exer-
cise of Federal Oversight Within Scope of Statutory Authority: Planned Introductions of Biotech-
nology Products into the Environment, 57 Fed. Reg. 6753 app. at 6760 (Feb. 27, 1992).  The first 
of the four principles stated that “[f]ederal government regulatory oversight should focus on the 
characteristics and risks of the biotechnology product — not the process by which it is created.”  
Id.  Similarly, in February of 1992, the Office of Science and Technology Policy published a “Final 
Statement on Scope,” which announced that executive oversight of biotechnology products 
“should not turn on the fact that an organism has been modified by a particular process or tech-
nique.”  Id. at 6753.  
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were required to regulate GM organisms.121  Instead, federal agencies 
would share regulatory oversight duties by exercising their authority 
under a pastiche of existing statutes.122  Accordingly, today the EPA 
regulates environmental risks posed by GM organisms through its au-
thority under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide 
Act123 and the Toxic Substances Control Act;124 the FDA evaluates the 
safety and marketing of GM organisms intended for human consump-
tion under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA);125 
and the USDA, acting through its Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service under the Plant Protection Act,126 monitors the use of GM or-
ganisms in agricultural production. 
Critics charge that the responsible agencies have diluted these 
statutory powers in practice.127  For instance, the FDA arguably has 
discretion to require thorough premarket review of GM food products 
under the FFDCA’s grant of authority to regulate “adulterated foods” 
and “food additives.”128  In practice, however, the FDA has conferred a 
“generally recognized as safe” (GRAS) exemption from premarket re-
view on any GM food crop deemed substantially equivalent to its tra-
ditionally bred parental strain.129  Moreover, the FDA has allowed 
product manufacturers themselves to determine whether a substance 
should be considered GRAS.130 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 121 See PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, GUIDE TO U.S. REGULATION OF 
GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS, at i, 6 (Sept. 
2001) [hereinafter PEW GUIDE], available at http://pewagbiotech.org/resources/issuebriefs/1-reg 
guide.pdf. 
 122 See Nathan W. Eckley, Comment, Reaping the Benefits of Agricultural Biotechnology 
Through Uniform Regulation, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 433, 436–39 (2002). 
 123 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 136–136y (West 2000 & Supp. 2003). 
 124 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601–2692 (West 2000 & Supp. 2003). 
 125 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 301–399 (West 2000 & Supp. 2003). 
 126 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 7701–7772 (West 2000 & Supp. 2003). 
 127 See, e.g., Bratspies, supra note 95; Mandel, supra note 95; McGarity, supra note 45. 
 128 See Stanley H. Abramson & J. Thomas Carrato, Crop Biotechnology: The Case for Product 
Stewardship, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 241, 250–51 (2001); Ved P. Nanda, Genetically Modified Food 
and International Law — The Biosafety Protocol and Regulations in Europe, 28 DENV. J. INT’L 
L. & POL’Y 235, 246–47 (2000); Terence P. Stewart & David S. Johanson, Policy in Flux: The 
European Union’s Laws on Agricultural Biotechnology and Their Effects on International Trade, 4 
DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 243, 248–49 (1999); George E.C. York, Note, Global Foods, Local Tastes and 
Biotechnology: The New Legal Architecture of International Agriculture Trade, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. 
L. 423, 437 (2001).  
 129 See Sheldon Krimsky & Nora K. Murphy, Biotechnology at the Dinner Table: FDA’s Over-
sight of Transgenic Food, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., Nov. 2002, at 80, 82.  GM sub-
stances altered in a manner such that they cannot be deemed GRAS are subject to regulation as 
food additives.  As of 2001, however, only one GM food product had triggered the food additive 
review process.  See PEW GUIDE, supra note 121, at 21 n.15. 
 130 See PEW GUIDE, supra note 121, at 20 (“FFDCA does not require FDA to make a premar-
keting determination that a potential food additive is GRAS; that determination is made by the 
food manufacturer without FDA review.”); McGarity, supra note 45, at 438 (“Ultimately, the 
agency leaves it up to the manufacturer to determine whether an added substance is GRAS.”).  
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The doctrine of substantial equivalence also finds expression in the 
FDA’s labeling policy for GM foods.  In its 1992 Policy Statement con-
cerning GM food products, the Agency made clear that it did not re-
gard the fact that an agricultural substance was produced through ge-
netic modification techniques to be “material” information subject to 
mandatory disclosure under the FFDCA.131  The Agency did indicate 
that labeling would be required “if a food derived from a new plant 
variety differs from its traditional counterpart such that the common 
or usual name no longer applies to the new food, or if a safety or usage 
issue exists to which consumers must be alerted.”132  The FDA might 
require labeling, therefore, when developers incorporate known aller-
genic material into a food product or when the “concentration and 
bioavailability of important nutrients” in the modified food product are 
no longer within the range ordinarily seen in traditional counterpart 
foods.133  Short of such extreme cases, however, the FDA concluded 
that it lacks statutory authority to force disclosure of information re-
lated solely to the process by which a food product was developed.134 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Manufacturers may, but need not, petition the FDA for an affirmation that the Agency agrees 
with the manufacturer’s GRAS determination.  See, e.g., Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from 
New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984 (May 29, 1992); Food & Drug Admin. Ctr. for Food 
Safety and Applied Nutrition, Guidance on Consultation Procedures: Foods Derived from New 
Plant Varieties, http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~lrd/consulpr.html (Oct. 1997).  During its waning days, 
the Clinton Administration issued a proposed regulation requiring premarket notification to the 
FDA, but the Agency appears not to have pursued the issue further.  See Premarket Notice Con-
cerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4706 (Jan. 18, 2001). 
 131 See Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. at  22,984; 
id. at 22,991 (“The agency is not aware of any information showing that foods derived by these 
new methods differ from other foods in any meaningful or uniform way, or that, as a class, foods 
developed by the new techniques present any different or greater safety concern than foods devel-
oped by traditional plant breeding.”). 
 132 Id. at 22,991. 
 133 Id. at 22,992. 
 134 Referencing both the language of the FFDCA and the Agency’s own past practices, com-
mentators have criticized the FDA’s conclusion that it lacked this authority.  See, e.g., Lara Beth 
Winn, Special Labeling Requirements for Genetically Engineered Food: How Sound Are the Ana-
lytical Frameworks Used by FDA and Food Producers?, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 667 (1999).  
Farmed salmon provides an instructive comparison.  In this context, the FDA has taken the posi-
tion that canthaxanthin — the primary artificial coloring agent used by the salmon industry — is 
a product additive whose use under the FFDCA must be disclosed to consumers in order to pre-
vent the “economic fraud” that would occur if consumers assumed that farmed salmon is natu-
rally colored.  See 63 Fed. Reg. 14,814 (Mar. 27, 1998); FDA Listing of Color Additives Exempt 
from Certification, 21 C.F.R. §§ 73.35(d)(3), 73.75(d)(4) (2004); FDA Food Labeling Requirements, 
21 C.F.R. §§ 101.22(a), (b), (k)(2), 101.100(a)(2).  The FDA could easily have applied this reasoning 
to the GM context: just as consumers in the absence of disclosure might assume that salmon 
products are not artificially colored, they also seem likely to assume that food products are not the 
result of genetic engineering unless informed otherwise. 
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Despite the failure of a legal challenge to these conclusions,135 op-
ponents of GM foods have found some success in the court of public 
opinion.  For instance, the USDA’s 1997 proposed federal organic certi-
fication standards, which would have permitted the use of GM ingre-
dients and other practices that were inconsistent with prevailing un-
derstandings of organic agriculture, prompted more public comments 
— almost all of them negative — than any other proposed regulation 
in the Agency’s history.136  Also around that time, more than 500,000 
individuals signed a petition demanding that the FDA require labeling 
of GM foods.137  Awareness of and opposition to GM food products 
continued to mount as activists adopted a variety of publicity strate-
gies.  Finally, in late 1999, the FDA announced that it would hold a se-
ries of three public meetings to explain its position on GM foods and to 
solicit views on whether the position should be altered.138 
As the FDA would later acknowledge, “[m]ost of the comments [it 
received] that addressed labeling requested mandatory disclosure of 
the fact that the food or its ingredients was bioengineered or was pro-
duced from bioengineered food.”139  Nevertheless, the FDA held to its 
position that genetic modification alone is not a material fact that must 
be disclosed under the FFDCA.140  Instead, the Agency issued draft 
labeling guidelines for voluntary disclosure by manufacturers, recog-
nizing that “many consumers are interested in the information, and 
some manufacturers may want to respond to this consumer desire.”141  
Because it did not believe that food manufacturers could ensure that 
their products were completely free of GM ingredients, the Agency 
noted that “GM-free” labeling is likely to be misleading, and therefore 
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 135 In Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166 (D.D.C. 2000), a federal district 
court refused to find that the FDA’s presumption that GM foods meet the GRAS standard in the 
absence of contrary evidence was arbitrary and capricious.  Id. at 181.  The court also rejected a 
challenge to the FDA’s labeling policy, accepting the Agency’s interpretation that the FFDCA re-
quired a “material” difference in products before consumer demand could even be considered.  Id. 
at 179 & n.10. 
 136 See Curt Anderson, USDA Urged To Scrap Organic Rules, AP ONLINE, May 1, 1998, 1998 
WL 6659243 (noting that comments were “overwhelmingly negative”); Patrice Wendling, Permis-
sive U.S. Rules Threaten the Meaning of “Organic”: New Serpent in the Garden, CAPITAL TIMES, 
Apr. 25, 1998, 1998 WL 5869134 (noting that 115,000 public comments “obliterat[ed] the previous 
record of 6,800 comments”). 
 137 See Lisa A. Tracy, Does a Genetically Modified Rose Still Smell As Sweet? — Labeling of 
Genetically Modified Organisms Under the Biosafety Protocol, 6 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 129, 156 
(1999). 
 138 Biotechnology in the Year 2000 and Beyond; Public Meetings, 64 Fed. Reg. 57,470 (Oct. 25, 
1999). 
 139 Food & Drug Admin. Ctr. for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, Draft Guidance for In-
dustry: Voluntary Labeling Indicating Whether Foods Have or Have Not Been Developed Using 
Bioengineering, http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~dms/biolabgu.html (Jan. 2001). 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. 
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unlawful.  Moreover, the Agency noted that “[a] statement that a food 
was not bioengineered or does not contain bioengineered ingredients 
may be misleading if it implies that the labeled food is superior to 
foods that are not so labeled.”142  Finally, in addition to these restric-
tions on the content of voluntary labeling, the FDA also noted that 
manufacturers should be able to substantiate non-GM marketing 
claims through such measures as “validated test methods,” “special 
handling,” “appropriate recordkeeping,” “segregation procedures,” or 
“certifications or affidavits from farmers, processors, and others in the 
food production and distribution chain.”143 
Given the Supreme Court’s skepticism of government bans on 
truthful commercial information,144 the FDA could go only so far in its 
effort to regulate non-GM claims by product marketers.  Nevertheless, 
taken together, the substantive and procedural requirements contained 
in the FDA’s draft labeling policy seem to suggest that the Agency 
would like to see food manufacturers refrain entirely from providing 
consumers with information regarding genetic engineering processes.145  
Having determined that GM food products are indistinguishable from 
alternative products for purposes of risk assessment, the FDA also 
seemed to assume that the products are indistinguishable for all other 
purposes relevant to consumer markets. 
3.  The Looming Trade War with Europe. — Unlike the United 
States, the European Union has established a regulatory program that 
distinguishes GM products for special treatment based solely on the 
fact of modification.  Specifically, under recently finalized EU rules, 
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 142 Id. 
 143 Id. 
 144 The Court repeatedly has emphasized the paternalistic dangers of suppressing accurate 
commercial information.  See, e.g., 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996) (not-
ing that government restrictions on truthful, “nonmisleading” speech “usually rest solely on the 
offensive assumption that the public will respond ‘irrationally’ to the truth”) (quoting Linmark 
Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96 (1977)); Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disci-
plinary Comm’n, 496 U.S. 91, 111 (1990) (“The Commission’s concern about the possibility of de-
ception in hypothetical cases is not sufficient to rebut the constitutional presumption favoring dis-
closure over concealment.”); Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 
351 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that a Puerto Rico ban on casino advertising consti-
tuted an effort to “manipulate private behavior by depriving citizens of truthful information con-
cerning lawful activities”); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 
574–75 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (describing a commercial speech restriction as “a covert 
attempt by the State to manipulate the choices of its citizens, not by persuasion or direct regula-
tion, but by depriving the public of the information needed to make a free choice”); Va. State Bd. 
of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (deeming a restric-
tion on the advertisement of pharmaceuticals “highly paternalistic”); see also Wash. Legal Found. 
v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 69–70 (D.D.C. 1998) (“If there is one fixed principle in the com-
mercial speech arena, it is that ‘a State’s paternalistic assumption that the public will use truthful, 
nonmisleading commercial information unwisely cannot justify a decision to suppress it.’”) (quot-
ing 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 497). 
 145 See McGarity, supra note 45, at 463–64. 
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before a GM product can be marketed, the European Food Safety Au-
thority must assess its safety through an extensive risk assessment and 
evaluation process that is open to public input and that does not in-
clude any shortcut approval mechanism akin to the United States’s 
GRAS procedure.146  In addition, all genetically altered products, in-
cluding animal feed, vegetable oils, seeds, and byproducts containing 
more than 0.9% GM ingredients, must bear a label that notes: “This 
product contains genetically modified organisms.”147  Finally, such 
products must be “traceable” through the establishment and mainte-
nance of an extensive informational network that tracks GM products 
within the production and distribution chain.148 
Member nations of the European Union considered these stringent 
regulations necessary to mollify concerns associated with overturning 
what had been a de facto ban on the importation, release, and market-
ing of any new GM products.  Although in the early 1990s Europe had 
authorized the release of eighteen GM organisms into the environment 
and the marketing of food products derived from sixteen GM organ-
isms, high-profile food scares later in the decade resulted in public de-
mand for heightened government screening of food and food technolo-
gies.149  Thus, beginning in October of 1998, the European Union 
suspended authorization of any new GM organisms for environmental 
release or for marketing to consumers.150 
Despite the fact that Europe was poised to supplant this de facto 
moratorium with its new regulatory framework, the United States filed 
a formal WTO trade complaint on May 13, 2003.151  The complaint 
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 146 See Regulation 1829/2003 of 22 September 2003 on Genetically Modified Food and Feed, 
2003 O.J. (L 268) 1; Regulation 178/2002 of 28 January 2002 Laying Down the General Principles 
and Requirements of Food Law, Establishing the European Food Safety Authority and Laying 
Down Procedures in Matters of Food Safety, 2002 O.J. (L 31) 1.  For a brief overview of the new 
regulations, see Brian P. Rafferty, Note, The Door Opens Slightly: Recent European Union Regu-
lations on Genetically Modified Products and the Ongoing United States-European Union GM 
Product Dispute, 16 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 281 (2004). 
 147 See Regulation 1830/2003 of 22 September 2003 Concerning the Traceability and Labeling 
of Genetically Modified Organisms and the Traceability of Food and Feed Products Produced 
from Genetically Modified Organisms and Amending Directive 2001/181EC, arts. 4, 7, 2003 O.J. 
(L 268) 24, 26, 27. 
 148 See id. arts. 4, 5. 
 149 See Kim Brooks, History, Change and Policy: Factors Leading to Current Opposition to 
Food Biotechnology, 5 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 153, 154–59 (2000) (describing the manner in which 
highly publicized food scares led to the emergence of a “transformed” consumer in the United 
Kingdom); Carter, supra note 89, at 626–28, 640–45 (1997) (noting the impact of the DES, E.Coli, 
and mad cow disease controversies on European demands for food safety). 
 150 See Request for Consultations by the United States, European Communities — Measures 
Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/1 (May 20, 2003), available 
at http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/doclib/docs/2003/november/tradoc_114610.pdf. 
 151 See id.; see also Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Contests Europe’s Ban on Some Food, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 14, 2003, at C1. 
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alleges that European regulation of biotechnology products is inconsis-
tent with the GATT, the TBT Agreement, and the SPS Agreement, 
and it therefore requests consultations with the European Communi-
ties to resolve the issues.152  In the words of U.S. Trade Representative 
Robert B. Zoellick, the United States believes that European caution 
with respect to GM agriculture is “Luddite” and “immoral,” reflecting 
not only a failure to respect the findings of science but also a failure to 
appreciate the powerful potential of genetic engineering to boost world 
food production.153  Europe naturally contests this characterization 
and has vowed to fight the complaint vigorously.154  At stake in the 
dispute are a number of important unresolved questions of interna-
tional law and, in a more abstract sense, the normative foundation of 
the trading system itself. 
To begin, the GM food products dispute brings to the fore long-
standing uncertainties regarding the relationship between international 
trade agreements and other multilateral instruments, particularly those 
designed to protect the environment.155  As Jeffery Atik and David 
Wirth note, although several multilateral environmental agreements 
(MEAs) appear on their face to conflict with international trading 
rules, the conflicts have yet to be tested due to “the absence of any con-
crete disputes in which trade measures authorized by an MEA in fact 
have been challenged.”156  The GM food controversy may present just 
such a concrete dispute, given the apparent conflict between the posi-
tion of the United States and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety,157 
an international agreement adopted pursuant to the Convention on 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 152 See Request for Consultations by the United States, European Communities — Measures 
Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, supra note 150. The complaint also 
alleges that the E.U. regulatory regime violates the Agriculture Agreement.  Id. 
 153 Lizette Alvarez, Consumers in Europe Resist Gene-Altered Foods, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 
2003, at A3. 
 154 Cf. Thomas P. Redick, Stewardship for Biotech Crops: Strategies for Improving Global Con-
sumer Confidence, 44 JURIMETRICS J. 5, 18 (2003) (quoting former U.S. Secretary of Agriculture 
Dan Glickman as saying that the conflict over GM foods promises to be a “Battle Royale of the 
21st Century” (quoting Reuters, U.S. Opposed to Segregation of Genetically Modified Crops, July 
9, 1997, http://users.westnet.gr/~cgian/glick.htm) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 155 For a general discussion of the relationship between GATT/WTO jurisprudence and other 
aspects of international law, see JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2003). 
 156 Jeffery Atik & David A. Wirth, Science and International Trade — Third Generation 
Scholarship, 26 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 171, 178 (2003).  See generally Chris Wold, Multilat-
eral Environmental Agreements and the GATT: Conflict and Resolution?, 26 ENVTL. L. 841 (1996) 
(discussing the conflicts between MEAs and the GATT).  In 2001, WTO member nations commit-
ted as part of the most recent round of trade negotiations to consider the question of how MEAs 
and trading rules interact.  See Mungkalarungsi, supra note 58, at 362.  Like many other aspects 
of these negotiations, however, the discussions have not been fruitful. 
 157 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 29, 2000, 39 
I.L.M. 1027 (2000). 
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Biological Diversity and ratified by over fifty nations, including those 
of the European Union.158  The Cartagena Protocol requires exporting 
nations to obtain informed consent from importing nations before 
shipping GM organisms and to label GM products that are intended 
for animal or human consumption.159  Because the United States is 
expected to argue that the EU labeling requirements constitute an im-
permissible trade restriction,160 and because the European Union 
might well defend such requirements by pointing to its obligations un-
der the Cartagena Protocol, one might say that the legality of the 
Cartagena Protocol itself will be at issue.161 
The GM food products dispute also may force clarification of how 
certain GATT/WTO agreements relate to each other.  Although both 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 158 Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
(Montreal, 29 Janurary 2000): Status of Ratification and Entry into Force, at http://www.biodiv. 
org/biosafety/signinglist.aspx?sts=rtf8ord=ctr (last visited Nov. 14, 2004). 
 159 See Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 
157, at arts. 7–12, 18.  It is unclear whether the labeling requirement must be satisfied by notify-
ing the ultimate consumer, as opposed to retailers, customs officials, or other agents earlier in the 
distribution chain.  See Michael P. Healy, Information Based Regulation and International Trade 
in Genetically Modified Agricultural Products: An Evaluation of the Cartagena Protocol on Bio-
safety, 9 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 205, 231 (2002).  Regardless of the interpretation, it seems likely 
that the negotiators of the Cartagena Protocol, a group consisting largely of environmental offi-
cials from participating nations, were aware of the importance of the GM labeling issue.  Cf. Phil-
lips & Kerr, supra note 58, at 69 (contending that the labeling provision of the Cartagena Protocol 
represents “an attempt by those opposed to biotechnology to obtain the ability to inhibit interna-
tional trade in GMOs through the back door when they have been unsuccessful in obtaining it at 
the WTO”).  Indeed, their actions may represent an example of what Kal Raustiala and David 
Victor have called “strategic inconsistency” in international lawmaking.  See Kal Raustiala & 
David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources, 58 INT’L ORG. 277, 301–02 
(2004) (coining the term “strategic inconsistency” to refer to states’ efforts to force change by craft-
ing rules in one regime that are incompatible with those in another).   
 160 The United States’s first submission in the dispute challenged only the EU’s de facto mora-
torium on new product approvals rather than the new regulatory regime itself.  See First Submis-
sion of the United States, European Communities — Measures Affecting the Approval and Mar-
keting of Biotech Products, para. 4, WT/DS291, 292, and 293 (Apr. 21, 2004), available at http:// 
www.genewatch.org/WTO/submissions/US_WTO_Submission.pdf.  Nonetheless, commentators 
expect future submissions and challenges from the United States to focus more specifically on the 
adopted regulatory regime, including especially the requirements of labeling and traceability.  Cf. 
Joshi, supra note 68, at 83 (noting American opposition to mandatory GM labeling). 
 161 As if to highlight the confusion regarding this important question of treaty priority, the pre-
amble to the Cartagena Protocol states both that “this Protocol shall not be interpreted as imply-
ing a change in the rights and obligations of a Party under any existing international agreements” 
and that “the [foregoing] recital is not intended to subordinate this Protocol to other international 
agreements.”  Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, supra 
note 157, at 1027.  Thus, although the European Union may describe its new regulatory regime 
for GM products as consistent with the obligations of the Protocol, it is not at all clear that this 
defense will suffice for purposes of international trade law.  See Brett Grosko, Genetic Engineer-
ing and International Law: Conflict or Harmony? An Analysis of the Biosafety Protocol, GATT, 
and the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 295, 297–98 (2001); 
John H. Barton, Note, Biotechnology, the Environment, and International Agricultural Trade, 9 
GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 95, 113–16 (1996). 
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the TBT and SPS Agreements position the WTO as a sort of “global 
meta-regulator,”162 the SPS Agreement, with its scientific basis re-
quirements, is clearly the more stringent of the two.163  Despite the ob-
vious importance of the question, however, there is a surprising degree 
of uncertainty about how to determine which Agreement applies to a 
given product standard.164  Some commentators appear to read the 
SPS Agreement broadly, arguing that the Agreement applies so long as 
the protection of human or animal health and safety at least partially 
justifies the measure, irrespective of whether other nonscientific inter-
ests also might support it.165  Others seem to give nations more lati-
tude to characterize the motivations behind a product measure and 
therefore to determine whether it falls within the scope of the SPS 
Agreement.166  For instance, on this reading, if the European Union 
described its GM labeling regulation as a matter of consumer aware-
ness rather than as one of health and safety protection, then the regu-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 162 Walker, supra note 86, at 255. 
 163 Indeed, the rigorous requirements of the SPS Agreement have been characterized by David 
Wirth as even “more aggressive than what has generally been accepted in the [U.S.] domestic 
regulatory reform debate.”  Wirth, supra note 66, at 337.   
 164 SPS AGREEMENT, supra note 75, Annex A.1.  Commentators have disagreed, for instance, 
about whether Europe’s labeling regulations should be analyzed under the TBT or SPS Agree-
ment.  Compare Fiona Macmillan & Michael Blakeney, Genetically Modified Organisms and the 
World Trade Organization, 3 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 93, 114 (2001) (suggesting that a GM 
label dispute “falls most properly within the sphere of the TBT Agreement”), with John S. Apple-
gate, The Prometheus Principle: Using the Precautionary Principle To Harmonize the Regulation 
of Genetically Modified Organisms, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 207, 237–39 (2001) (stating 
that the SPS Agreement will likely be applied to evaluate GM label requirements); see also Mich-
ele M. Compton, Applying World Trade Organization Rules to the Labeling of Genetically Modi-
fied Foods, 15 PACE INT’L L. REV. 359, 409 (2003) (noting that while it is unclear which agree-
ment governs, “[t]he labeling schemes would likely not fall under the SPS Agreement”); Joanne 
Scott, European Regulation of GMOs and the WTO, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 213, 228–31 (2003) (not-
ing that both the TBT and SPS Agreements are relevant to the GM label dispute). 
 165 See Healy, supra note 159, at 233 (opining that a nation would “undoubtedly violate the SPS 
Agreement” if it imposed a labeling requirement while simultaneously determining that a GM 
food product posed no articulable risk); cf. Alessandro Nucara, Precautionary Principle and 
GMOs: Protection or Protectionism?, INT. TRADE L. & REG., Mar. 2003, 47, 50 (“Consumer con-
cerns about the use of hormones or genetically modified products can no longer constitute a valid 
reason for restrictions on the import of such products when these concerns are not backed by con-
sistent scientific evidence.”). 
 166 See Mariëlle Matthee & Dominique Vermersch, The International Integration of European 
Precautionary Measures on Biosafety, 10 EUR. ENVTL. L. REV. 183, 188 (2001) (noting that 
“[w]hether the European labelling regulation is to be considered as a sanitary or phytosanitary 
measure depends on its purpose” and that labeling might fall under the TBT Agreement if prem-
ised on the consumer’s right to know); Sara Pardo Quintillán, Free Trade, Public Health Protec-
tion and Consumer Information in the European and WTO Context — Hormone-Treated Beef and 
Genetically Modified Organisms, 33 J. WORLD TRADE 147, 189 (1999) (arguing that precautionary 
measures resting on consumer concern and the wider notion of risk embraced by the public 
should be lawful, even when supported by little or no scientific evidence). 
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lation might be analyzed under the TBT Agreement, not the SPS 
Agreement.167 
Much turns on this interpretive question.  If a nation’s citizens de-
mand the prohibition of both the importation and the domestic pro-
duction of a certain good, but insufficient scientific evidence of health 
or safety threats exists to support their opposition to the good, does the 
ban nevertheless constitute a measure designed to “protect human or 
animal life or health” subject to the dictates of the SPS Agreement, or 
does it instead represent a nondiscriminatory consumer protection 
measure governed by the TBT Agreement?  Put concretely, could a 
ban on GM food be considered similar to a ban on child pornography, 
justified not by empirical evidence regarding harmful consequences of 
its distribution but simply by the sovereign will of a nation’s citi-
zens?168  What role, in other words, do consumer concern and moral 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 167 On its website, the WTO states that the SPS Agreement does not cover “[m]easures for en-
vironmental protection . . . , to protect consumer interests, or for the welfare of animals.”  World 
Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Meas-
ures, at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsund_e.htm (May 1998).  When multiple con-
siderations support a single regulatory measure, however, it may be difficult to classify the meas-
ure in the neat manner hypothesized by the WTO.  For instance, when the WTO Appellate Body 
reviewed the European Union’s ban on imports of hormone-treated beef, Europe defended itself 
by pointing to scientific evidence that growth hormones are linked to cancer and other adverse 
health consequences.  The Appellate Body rejected this contention on the ground that Europe 
was required to provide a risk assessment of the health threats specifically arising from hormone-
treated beef rather than from growth hormones as a general matter.  See Appellate Body Report, 
EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), para. 200, WT/DS26/AB/R, 
WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter EC Hormones Report].  Given the high levels of anxi-
ety over food safety among European consumers, however, Europe theoretically could have de-
fended its import ban simply by invoking the need to respond to intense consumer concern.  See 
Carter, supra note 89, at 653 (describing proposals within Europe to treat “consumer preferences” 
as a “fourth hurdle” that technologies must overcome in order to obtain regulatory approval).  
Had Europe only invoked strong consumer opposition to hormone-treated beef in this manner, the 
Appellate Body would have been forced to explicate the scope of the SPS Agreement in relation to 
scientifically unsupported regulations that nevertheless respond to sincere consumer demands for 
information.  Cf. Alan O. Sykes, The Least Restrictive Means, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 403, 412 (2003) 
(noting that if the policy behind the E.U. ban on the importation of hormone-treated beef “could 
be restated as one of ensuring that consumers are protected against unwitting ingestion of hor-
mone residues that they might prefer to avoid,” then labeling would provide a less trade-
restrictive means of accomplishing this goal).  Presently, the European Union continues to ban 
hormone-treated beef imports on the ground that scientific risk assessments conducted subsequent 
to the Appellate Body decision establish a specific health risk from the ingestion of hormone-
treated beef.  See European Union, Hormones in Meat — Introduction, at http://europa.eu.int/ 
comm/food/food/chemicalsafety/contaminants/hormones/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2004). 
 168 To turn the question around, must a ban on child pornography also be based on a purely 
instrumentalist assessment of its harmful consequences?  Although the SPS Agreement would not 
apply to such a ban, the requirements of the TBT Agreement and GATT/WTO jurisprudence 
more generally would.  Thus, the question is not entirely academic.  Cf. Robert Howse, The World 
Trade Organization and the Protection of Workers’ Rights, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 131, 
143–44 (1999) (noting that a rigid process/product distinction might raise questions regarding the 
permissibility under the GATT of a ban on pornography “made with children or involving (but 
not necessarily depicting) involuntary acts of sex and other illegal violence”).   
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objection play in international trade law when viewed separately from 
empirical evidence that might or might not support the ban from a 
purely instrumental perspective?169 
As these questions indicate, the GM dispute challenges more than 
simply the manner in which international treaties are interpreted.  
Rather, as Richard Stewart has noted, the dispute poses fundamental 
questions regarding the normative foundation and the institutional de-
sign of contemporary international trade.170  Many Europeans believe 
that GM foods implicate not only scientific questions about the envi-
ronment and human health and safety, but also important moral and 
cultural questions regarding the production of food.171  Thus, through 
the GM foods controversy, the WTO will find itself in the uncomfort-
able position of either, on the one hand, dismissing long-cherished as-
pects of European culture as insufficient bases for domestic regulation 
or, on the other hand, accepting the legitimacy of Europe’s interests 
while opening the door to a stream of moral or cultural justifications 
for trade regulations that will be difficult for complaining nations to 
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 169 Under the TBT Agreement, product regulations must be no more trade-restrictive than nec-
essary to fulfill a “legitimate objective.”  TBT AGREEMENT, supra note 76, art. 2.2.  The Agree-
ment, however, provides only a suggestive list of what counts as a “legitimate objective,” see id. 
(“[L]egitimate objectives are, inter alia: national security requirements; prevention of deceptive 
practices; the protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environ-
ment.”), leaving one to wonder whether the satisfaction of consumer interest alone would consti-
tute a sufficient purpose to support labeling regulations.  Similarly, under the GATT, Article 
XX(a) contains an exception for trade measures “necessary to protect public morals.”  GATT, su-
pra note 54, art. XX(a).  However, as Steve Charnovitz notes in his exhaustive review of the his-
tory of morally based trade measures, the scope and significance of the exception is “uncharted in 
trade jurisprudence.”  Steve Charnovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 
689, 690 (1998).  At least one commentator regards the public morals exception as an outdated 
provision that should remain unused: “In the polyvalent society of the Global Market Place there 
is, of course, small room for individual ethics.  Ethics are not a permitted ground for restricting 
trade pursuant to Article XX of GATT 1994.”  Bentley, supra note 74, at 130. 
 170 Richard B. Stewart, The Challenge of GMOs to International Governance of Trade and 
Environmental Regulation (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School li-
brary). 
 171 See Compton, supra note 164, at 383 (noting that the European Union requires labels “to 
provide information to consumers, for health reasons, for ethical reasons and to prevent them 
from being misled”) (footnotes omitted); Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety Regulation in the Euro-
pean Union and the United States: Different Cultures, Different Laws, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 525, 
526 (1998) (“The culture and attitudes of European citizens have tended to favor traditional foods 
and minimal processing, while being skeptical of new technologies.”); Drew L. Kershen, Innova-
tions in Biotechnology — Public Perceptions and Cultural Attitudes: An American Viewpoint, 3 
GLOBAL JURIST TOPICS 1, 13 (2003) (“Europeans, to a greater percentage than Americans, con-
sider scientific evidence irrelevant.  What is relevant is protecting the religious and ethical purity 
of food.”); cf. Christopher D. Stone, Is There a Precautionary Principle?, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 
10,790, 10,798 (2001) (noting that opposition to GM foods “arises not merely from diverging inter-
pretations of the limited empirical data,” but also from “[c]onflicting national and cultural val-
ues . . . including control over what we eat, and attitudes toward science, sovereignty, and capital-
ism”).  
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falsify.  In either case, the integrity of the modern trading regime will 
be seriously strained. 
C.  Commercial Speech and “Mere Consumer Concern” 
A final example of the process/product distinction appears in rudi-
mentary form under the First Amendment.  Recent commercial speech 
litigation has generated a new free speech principle, according to 
which the satisfaction of “consumer curiosity” is an insufficient state 
interest to support laws that require manufacturers to provide con-
sumers with process information through labeling or other means of 
disclosure.  Just as the international law of trade tends to view con-
sumer interest alone as an insufficient basis for sustaining process-
based trade measures, a well-known Second Circuit opinion in Inter-
national Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy172 regarded “mere consumer 
concern” about “production methods” as an inadequate justification for 
mandatory state disclosure rules.173  Additionally, litigants in the re-
cent Nike, Inc. v. Kasky174 appeal attempted to push the proc-
ess/product concept further, offering the distinction as a new test for 
separating corporate publicity into commercial and core speech.  Un-
der this test, information concerning products would constitute com-
mercial speech subject to traditional false advertising regulation, while 
information concerning processes would constitute core speech entitled 
to the full protection of the First Amendment.175  In combination, 
these developments suggest a consumer marketplace in which process 
information may become comparatively privileged against disclosure 
and verification. 
1.  International Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy: Mandatory Disclo-
sure of Process Information. — In 1993, Monsanto Corporation’s syn-
thetic bovine growth hormone, Posilac, became the first widely mar-
keted agricultural product to be developed using modern 
biotechnology.176  Formally known as recombinant bovine somatotro-
pin (rbST), Monsanto’s product boosts the milk production of cows by 
mimicking the effects of naturally occurring bovine hormones.177  
Monsanto contends, and the FDA agreed in its review of Posilac, that 
no discernable differences exist between milk obtained from rbST-
treated cows and nontreated cows.178  Accordingly, the FDA approved 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 172 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 173 Id. at 73 n.1, 73–74. 
 174 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003) (order dismissing certiorari as improvidently granted). 
 175 See infra pp. 576–77. 
 176 See David Aboulafia, Pushing RBST: How the Law and the Political Process Were Used To 
Sell Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin to America, 15 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 603, 605–06 (1998).   
 177 See id. at 604–05. 
 178 Id. at 615–16. 
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the drug for commercial use despite a rash of controversy including 
congressional investigations,179 intense public criticism,180 and internal 
dissent within the Agency.181  In addition, consistent with its general 
stance regarding the products of genetic engineering technologies, the 
FDA issued labeling guidelines that not only failed to require milk 
from rbST-treated cows to be labeled as such, but also cast doubt on 
the ability of other retailers to identify their product as the milk of 
nontreated cows.182 
Given the uncertainty and controversy surrounding rbST, it was 
only natural that disputes involving the product would spill over into 
forums other than the FDA, including the courts.  In the first lawsuit 
involving rbST, a group of “American consumers of commercially sold 
dairy products” challenged both the FDA’s decision to approve rbST 
for general use and the Agency’s failure to require labeling of rbST-
derived dairy products.183  Despite finding that rbST causes a number 
of adverse health effects in cows and potentially poses health risks to 
humans,184 the district court nevertheless concluded that the FDA did 
not act arbitrarily or capriciously given the administrative record be-
fore the Agency at the time of rbST’s approval.185  Moreover, the court 
found that although rbST may increase levels of a protein hormone 
that has unknown long-term health consequences, this product differ-
ence, even if demonstrated, would not be “organoleptic” to the con-
sumer — that is, it would not be “capable of being detected by a hu-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 179 See id. at 614–15, 621–24 (describing investigatory actions by the General Accounting Office 
and congressional leaders during and after the FDA rbST approval process). 
 180 Jim Chen, The American Ideology, 48 VAND. L. REV. 809, 865 (1995) (“No other recent legal 
event in American agriculture . . . has provoked as much agrarian anger as the [FDA’s] decision to 
permit the use of rbST in milk production.”). 
 181 See Aboulafia, supra note 176, at 623 (noting that “an anonymous letter, circulated by FDA 
employees, . . . raised the issue of bias in the FDA approval process”).  
 182 To eliminate FDA concerns that an rbST-free label would mislead consumers, the Agency 
told any producer choosing to label its milk as rbST-free to include on all product packages a con-
textual disclaimer such as: “No significant difference has been shown between milk derived from 
rbST-treated cows and non–rbST-treated cows.”  Interim Guidance on the Voluntary Labeling of 
Milk and Milk Products from Cows That Have Not Been Treated with Recombinant Bovine 
Somatotropin, 59 Fed. Reg. 6279, 6280 (Feb. 10, 1994).  The guidelines also suggested that states 
should impose a substantial record-keeping burden on any firm making an “rbST-free” claim, 
stating that the firm might face administrative action “in the face of circumstantial evidence that 
it is using rbST or selling milk from treated cows [despite claims to the contrary].”  Id.  Critics 
were quick to point out that these guidelines were “strikingly similar” to language contained in a 
Monsanto legal memorandum that the company had used to warn companies not to label their 
products as “BGH free.”  Aboulafia, supra note 176, at 617.  Michael Taylor, a former Monsanto 
attorney who had advised the company on food labeling issues, approved and signed the labeling 
guidelines while serving as an FDA official.  See Anne Miller, Time for Government To Get Mooo-
ving: Facing up to RbST Labeling Problem, 18 HAMLINE L. REV. 503, 519 n.181 (1995). 
 183 Stauber v. Shalala, 895 F. Supp. 1178, 1182 (W.D. Wis. 1995). 
 184 Id. at 1183–85. 
 185 Id. at 1190–93. 
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man sense organ.”186  Absent such a detectable difference in the end 
product itself, and irrespective of the degree of consumer demand for 
information about the use of rbST, the court concluded that the FDA 
was correct in its determination that it lacked authority to require la-
beling based merely on differences in production processes.187 
Opponents of rbST have had more success on the state level.  Fol-
lowing the FDA’s issuance of interim labeling guidelines, a number of 
states moved to formalize voluntary programs for labeling dairy goods 
that were produced from non–rbST-treated cows.188  One state, Ver-
mont, adopted a mandatory labeling scheme under which retailers 
were required to place a blue dot on products that contained or might 
have contained milk from rbST-treated cows.189  In accordance with 
the FDA interim guidelines, the Vermont labeling regulations required 
a disclaimer that “the [FDA] has determined that there is no significant 
difference between milk from treated and untreated cows.”190  In addi-
tion, however, the regulations also required notice that “[i]t is the law 
of Vermont that products made from the milk of rbST-treated cows be 
labeled to help consumers make informed shopping decisions.”191 
A consortium of dairy manufacturers and food retailers challenged 
the Vermont statute and regulatory scheme in International Dairy 
Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy.192  The dairy producers argued that prelimi-
narily enjoining operation of the labeling scheme was appropriate in 
light of its likely impermissibility under the First Amendment.  The 
Second Circuit agreed, reasoning that because “neither consumers nor 
scientists can distinguish rBST-derived milk from milk produced by an 
untreated cow,”193 the only plausible state interest in support of the 
Vermont labeling rule was “mere consumer concern”194 about “produc-
tion methods.”195  In the court’s view, “consumer curiosity alone” could 
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 186 Id. at 1193.  For a discussion of evidence linking this hormone to the development of vari-
ous cancers, see George Davey Smith et al., Cancer and Insulin-Like Growth Factor-I: A Potential 
Mechanism Linking the Environment with Cancer Risk, 321 BRIT. MED. J. 847 (2000). 
 187 Stauber, 895 F. Supp. at 1193. 
 188 See Terence J. Centner & Kyle W. Lathrop, Labeling rbST-Derived Milk Products: State 
Responses to Federal Law, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 511, 535–50 (1997); Jennifer R. Thornley, Note, Got 
“Hormone-Free” Milk?: Your State May Have Enough Interest To Let You Know, 76 IND. L.J. 
785, 799–801 (2001). 
 189 Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 69–70 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 190 Id. at 70 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Adopted Rules: rBST Notification and Labeling Regu-
lations Relating to Milk and Milk Products, Vt. Gov’t Reg. § 3.1b (1995)). 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. at 67. 
 193 Id. at 73. 
 194 Id. at 73 n.1. 
 195 Id. at 74. 
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not support a law that required manufacturers and retailers to disclose 
“even an accurate, factual statement” against their will.196 
In a stinging dissent, Judge Leval first chastised the majority for 
failing to appreciate the full range of considerations behind the Ver-
mont statute, which, on his reading of the record, included “concerns 
about human health, cow health, biotechnology, and the survival of 
small dairy farms.”197  According to Judge Leval, the majority’s at-
tempt to distill these multifarious concerns into a single catchphrase — 
“consumer curiosity” — seriously distorted the policy purposes behind 
the Vermont legislation.198  Additionally, the dissent sharply criticized 
the majority’s implicit presumption that an FDA failure to find any 
“significant difference” between milk from treated and nontreated 
cows eliminated entirely the possibility that health and safety concerns 
might justify the statute.199  In the face of scientific uncertainty — 
which inarguably characterized the rbST situation, at least regarding 
long-term consequences for human and animal health — Judge Leval 
reasoned that states might adopt a range of regulatory stances, some 
more cautious and consumer-focused than the FDA’s.200 
As the majority noted, however, Judge Leval’s dissent failed to dis-
tinguish between the interests that consumers might espouse in favor 
of a state disclosure law and the interests that the state actually in-
vokes.  Significantly, when defending its regulatory scheme, Vermont 
refused to take a position on whether rbST is safe for human con-
sumption.201  Instead, Vermont simply argued that “its citizens are en-
titled to have information which assists them in making purchases 
consistent with their beliefs on the appropriateness of rBST use.”202  
Thus, the process/product distinction was presented in sharp relief to 
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 196 Id. 
 197 Id. at 76 (Leval, J., dissenting); see also id. at 75 (listing “concerns about FDA determina-
tions about the product as regards health and safety or about recombinant gene technology, con-
cerns about the effect of the product on bovine health; and concerns about the effect of the prod-
uct on the existing surplus of milk and in the dairy farm industry’s economic status and well-
being” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 198 Id. at 76. 
 199 See id. at 77 (“To suggest that a government agency’s failure to find a health risk in a short-
term study of a new genetic technology should bar a state from requiring simple disclosure of the 
use of that technology where its citizens are concerned about such health risks would be unrea-
sonable and dangerous.”). 
 200 Id. at 76–77. 
 201 Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n, 92 F.3d at 73 n.1 (“Vermont takes no position on whether rBST is 
beneficial or detrimental.”  (quoting International Dairy Food Ass’n v. Amestoy, 898 F. Supp. 241, 
252 (D. Vt. 1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Of course, the two required messages un-
der the Vermont labeling regime — one espousing the FDA’s conclusion about health effects from 
rbST and the other indicating Vermont’s desire that consumers have a basis for making “informed 
shopping decisions” — seemed to carry the implicit message that, regardless of the FDA’s position, 
Vermont believed its consumers should be concerned about the use of rbST. 
 202 Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n, 898 F. Supp. at  252.  
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the Second Circuit panel: Vermont consumers desired information re-
garding a process that, all parties agreed for purposes of litigation, did 
not result in products that were tangibly different from those of com-
peting process methods.  In that regard, Judge Leval’s attempt to ex-
amine directly the grounds of “consumer curiosity” and to question the 
empirical basis of the FDA’s “no significant difference” finding was an 
attempt to resolve a different case than the one before the court.203 
Although the International Dairy holding has yet to receive wide 
reinforcement in constitutional caselaw, the process/product distinction 
that it articulates has become a prominent argument raised by oppo-
nents of product labeling requirements.204  Additionally, Monsanto has 
aggressively challenged voluntary labeling by producers of milk from 
nontreated cows, claiming that such process information is misleading 
to consumers unless accompanied by a statement that “[s]cientific stud-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 203 Judge Leval recognized the distinction and therefore urged Vermont to revise its stance on 
remand to include more than “mere[] consumer curiosity” among its justifications for the manda-
tory labeling program.  Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n, 92 F.3d at 81 (Leval, J., dissenting).  Perhaps in 
recognition of the force of Judge Leval’s argument — binding facts to the contrary notwithstand-
ing — the International Dairy majority expressed reluctance regarding its holding at several 
points in its discussion.  See Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n, 92 F.3d at 73 (“We do not doubt that Ver-
mont’s asserted interest, the demand of its citizenry for such information, is genuine; reluctantly, 
however, we conclude that it is inadequate.”); id. at 74 (“[T]he Court is sympathetic to the Ver-
mont consumers who wish to know which products may derive from rBST-treated herds . . . .”).  
Nevertheless, the court ultimately concluded that it would be unwise to allow “consumer interest 
alone” to justify mandatory disclosure of information “about a production method that has no dis-
cernable impact on a final product,” reasoning that such disclosure obligations could multiply un-
controllably.  Id. at 73–74.  More recently, a Second Circuit panel upheld a Vermont statutory 
scheme that required manufacturers to label certain products containing mercury in order to fa-
cilitate proper disposal of the products by consumers.  See Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 
F.3d 104, 116 (2d Cir. 2001).  The court distinguished International Dairy on the ground that 
Vermont’s interest went beyond merely satisfying “consumer curiosity” to affirmatively “protect-
ing human health and the environment from mercury poisoning.”  Id. at 115 n.6.  Although the 
court recognized that the state’s environmental goals were “inextricably intertwined with the goal 
of increasing consumer awareness of the presence of mercury in a variety of products,” the statute 
passed constitutional muster in part because Vermont did not defend it based solely on consumer 
awareness for its own sake.  Id. at 115. 
 204 For instance, a recent decision by the FDA to require that trans fatty acids be declared on 
food and supplement nutrition labels was opposed on the ground that “the government cannot 
compel speech when disclosures are not necessary to materially alleviate real consumer harm.”  
Food Labeling: Trans Fatty Acids in Nutrition Labeling, Nutrient Content Claims, and Health 
Claims, 68 Fed. Reg. 41,434, 41,439 (July 11, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101) (noting 
citations of International Dairy by commentators to support the quoted statement).  Similarly, the 
USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service’s mandatory labeling regulations for irradiated food 
were challenged on the ground that “consumer desire to know how food was processed is not 
alone sufficient to justify mandatory disclosure of the processing.”  Irradiation of Meat Food 
Products, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,150, 72,158 (Dec. 23, 1999) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pts. 381, 424).  
The Agency rejected this argument, not because it necessarily disagreed with the legal proposi-
tion, but because it found that the irradiation process can result in actual material alterations to 
the treated products that are “not obvious to consumers in the absence of labeling.”  Id.  For fur-
ther discussion and criticism of this reasoning, see infra pp. 591–92. 
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ies conclude that the use of rBST to improve milk production does not 
change the nutrition, taste, quality, or any other health or safety char-
acteristics of milk.”205  Shortly after publication of the FDA labeling 
guidelines, for instance, the company sued two dairies that used “rbST-
free” labels and wrote to over two thousand other producers, threaten-
ing legal action if they should do the same.206 
More recently, Monsanto argued that the Maine Quality Trademark 
for Milk and Milk Products, a voluntary program used to certify in-
state dairy producers who do not use rbST, constitutes misleading ad-
vertising and imposes an unlawful restriction on market access.207  
When the Maine Attorney General rejected these arguments,208 Mon-
santo responded by suing a leading Maine dairy under the Lanham 
Act in federal district court, charging that its product label (“Our 
Farmers’ Pledge: No Artificial Growth Hormones”) constitutes a mis-
leading representation of fact and indirectly disparages rbST.209  In its 
suit, Monsanto contended that “[b]ecause there is no known way to tell 
the difference between milk from cows supplemented with Posilac and 
milk from other cows,” the marketing and sale of milk from cows that 
have not been treated with rbST cannot constitute “any kind of legiti-
mate marketing advantage.”210  This argument would seem to imply 
that, in Monsanto’s view, consumers also cannot express any kind of 
legitimate preference for the use of manufacturing processes that do 
not result in identifiable physical differences in end products. 
2.  Nike, Inc. v. Kasky: Voluntary Disclosure of Process Informa-
tion. — While International Dairy suggests that process information 
should be privileged against mandatory disclosure in the absence of 
some demonstrated environmental, health, or safety effect, arguments 
recently offered in Kasky211 suggest that process information also 
should be insulated from false advertising regulation when manufac-
turers provide it voluntarily.  To defend itself against charges of ex-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 205 Press Release, Monsanto Co., Monsanto Statement Regarding Oakhurst Dairy Inc. Filing, 
available at http://www.monsantodairy.com/updates/OakhurstDairyInc.Filing.html (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2004). 
 206 See Thornley, supra note 188, at 799. 
 207 See Letter from G. Steven Rowe, Attorney General, State of Maine, to Joan Z. Bernstein, 
Esquire (Feb. 6, 2003), available at http://www.KeepMaineFree.org/AttorneyGeneral2.pdf. 
 208 See id. 
 209 See Complaint for an Injunction, Monsanto Co. v. Oakhurst Dairy Inc., No. 03-11273RCL 
(D. Mass. filed July 3, 2003). 
 210 Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff Monsanto Company’s Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction at 13, Monsanto Co. v. Oakhurst Dairy Inc., No. 03-11273RCL (D. Mass. filed July 3, 
2003).  The parties ultimately settled the litigation when the Oakhurst Dairy agreed to add the 
following disclaimer to its label: “FDA States: No significant difference in milk from cows treated 
with artificial growth hormones.”  Edward D. Murphy, Oakhurst To Alter Its Label, PORTLAND 
PRESS HERALD, Dec. 25, 2003, at 1A, available at 2003 WL 58374343. 
 211 See 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003); 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002). 
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ploitative labor practices, Nike conducted an extensive publicity cam-
paign in the late 1990s that depicted the company as a socially respon-
sible employer.212  Pursuant to an unusual state consumer protection 
regime that at the time allowed “any person acting for the interests 
of . . . the general public” to bring an action for equitable relief,213 
California resident Marc Kasky challenged several of the factual 
claims made by Nike as false and misleading.  An important prelimi-
nary question for the California courts in assessing Kasky’s claims was 
whether to characterize Nike’s statements as commercial or noncom-
mercial speech.214  By portraying its publicity campaign as noncom-
mercial speech, Nike sought the benefit of the heightened constitu-
tional protection afforded to speech on matters of public concern, a 
status that would render portions of the California consumer protec-
tion law constitutionally suspect.215 
The California court rejected Nike’s argument, holding instead that 
“when a corporation, to maintain and increase its sales and profits, 
makes public statements defending labor practices and working condi-
tions at factories where its products are made, those public statements 
are commercial speech that may be regulated to prevent consumer de-
ception.”216  To be sure, the court noted, Nike’s speech is protected to 
the full extent of the First Amendment when it constitutes general dis-
cussion of issues such as the value of globalization or the status of de-
veloping world labor conditions.217  When, on the other hand, the 
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 212 Nike’s efforts included press statements, letters to newspaper editors, and letters to heads of 
collegiate athletic programs.  See Kasky, 123 S. Ct. at 2554 (2003). 
 213 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (West 1997).  For the structure of the regime generally, see 
Unfair Competition Law, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200–17210 (West 1997); and False Adver-
tising Law, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17500–17509 (West 1997).  For a discussion of the Cali-
fornia statute and the constitutional issues that it raises, see Trevor Morrison, Private Attorneys 
General and the First Amendment, 103 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005). 
 214 The Court has described the proposal of a commercial transaction as “the test for identify-
ing commercial speech.”  Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473–74 (1989); see 
also United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409 (2001) (noting that commercial speech 
is “usually defined as speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction”); City of 
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 423 (1993) (following the formula articulated 
in Fox).  In an earlier decision, the Court referred more vaguely to factors such as whether the 
manufacturer conceded that its speech constituted advertising, whether it referred to a specific 
product, and whether the manufacturer had an economic motivation for speaking.  See Bolger v. 
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66–67 (1983). 
 215 See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 64–65 (“[T]he Constitution accords less protection to commercial 
speech than to other constitutionally safeguarded forms of expression.”).  Specifically, by casting 
its communications as noncommercial speech, Nike hoped to benefit from the heightened scienter 
standard that must be met prior to the imposition of tort liability for statements relating to mat-
ters of public concern.  See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265–66, 279–80 (1964); see 
also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388–89 
(1967). 
 216 Kasky, 45 P.3d at 262. 
 217 Id. at 261. 
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speech consists of “factual statements about how Nike makes its prod-
ucts”218 designed to appeal to a consumer audience, it is subject to the 
less stringent level of scrutiny for commercial speech outlined by the 
Supreme Court in its Central Hudson test.219  Notably, as part of its 
conclusion that Nike’s speech was motivated by the prospect of eco-
nomic gains, the California court observed that process information of 
the type offered by Nike frequently constitutes an important criterion 
for consumer decisionmaking.220  Indeed, by reading the Supreme 
Court’s definition of commercial speech expansively to include, among 
other things, “statements about the manner in which . . . products are 
manufactured,” the court seemed specifically to reject any distinction 
between processes and products for purposes of its analysis.221 
Nike’s appeal from the California Supreme Court attracted thirty-
one amicus briefs and widespread public attention.222  Much of the 
discussion in the court filings centered on the distinction between cor-
porate speech that concerns processes as opposed to products, with 
Nike and its supporters advancing the argument that speech concern-
ing process information is necessarily noncommercial speech, and 
therefore entitled to full First Amendment protection.  Nike’s brief, for 
instance, argued that commercial speech should consist only of state-
ments that relate to “the qualities of a product as such (like its price, 
availability, or suitability).”223  Similarly, in its amicus filing, the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce proposed a test for commercial speech that ex-
plicitly incorporated a process/product distinction: “only speech that in 
some way advertises the attributes of products or services for sale 
should be considered ‘commercial speech,’ and speech that merely re-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 218 Id. 
 219 Under the test set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Electricity Corp. v. Public Service Com-
mission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), a restriction on commercial speech may be upheld even when the 
commercial speech “concern[s] lawful activity” and is not “misleading,” so long as “the asserted 
governmental interest is substantial,” “the regulation directly advances the governmental interest 
asserted,” and the regulation is “not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.”  Id. at 
566.   
 220 See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 262 (“For a significant segment of the buying public, labor practices 
do matter in making consumer choices.”). 
 221 See id. at 257; see also Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers, Inc. v. Lungren, 44 F.3d 726, 727–29 (9th 
Cir. 1994) (concluding that merchants’ environmental representations constitute commercial 
speech). 
 222 See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554, 2560 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the dis-
missal of certiorari). 
 223 Brief for the Petitioners, Kasky (No. 02-575), available in 2003 WL 898993, at *21 (emphasis 
added).  Nike’s phrasing in this sentence bears a striking resemblance to the language used by the 
Tuna/Dolphin panel when it first announced the process/product distinction as part of 
GATT/WTO jurisprudence.  See supra p. 542. 
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lates to business operations or other matters of public concern should 
be accorded full First Amendment protection.”224 
Nike also challenged the California Supreme Court’s acceptance of 
the notion that consumers express preferences for processes as part of 
their market behavior, arguing instead that “[t]here is only the most at-
tenuated link between public statements on important social, political, 
and moral issues — which generate heated responses and debate — 
and consumer purchasing decisions.”225  To the extent that some con-
sumers do appear to care about factors such as whether a good was 
produced using sweatshop labor, unsustainable harvesting techniques, 
animal cruelty, or other objectionable practices, Nike argued that such 
consumers act “for non-economic reasons.”226  A brief filed by three 
advertising trade groups seconded this view, asserting that “[t]he con-
sumer’s concern is [only] about the price of the product and whether 
the product works as it should.”227  Beyond those spare attributes, the 
advertisers argued, consumers have no interest in corporate or process-
related information, at least not in their capacity as consumers.228 
In contrast, supporters of the California court’s decision repeatedly 
cited the importance of process information to consumer decisionmak-
ing as evidence that Nike’s speech was primarily commercial in na-
ture.229  As Erwin Chemerinsky wrote on behalf of several members of 
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 224 Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America in Sup-
port of Petitioners, Kasky (No. 02-575), available in 2003 WL 835350, at *12; see also Reply Brief 
for the Petitioners, Kasky (No. 02-575), available in 2003 WL 1922453, at *6 (arguing that the 
category of commercial speech “encompasses product advertising, product labels, and other 
statements touting the attributes of a product . . . such as its price, how it performs, or where it 
may be purchased”); Brief Amici Curiae of Forty Leading Newspapers, Magazines, Broadcasters, 
Wire-Services, and Media-Related Professional and Trade Associations in Support of Petitioners, 
Kasky (No. 02-575), available in 2003 WL 835613, at *28 (“Accordingly, this Court should hold 
here unequivocally that only speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction — 
that is, speech that does no more than promote tangible qualities of a product or service in a tra-
ditional advertising format — may be treated as commercial speech and subjected to strict liabil-
ity rules such as the California laws at issue here.”); Brief Amici Curiae of the American Civil 
Liberties Union and the ACLU of Northern California in Support of Petitioner, Kasky (No. 02-
575), available in 2003 WL 721563, at *13–14 (“The challenged statements do not concern the 
price or safety of any Nike product, nor are they even alleged to provide any misleading informa-
tion about the product’s essential purpose or function.  Absent these considerations, there is no 
justification for treating Nike’s statements as transaction driven speech.”). 
 225 Brief for the Petitioners, Kasky (No. 02-575), available in 2003 WL 898993, at *36. 
 226 Id. at *22. 
 227 Brief of Amici Curiae the Association of National Advertising, Inc., the American Advertis-
ing Federation, and the American Association of Advertising Agencies in Support of Petitioners, 
Kasky (No. 02-575), available in 2003 WL 835112, at *22. 
 228 See id. (“To the extent that a consumer brings his or her own political views about the com-
pany into purchasing decisions, the consumer is taking the purchase out of the realm of commer-
cial speech and into the realm of political, noncommercial speech.”). 
 229 Brief for Global Exchange as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, Kasky (No. 02-575), 
available in 2003 WL 1844651, at *14–15 (“Consumers have indicated that they value the charac-
ter of the labor input into a product just as they would any other product attribute.”); Brief of 
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Congress, “[t]he position taken by Nike and its amici fails to recognize 
that consumers may care more about the conditions under which 
goods are produced . . . than the price, ingredients, or caloric con-
tent.”230  Refusing to acknowledge these aspects of consumer prefer-
ence, the respondent and its amici argued, leads to an unduly narrow 
view of commercial speech and its role in contemporary market  
society. 
The Court dismissed certiorari in Kasky as improvidently 
granted,231 and soon thereafter Nike settled the litigation by agreeing 
to contribute $1.5 million to a workers’ rights organization.232  Never-
theless, the constitutional questions presented by the case will be 
raised again.  More than any speech case the Court has heard before, 
Kasky illustrates the instability of the First Amendment divide be-
tween core and commercial speech.233  Because the Court previously 
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Domini Social Investments LLC, KLD Research & Analytics, Inc., and Harrington Investments, 
Inc., as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Kasky (No. 02-575), available in 2003 WL 
1844598, at *2 (“Consumers and investors are increasingly taking social and environmental facts 
into account in their purchasing and investment decisions, and thus these facts are properly un-
derstood as commercial speech.”); Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Respondent by Members of 
the United States Congress, Representatives Dennis J. Kucinich, Bernard Sanders, Corrine 
Brown, and Bob Filner, Kasky (No. 02-575) [hereinafter Brief of U.S. Congressional Representa-
tives], available in 2003 WL 1844684, at *9 (“Consumers have a variety of concerns when they 
buy products, and concerns about the conditions under which products are made are entitled to 
no less protection than concerns about price.”); Brief of Amici Curiae the States of California, 
Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New 
Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia 
and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in Support of Respondent, Kasky (No. 02-575), available 
in 2003 WL 1844750, at *8 (“A spokesperson from Reebok openly stated that ‘consumers today 
hold companies accountable for the way products are made, not just the quality of the product 
itself.’”  (quoting Su-Ping Lu, Note, Corporate Codes of Conduct and the FTC: Advancing Human 
Rights Through Deceptive Advertising Law, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 603, 624 (2000))); Brief 
of Amicus Curiae Public Citizen, Kasky (No. 02-575), available in 2003 WL 21012624, at *6 (“La-
bor practices, as with other intangible aspects of products, are an established basis of consumer 
choice.”).  Significantly, the United States also adopted this position, though it sided with Nike in 
the dispute, arguing that the private attorney general aspect of California’s statutory scheme ren-
dered it constitutionally infirm.  See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Pe-
titioners, Kasky (No. 02-575), available in 2003 WL 899100, at *28 (“In today’s environment, the 
means used to produce goods, no less than the quality of the goods themselves, have profound 
significance for some consumers, who are willing to pay more to achieve desirable environmental 
or social ends.”).  The United States’s private attorney general argument is thoroughly critiqued  
in Morrison, supra note 213 (manuscript at 54–61, 68–79, on file with the Harvard Law School 
Library). 
 230 Brief of U.S. Congressional Representatives, Kasky (No. 02-575), available in 2003 WL 
1844684 at *3. 
 231 123 S. Ct. at 2554 (2003) (order dismissing certiorari as improvidently granted). 
 232 William McCall, Nike Free-Speech Case Settled for $1.5 Million, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 13, 
2003, at C1. 
 233 Even before Kasky, the Court had recognized this instability.  See City of Cincinnati v. Dis-
covery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 419 (1993) (observing “the difficulty of drawing bright lines 
that will clearly cabin commercial speech in a distinct category”); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 
514 U.S. 476, 493 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that “the borders of the 
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has described commercial speech as “expression solely related to the 
economic interests of the speaker and its audience,”234 a critical focus 
of the briefing in Kasky was how to characterize the interests that con-
sumers have in receiving representations concerning a producer’s labor 
practices: do such representations “shape[] moral conclusions in the 
first instance and affect[] purchasing choices only secondarily, if at 
all,”235 as Nike put it, or do they “provide consumers with information 
about the circumstances under which goods are produced so that they 
can rely on the information in their purchasing decisions,”236 as Kasky 
put it?  The answer, discussed in Part II, is naturally more complicated 
than either of these depictions suggest. 
II.  THE REGULATION OF CONSUMER CHOICE 
Despite the aspiration of market liberalism to avoid judging or in-
terfering with the choices of individual actors, “[i]n many situations, 
some organization or agent must make a choice that will affect the 
choices of some other people.”237  Government regulation of the infor-
mational environment of consumers represents a strong example of 
this kind of unavoidable paternalism.  By influencing the amount of 
information that must or may be disclosed to consumers regarding 
product manufacturing practices, governments also influence the pat-
terns of consumer preference that emerge following the regulatory de-
cision.238  As the previous Part demonstrates, a particular vision of 
consumer decisionmaking is being offered to policymakers who are 
faced with these inevitably paternalistic decisions, a vision in which 
consumers scrutinize price, performance, and safety characteristics of 
products, but do not question or concern themselves in their role as 
consumers with the broader economic, social, and environmental con-
text within which products are manufactured. 
The process/product distinction and related legal developments ap-
pear in response to a variety of overlapping concerns.  For instance, 
rather than allow nations to accommodate citizens’ process-related 
demands through unchecked and potentially protectionist actions, the 
law of international trade strives to ensure that domestic regulations 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
commercial speech category are not nearly as clear as the Court has assumed”).  Moreover, Steven 
Shiffrin argued well before these observations that the commercial/noncommercial dichotomy 
displays insufficient sensitivity to the fact that “the commercial speech problem is in fact many 
problems.”  Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a Gen-
eral Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1212, 1216 (1983). 
 234 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).  
 235 Brief for the Petitioners, Kasky (No. 02-575), available in 2003 WL 898993, at *36. 
 236 Brief for Respondent, Kasky (No. 02-575), available in 2003 WL 1844849, at *33.  
 237 Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 15, at 175. 
 238 See infra pp. 628–32. 
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rely on adequate scientific justification and do not appear to reach too 
far beyond consumers’ immediate environments.  Rather than subject 
complex technologies such as genetic engineering to the potentially er-
ratic market test of consumer choice, the substantial equivalence doc-
trine holds that most products of recombinant DNA techniques do not 
differ significantly from their conventional counterparts and therefore 
do not require special regulatory treatment or product labeling.  
Rather than permit discovery and scrutiny of all aspects of a product’s 
history by actors who may misconstrue, exploit, or chill the provision 
of such information, commercial speech doctrine stands ready to nar-
row the circumstances under which states may mandate or regulate 
corporate disclosure of process information.  In short, the process/pro-
duct distinction and its related developments function as ready devices 
for determining when regulations are likely to have drifted beyond the 
satisfaction of legitimate consumer interest into areas of disguised pro-
tectionism, unjustified alarm, or excessive encroachment onto compet-
ing interests. 
This Part assesses the strength of the case for the process/product 
distinction, both by reexamining the assumed content of process pref-
erences and by evaluating those preferences within their domestic and 
international regulatory contexts.  Although proponents of the proc-
ess/product distinction tend to view manufacturing processes as espe-
cially unreliable bases for consumer distinction, process preferences on 
close examination appear to reflect coherent, well-grounded consumer 
viewpoints, essentially indistinguishable from other aspects of prefer-
ence that have been regarded as unassailable within the liberal market 
framework.  Moreover, although undoubtedly a partial and unsatisfac-
tory substitute for more traditional forms of political activity, process-
based consumer activities nevertheless resonate well with a variety of 
forces that have combined to place the consumer and the market at the 
center of twenty-first century culture and governance.  Accordingly, in 
the search for vehicles of public expression and social organization that 
might help to close the “democracy deficits” created by the forces of 
globalization,239 process preferences present an unlikely but promising 
candidate. 
A.  Comprehending Preferences for Processes 
To begin an assessment of the normative case in favor of the proc-
ess/product distinction, this section asks an important preliminary 
question that sometimes attracts only passing attention from propo-
nents of the doctrine: why exactly is it that consumers seem to prefer 
certain manufacturing processes in the absence of any tangible impact 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 239 See infra pp. 634–35. 
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from those processes on the product itself?  Why, in other words, do 
GM food products that are “substantially equivalent” to traditional 
foods nevertheless spark boycotts, street protests, international trade 
disputes, and enormous expenditures on organic alternatives?  Why 
are inexpensive textile imports greeted by some consumers with hesita-
tion and discomfort, rather than with admiration (or indifference) at 
the fact that modern trading has harnessed developing-world labor for 
the convenience of Northern consumers?240 
As will be seen, the answers to these questions significantly compli-
cate the effort to resolve important policy debates through an imagined 
distinction between products and processes.  This section examines 
three separate perspectives on process preferences.  The first treats 
consumer process preferences as most critics have: by examining the 
essentially empirical question whether acting on such preferences will 
achieve the apparent policy aim of the consumer or whether, instead, 
consumers are especially likely to misjudge the effect of purchasing 
goods for process-related reasons.  It will be argued that critics of 
process preferences often fail to account fully for the social, economic, 
and environmental consequences of production processes, such that the 
grounds of consumer attitudes with respect to those processes remain 
insufficiently appreciated.  Properly understood, these grounds dimin-
ish much of the force of the instrumental critique of consumer prefer-
ences for processes. 
Moreover, there are important alternative ways of understanding 
process preferences that do not depend so critically on debatable scien-
tific and economic questions regarding the consequences of consump-
tion.  In particular, the two remaining accounts of consumer process 
preferences provided in this section describe their expressive and ethi-
cal dimensions, seeking to understand such preferences from the view-
point of the consumer herself, rather than from an accounting of their 
impact on the external world.  From these perspectives, it will be ar-
gued that process preferences exhibit many of the features that tradi-
tionally have defined an individual’s sphere of autonomy within the 
liberal political framework.  That is, in addition to whatever role they 
may play as mechanisms for instrumental change, process-based pur-
chases also represent a significant vehicle through which individuals 
both project their public views and practice their core moral convic-
tions.  In those respects, there is little theoretical justification for deni-
grating process preferences in the manner that the process/product dis-
tinction implies. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 240 Cf. Andrew T. Guzman, Trade, Labor, Legitimacy, 91 CAL. L. REV. 885, 892 (2003) (“[I]f one 
is wholly unconcerned about the welfare of foreigners, foreign labor practices that reduce the cost 
of production — no matter how abhorrent — are not a cause for concern.”). 
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1.  The Instrumental Account. — One notable exception to the 
process/product distinction occurs in a federal labeling requirement for 
products developed using chlorofluorocarbons and other ozone-
depleting substances.241  Adopted as part of the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments, the requirement mandates inclusion by product manu-
facturers of “a clearly legible and conspicuous label stating: ‘Warning: 
Manufactured with [insert name of substance], a substance which 
harms public health and environment by destroying ozone in the upper 
atmosphere.’”242  Thus, despite the fact that products manufactured 
with ozone-depleting substances appear indistinguishable from substi-
tute wares manufactured without such substances, and despite the fact 
that end users may be harmed in only an indirect sense by ozone-
depleting substances used to manufacture a particular product, Con-
gress nevertheless felt that consumer awareness of this process infor-
mation would aid the effort to resolve the international ozone crisis.243 
In a world characterized by consumption practices with complex 
and far-reaching consequences, actions of the sort taken by Congress 
in the case of ozone-depleting substances may grow in significance.  
Already, voluntary efforts to bridge the gap between products and 
processes are proliferating.  For instance, member organizations of the 
International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling 
Alliance certify products from a diverse range of production processes, 
including sustainable forestry (Forest Stewardship Council), sustain-
able fishing (Marine Stewardship Council), organic and sustainable ag-
riculture (International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements, 
International Organic Accreditation Service), and socially accountable 
labor (Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International, Social Ac-
countability International).244  In addition, websites such as behindthe-
label.org, corpwatch.org, sweatshops.org, and responsibleshopper.org 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 241 See 42 U.S.C. § 7671j(d)(1) (2000). 
 242 Id.   
 243 Indeed, the EPA’s implementing regulations for the statute indicated strong awareness of 
the possibility that labeling might spur the development and satisfaction of consumer process 
preferences, which in turn might inspire changes in the environmental impact of production proc-
esses.  See Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 57 Fed. Reg. 19,166, 19,169 (proposed May 4, 1992) 
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 82) (“The increased ability of consumers to express a preference for 
products not using controlled substances would create a market-based incentive for manufactur-
ers to find and utilize substitutes for ozone-depleting substances that reduce the overall risk to 
human health and the environment.”).  In practice, however, the labeling requirement turned out 
to be less significant than anticipated, given the rapidity with which Class I ozone-depleting sub-
stances were phased out.  See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL LABELING ISSUES, 
POLICIES, AND PRACTICES WORLDWIDE B-162 (1998), available at http://www.epa.gov/oppt/epp/ 
pubs/envlab/wwlabel3.pdf. 
 244 Int’l Soc. & Envtl. Accreditation & Labelling Alliance, ISEAL Members, at http://www. 
isealalliance.org/membership/founding.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2004). 
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provide more detailed information regarding manufacturing practices 
than the spare medium of a packaging label can provide.245 
Such programs appear to be meeting with success.  For instance, 
spurred by increasing consumer awareness and the development of a 
uniform federal labeling program, the organic food movement has ex-
panded from a little-understood fringe element to the fastest growing 
segment of American agriculture, with U.S. sales totaling $7.8 billion 
in the year 2000.246  Demand for “fairly traded” coffee, chocolate, ba-
nanas, and other goods has grown to the point that Fairtrade Labelling 
Organizations International, a leading certification body, now endorses 
more than 800,000 producers in forty countries.247  Indeed, according 
to the International Federation for Alternative Trade, sales of Fair-
trade-labeled goods have increased anywhere from fifteen to forty-two 
percent in each of the last five years, reaching an international total of 
$260 million in 2002.248  Buoyed by such successes, delegates to the 
World Summit of Sustainable Development in Johannesburg recently 
called for action at all levels of government to “[d]evelop and 
adopt . . . consumer information tools to provide information relating 
to sustainable consumption and production.”249 
As noted in the previous Part, however, the process/product distinc-
tion casts considerable doubt on the legality and desirability of these 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 245 A graduate student in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Media Lab took this 
premise one step further by designing a bar code scanner that is linked to a database of informa-
tion regarding product manufacturers’ labor practices and environmental records.  See Will 
Wade, A Good Corporate Citizen? This Scanner Can Tell, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2003, at G5.  In 
that manner, detailed process information can be made available to the consumer at the point of 
purchase. 
 246 See CAROLYN DIMITRI & CATHERINE GREENE, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AGRIC. INFO. 
BULLETIN NO. 777, RECENT GROWTH PATTERNS IN THE U.S. ORGANIC FOODS MARKET 2 
(Sept. 2002), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aib777/aib777.pdf.  With respect to 
organic food, it is difficult to separate consumers’ beliefs or desires about the processes lying be-
hind the product from their perceptions about physical attributes of the product itself.  Neverthe-
less, to many observers, demand for organic food encompasses not only a desire for reduced pesti-
cide residues and other product-related characteristics, but also, and more fundamentally, a desire 
to promote a particular vision of the human role within economic and biotic communities.  On 
this account, “[o]rganic food is not just about a product; it is a philosophy in which the process of 
production is as important as the final result.”  Peter Hoffman, Editorial, Going Organic, Clum-
sily, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1998, at A23; see also INT’L FED’N OF ORGANIC AGRIC. MOVEMENTS, 
IFOAM BASIC STANDARDS FOR ORGANIC PRODUCTION AND PROCESSING 9 (2002) (noting that 
an aim of organic agriculture is “to support the establishment of an entire production, processing 
and distribution chain which is both socially just and ecologically responsible”), available at http:// 
www.ifoam.org/standard/norms/ibs.pdf. 
 247 Fairtrade Labelling Orgs. Int’l, FLO: Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International, at 
http://www.fairtrade.net (last visited Nov. 14, 2004).  
 248 Luuk Zonneveld, 2002–2003: The Year in Review: Labelled Fairtrade, at http://www. 
fairtrade.net/sites/news/onetonine/two.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2004). 
 249 Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development 14, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.199/20 
(2002).   
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efforts to downstream process information to consumers.  This section 
challenges the case for the process/product distinction, arguing that 
consumers frequently are not irrational or misguided in their prefer-
ences for processes, but rather are expressing different levels of risk 
aversion and a wider set of relevant considerations than are regula-
tors.250  This conclusion has significant implications for the variety of 
legal disputes that the process/product distinction has been employed 
to resolve, including the controversial and uncertain status of process-
based trade measures within the international economic system. 
(a)  Sovereignty of Consumers. — The very structure of market 
economies ensures that consumer choices exert an extraordinary level 
of influence over the activities of producers.  It is not immediately ob-
vious, therefore, why the sphere of influence entrusted to consumers 
should be artificially confined to the physical dimensions of the prod-
uct, excluding all aspects of the product’s processing history that do 
not directly bear on price, safety, or functionality.  When economist 
William Hutt coined the term “consumer sovereignty,” he referred 
broadly to “the controlling power exercised by free individuals, in 
choosing between ends, over the custodians of the community’s re-
sources,”251 a conception that easily accommodates consumer desires 
regarding the conditions of production.  Indeed, Hutt regarded this 
self-consciously political aspect of consumption as a vital element of 
the normative case in favor of capitalism.  He wrote: “The consumer is 
sovereign when, in his role of citizen, he has not delegated to political 
institutions for authoritarian use the power which he can exercise so-
cially through his power to demand (or to refrain from demanding).”252 
Hutt’s vision long has been reflected in actual market behavior.  
Indeed, almost from its outset, the age of mass production and market-
ing of consumer goods has generated episodes of consumer activism 
designed to catalyze changes in labor standards, factory conditions, 
and other processes by which products are made.  According to histo-
rian Kathryn Kish Sklar, for instance, “[d]uring the first two decades of 
the twentieth century the National Consumers’ League . . . constituted 
the single most powerful lobbying group for the enactment of labor 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 250 Cf. Franz Xaver Perrez, The Efficiency of Cooperation: A Functional Analysis of Sover-
eignty, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 515, 527–38 (1998) (describing a variety of externalities that 
might foster states’ interest in process information, even when the production processes do not 
affect the physical characteristics of products themselves). 
 251 W.H. Hutt, The Concept of Consumers’ Sovereignty, 50 ECON. J. 66, 66 (1940); cf. Va. State 
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976) (“So long as we pre-
serve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure 
will be made through numerous private economic decisions.”). 
 252 W.H. HUTT, ECONOMISTS AND THE PUBLIC: A STUDY OF COMPETITION AND OPINION 257 
(1936). 
2004] PREFERENCES FOR PROCESSES 585 
legislation to protect nonunionized, unskilled workers.”253  An essential 
component of this group’s advocacy came in the form of a “Consum-
ers’ White Label Campaign,” which ran from 1898 to 1918 and which 
served to “moralize the relationship between consumers and produc-
ers” by identifying whether particular goods were manufactured under 
sweatshop conditions.254  At its peak, the Consumers’ White Label 
Campaign certified goods from sixty producers, including the emerging 
retailing giant Wanamaker,255 and helped encourage consumers not 
only to support improved labor standards through their purchasing 
decisions, but also to begin to think of themselves and their activities 
in a public-regarding fashion.256 
In a similar manner, sit-ins, boycotts, affirmative purchasing cam-
paigns, and other episodes of commercial activism proved essential to 
the success of the civil rights movement throughout the twentieth cen-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 253 Kathryn Kish Sklar, The Consumers’ White Label Campaign of the National Consumers’ 
League, 1898–1918, in GETTING AND SPENDING: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN CONSUMER 
SOCIETIES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 17, 17 (Susan Strasser et al. eds., 1998). 
 254 Id. at 17–18.  Specifically, the Consumers’ White Label Campaign assured that garments 
bearing its mark were “made under clean and healthful conditions” in accordance with all appli-
cable state manufacturing laws and without the use of overtime or child labor.  Id. at 18 (all capi-
talization omitted).  An important predecessor to the labeling campaign consisted of “White Lists” 
and “We Don’t Patronize” lists issued by labor unions and women’s consumer groups that enabled 
members to purchase products only from union-friendly manufacturers and merchants.  See id. at 
21–22; MONROE FRIEDMAN, CONSUMER BOYCOTTS: EFFECTING CHANGE THROUGH THE 
MARKETPLACE AND THE MEDIA 39 (1999). 
 255 Sklar, supra note 253, at 24.  Wanamaker not only proudly advertised its National Consum-
ers’ League certification, but also set up traveling exhibits with pictures of sweatshop labor juxta-
posed against pictures of Wanamaker workers.  See id. at 31. 
 256 See id. at 24–25 (noting that “consumers supporting the White Label campaign became the 
vehicle whereby the National Consumers’ League emerged as the single most politically effective 
organization of middle-class women in the decades before World War I”).  The leader of the Na-
tional Consumers’ League, Florence Kelley, vowed to continue the campaign until it created noth-
ing less than an entire nation of citizen-consumers practicing ethical consumption.  See id. at 27.  
Although Kelley’s grandiose vision never materialized, the White Label Campaign did generate a 
foundation of support for the National Consumers’ League that ultimately enabled the organiza-
tion to play a key role in many Progressive Era labor reforms.  The League spearheaded litigation 
that led to the Supreme Court’s acceptance of the constitutional validity of maximum workday 
legislation for female workers in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).  Id. at 423.  Indeed, ac-
cording to Sklar, Josephine Goldmark, Justice Brandeis’s sister-in-law and a member of the 
League, authored the famous Brandeis Brief that heavily influenced the Court’s decision in Mul-
ler and that forever changed the role of social science evidence in constitutional advocacy.  See 
Sklar, supra note 253, at 32; see also LANDON R.Y. STORRS, CIVILIZING CAPITALISM: THE 
NATIONAL CONSUMERS’ LEAGUE, WOMEN’S ACTIVISM, AND LABOR STANDARDS IN THE NEW 
DEAL ERA 44–46 (2000).  Additionally, the League campaigned for minimum wage legislation that 
eventually became the basis for the minimum wage provisions of the federal Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act of 1938.  As Sklar argues, these political achievements were made possible in no small 
part by the League’s earlier success at mobilizing thousands of consumers through the White La-
bel Campaign.  See Sklar, supra note 253, at 32–34. 
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tury.257  Unquestionably, participants viewed these campaigns as a 
means of reforming the economic and moral character of market proc-
esses.  Black leaders in Lynchburg, Virginia, for instance, sparked an 
early boycott of segregated trolley cars by urging consumers: “touch to 
the quick of the white man’s pocket” by withholding patronage, for 
“’[t]is there his conscience often lies.”258  Throughout Northern cities in 
the late 1920s and 1930s, consumer protests sought to widen options 
for African-American laborers by appealing, “Don’t Buy Where You 
Can’t Work,” or “Spend Your Money Where You Can Work.”259  Ac-
tivist Ella Baker later worked to solidify this concept of “organizing at 
the point of consumption” as a key element of the overall civil rights 
movement, a strategy that proved essential to the movement through-
out the remainder of the century260 and that ultimately received consti-
tutional recognition from the Supreme Court.261 
As these examples demonstrate,262 process-oriented consumer activ-
ism enjoys a long pedigree in the United States.  The contemporary 
critique of process preferences, however, tends to ignore this history by 
attributing such preferences to ill-informed personal fears or the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 257 As historian Lizabeth Cohen notes, it is not coincidental that, in addition to the female-led 
National Consumers’ League, African Americans were the other major socioeconomic group to 
use consumer activism prominently and successfully in pursuit of political goals during the twen-
tieth century.  Denied access to traditional avenues of political expression and authority, both 
groups “seized upon the citizen consumer role as a new way of upholding the public interest.”  
COHEN, supra note 2, at 13. 
 258 August Meier & Elliott Rudwick, The Boycott Movement Against Jim Crow Streetcars in 
the South, 1900–1906, 55 J. AM. HIST. 756, 761 (1969) (quoting LYNCHBURG NEWS, June 9, 1906). 
 259 COHEN, supra note 2, at 44.  Similarly, ministers began to speak of the “Double Duty Dol-
lar,” whereby consumers not only could satisfy their personal needs and desires through pur-
chases, but also could help to improve the economic prospects of African Americans by patroniz-
ing black-owned or black-employing businesses.  Id. at 48. 
 260 Id. at 50.  Indeed, Cohen contends that, in no small measure, “[m]ass consumption begot a 
mass civil rights movement.”  Id. at 190. 
 261 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 911 (1982) (“In sum, the boycott 
clearly involved constitutionally protected activity.  The established elements of speech, assembly, 
association, and petition, though not identical, are inseparable.  Through exercise of these First 
Amendment rights, petitioners sought to bring about political, social, and economic change.”  (ci-
tation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  See generally Michael C. Harper, The Con-
sumer’s Emerging Right To Boycott: NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware and Its Implications for 
American Labor Law, 93 YALE L.J. 409 (1984) (providing a thorough analysis of the Claiborne 
Hardware decision and the possibility of a more general constitutional right to boycott).  
 262 Other notable examples of consumer behavior aimed at altering production processes in-
clude the grape boycotts of the late 1960s led by Cesar Chavez and the United Farm Workers Or-
ganizing Committee, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 254, at 47–49; the long-running campaign of in-
ternational activists against Nestlé Corporation in protest of its infant formula marketing 
practices in developing nations, see id. at 176–78; the consumer boycott of the 1980s that, in con-
junction with other aspects of the anti-Apartheid movement, ultimately led more than 160 U.S. 
corporations to cease operations in South Africa, see id. at 172–73; and the early 1990s boycott of 
the Cracker Barrel restaurant chain in protest of the company’s anti-gay and -lesbian employment 
policy, see id. at 149–50. 
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machinations of interest groups.  In the past, regulators could not have 
convincingly dismissed the Consumers’ White Label Campaign or the 
civil rights boycotts as irrational or misled, given that those campaigns 
targeted the unequivocally normative goals of economic and political 
equality.  The process/product distinction, on the other hand, portrays 
process preferences as almost inherently illegitimate, in that it confines 
the acceptable scope of consumer interest merely to verifiable claims 
about physical consequences that are manifest in the end product itself 
and that impact the consumer directly.263  Absent such tangible effects, 
the consumer’s demand for information regarding processes appears 
by definition to be unfounded, and therefore subject to paternalistic 
discounting rather than governmental acknowledgment and support. 
Consider in this regard the preference of some consumers and 
states for small or family-owned producers.  To proponents of the 
process/product distinction, such preferences are understood as barely 
disguised efforts to subsidize or otherwise protect inefficient indus-
tries,264 generally with harmful consequences to both domestic con-
sumers and foreign producers.265  Consistent with this view, a GATT 
dispute panel ruled in 1992 that certain excise tax credits provided by 
the state of Minnesota to small breweries would have been inconsistent 
with Article III of the GATT, even if the state had offered such credits 
to foreign and domestic breweries on a nondiscriminatory basis.266  
The panel rested its ruling on a formalistic determination that brewery 
size does not affect beer as a product — foreshadowing the proc-
ess/product distinction that would be adopted in Tuna/Dolphin I 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 263 See, e.g., Kurt Buechle, The Great, Global Promise of Genetically Modified Organisms: 
Overcoming Fear, Misconceptions, and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL 
LEGAL STUD. 283, 311 (2001) (contending that labels are more “helpful” to consumers when the 
labeled product expresses traits that affect the product’s end uses); Healy, supra note 159, at 239–
40 (stating that “[o]nce the government has determined that a product poses no risks, it is incoher-
ent to require a label that would allow individual decisionmaking based on concerns about the 
product that have no basis in fact”). 
 264 For example, state labeling requirements for rbST-treated milk have been critiqued in this 
fashion.  See Chen, supra note 180, at 866 (describing state efforts to require or promote rbST la-
beling and concluding that “[t]he pungent odor of producer protectionism permeates the legisla-
tive air”); see also Jim Chen, Globalization and Its Losers, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 157, 201–04 
(2000) (arguing that, “[i]f anything, smallness and family ownership bear a negative correlation to 
environmental protection”). 
 265 Too often, for instance, measures turn out in practice to direct resources to (nominally) unin-
tended beneficiaries, thereby harming consumers and foreign competitors through artificially in-
flated prices while simultaneously failing to achieve the very wealth transfer that provided the 
publicly avowed purpose for the measure’s passage.  Cf. Chen, supra note 264, at 201 (“Farm-
sector lobbyists readily bamboozle agriculturally illiterate consumers and policymakers . . . .”). 
 266 United States Measures Affecting Alcohol and Malt Beverages, June 19, 1992, GATT 
B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 275 (1993) [hereinafter Beer II]. 
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shortly thereafter.267  The panel’s underlying concern, however, seemed 
to center on the fact that, at the time of the dispute, Canada was home 
to few or no microbreweries that would qualify for the Minnesota tax 
credit.  To the dispute panel, therefore, Minnesota’s policy appeared to 
be an unfair attempt to support local producers through a cleverly de-
signed tax scheme that, although facially neutral, excluded nearly all of 
an important trading partner’s breweries.268 
As this example reveals, dispute panelists and trade scholars have 
especially sensitive antennae when it comes to detecting disguised pro-
tectionism.269  Although their sensitivity is not without some justifica-
tion, it should be tempered by a healthy measure of respect for the 
preferences of citizens and consumers, who may have legitimate moti-
vations for adopting even those process-based policy measures that 
commentators believe are most subject to abuse.  Minnesota, for in-
stance, seems to have been sincere in its desire to support a nascent 
“microbrew revolution” at a time when industry concentration had de-
pleted levels of both brewery employment and consumer choice.270  
Furthermore, nothing prevented the development of a microbrewery 
industry in Canada that would have been eligible for Minnesota’s 
preferential tax treatment.271  Without any obvious impediments to 
such a development, the GATT panel was unjustified in leaping to its 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 267 The link between the panel’s ruling and Tuna/Dolphin I should not be overstated.  As San-
ford Gaines points out, the Beer II panel interpreted “like products” under Article III:2 of the 
GATT, a provision that “offers limited guidance on the interpretation of Article III:4.”  Gaines, 
supra note 62, at 413.  
 268 A celebrated example of such disguised protectionism concerned an effort by Germany to 
grant a tariff reduction to Switzerland without affording similar benefits to its other trading part-
ners.  Accordingly, the measure was drafted to cover only “large dappled mountain cattle or 
brown cattle reared at a spot at least 300 meters above sea level and which have at least one 
month’s grazing each year at a spot at least 800 meters above sea level.”  Charnovitz, The Law of 
Environmental “PPMs” in the WTO: Debunking the Myth of Illegality, supra note 58, at 68 (quot-
ing Memorandum on Discriminatory Tariff Classifications, League of Nations Doc. C.E.C.P. 96, at 
8 (1927)).  
 269 Perhaps this sensitivity is explained by the fact that many panelists and scholars spent their 
former lives in national trade offices, carefully manipulating tariff schedules around product de-
scriptions to accomplish just this kind of protectionism.  See Hudec, supra note 54, at 110–11 (de-
scribing such efforts and stating that “[m]ost observers have their own anecdotal evidence to sup-
port this generalization about tariff practice”). 
 270 See, e.g., BILL YENNE, THE AMERICAN BREWERY: FROM COLONIAL EVOLUTION TO 
MICROBREW REVOLUTION 115–48 (2003). 
 271 Indeed, in subsequent years, a microbrewery industry emerged in Canada, aided, somewhat 
ironically, by tax breaks from provincial governments.  See, e.g., Kelly Louiseize, Tax Breaks on 
Tap for Breweries, N. ONTARIO BUS., May 1, 2003, at 10 (describing a tax concession scheme for 
small brewers in Ontario), available at 2003 WL 12121647; David Kuxhaus, NDP Pours Tax Re-
lief into Microbreweries: Reduction To Help Local Producers Compete, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, 
Apr. 19, 2001, at B7 (describing a similar program in Manitoba), available at 2001 WL 16235499.  
In the celebrated mountain cattle example, by contrast, Germany utilized more permanent geo-
graphical conditions to confer its disguised tariff concession on Switzerland without opening up 
eligibility to other nations.  See supra note 268. 
2004] PREFERENCES FOR PROCESSES 589 
skeptical conclusion about the state’s motivation for adopting a policy 
preference in favor of small producers.272 
This tendency toward skepticism is further exemplified in the in-
ternational trade context by the SPS Agreement, which requires that 
certain trade measures rest on scientific risk assessments in order to 
withstand WTO scrutiny.  As Alan Sykes notes, the premise of the SPS 
Agreement’s evidentiary requirements is simple: 
If a regulation that is ostensibly aimed at protecting health, safety, or the 
environment nevertheless has the effect of restricting trade, and there is no 
scientific evidence of any danger to be avoided or of any reduction in risk 
as a result of the regulation, then the suspicion arises that the regulation is 
disguised protectionism.273   
The shortcoming of this approach, however, is its implicit assumption 
that regulations that appear aimed at preventing environmental, 
health, or safety risks can be adequately understood and evaluated 
outside of the cultural context within which they originate.  As soci-
ologist Dorothy Nelkin observes, “controversies over science and tech-
nology [often] are struggles over meaning and morality, over the distri-
bution of resources, and over the locus of power and control” in a 
society.274  By demanding that regulatory actions be “based on an as-
sessment . . . of the risks to human, animal or plant life or health,”275 
the SPS Agreement relegates such nontechnical meanings of risk to a 
second tier of legitimacy, able to be invoked by nations in defense of 
regulatory measures only after a “sufficiently specific” risk assessment 
has identified an “ascertainable” threat.276 
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 272 The panel was perhaps impaired in its analysis by the failure of the United States to defend 
Minnesota’s scheme seriously.  See Howse & Regan, supra note 58, at 263. 
 273 Alan O. Sykes, Domestic Regulation, Sovereignty, and Scientific Evidence Requirements: A 
Pessimistic View, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 353, 354 (2002).  Note, however, that it is not necessary to 
demonstrate that the restrictive measures have had discriminatory effects in order to invoke the 
SPS Agreement.  See supra pp. 550–51. 
 274 Dorothy Nelkin, Science Controversies: The Dynamics of Public Disputes in the United 
States, in HANDBOOK OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STUDIES 444, 445 (Sheila Jasanoff et al. 
eds., 1995); see also Alvin M. Weinberg, Science and Trans-Science, 10 MINERVA 209, 209 (1972) 
(coining the term “trans-science” to describe controversies that may be framed within the dis-
course of science, but cannot be resolved within it).  A large body of psychological evidence, for 
instance, suggests that individuals infuse risks with a variety of social meanings, many of which 
escape the comparatively sterile methodologies of scientific risk assessment.  See Douglas A. Ky-
sar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1700, 1763–66 (2003) (summarizing 
studies that suggest that “risk is a complex, textured assessment of numerous variables that sur-
round a given environmental, health, or safety hazard . . . such as whether a risk is voluntarily 
confronted by the victim, whether its potential harm is equitably distributed among the popula-
tion, whether it poses a particularly dreaded form of death or illness, whether it threatens future 
generations, and whether the perceived source of the risk is believed to be a trustworthy actor”). 
 275 SPS AGREEMENT, supra note 75, at art. 5(1).  
 276 See EC Hormones Report, supra note 167, paras. 186–87.  Thus, while the EC Hormones 
Report indicated that consumer concerns could be considered in selecting the appropriate level of 
protection once a scientific risk assessment had established a basis for taking precautions, such 
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A similar excision of meaning occurs in the U.S. regulation of GM 
technologies.  By parceling government authority in piecemeal fashion 
among USDA, FDA, and EPA regulators, the Reagan Administration 
ensured that no single government decisionmaker would take a com-
prehensive look at the variety of risks and benefits posed by GM agri-
culture.277  Consumers, however, are not similarly compartmentalized 
in their evaluation of GM food products.  Thus, in addition to captur-
ing concern over long-term consequences for human health and safety, 
consumer suspicion of GM foods also reflects disapproval of the im-
pact that GM agriculture may have on nontarget animal and insect 
species, on ecosystem integrity, on the viability of organic farming, and 
on a host of more general ethical and cultural considerations.278  Fail-
ure to label GM foods therefore invites the alteration of fundamental 
agricultural, economic, and cultural aspects of the food supply without 
input from consumers.  This exclusion is defended on the basis that 
consumers are incapable of comprehending the complex set of trade-
offs posed by biotechnology.  A fair review of the evidence, however, 
suggests that much of the opposition to GM food products is both rea-
soned and, at least partially, substantiated.  Indeed, given that con-
sumers are, in some sense, the only decisionmakers in a position to 
evaluate new technologies such as GM agriculture in their totality, one 
might think that consumer views merit special credence, rather than 
special efforts at suppression.279 
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concerns could not enter the first stage of the analysis.  Id. para. 245.  As Jeffery Atik describes, 
these science-based aspects of the SPS Agreement may “lead to a new kind of international dis-
course, where certain moves are excluded.”  Jeffery Atik, Science and International Regulatory 
Convergence, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 736, 758 (1996–1997); see also Marc L. Miller, NIS, WTO, 
SPS, WIR: Does the WTO Substantially Limit the Ability of Countries to Regulate Harmful Non-
indigenous Species?, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1059, 1089 (2003) (“‘Science’ is an important aspect 
of rational decisionmaking, but the limits of the scientific paradigm and its role in a larger sphere 
of choice should be recognized, not only for questions that seem largely scientific but also for 
those that reflect reasoned choices about what environment — ecological and cultural — we 
would like.”). 
 277 See Applegate, supra note 164, at 233 (noting that the Coordinated Framework for regulat-
ing GM products assumes that GM organisms “pose no social complications that are sufficiently 
serious to include in the regulatory evaluation”); Bratspies, supra note 95, at 310 (“Rather than 
having a single agency responsible for regulating biotechnology, . . . the United States doles out 
administrative responsibilities piecemeal to various federal agencies.”).  As William Buzbee has 
noted, such “regulatory gaps” can be thought of as arising almost inevitably from “predictable in-
centives in complex, multi-layered political-legal contexts for social ills not to be overregulated, 
but to remain unaddressed,” an incentive deficit that Buzbee refers to as the “regulatory commons 
problem.”  William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory 
Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 5 (2003). 
 278 See supra pp. 554–56. 
 279 For instance, because regulators from various agencies address GM agriculture in piecemeal 
fashion, they might demonstrate a form of group-choice paradox in which each agency approves 
GM agriculture with respect to their issue or issues of concern, even though they might reject it 
on a holistic evaluation.  See LEWIS A. KORNHAUSER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, THE MANY AS 
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Other uses of the process/product distinction also overlook impor-
tant grounds for consumer preference.  In the case of rbST-derived 
milk, for instance, consumers have expressed concern not only over the 
types of risk that accompany genetically engineered products more 
generally, but also over the threat of painful and potentially dangerous 
effects of rbST treatment on dairy cows.  Indeed, Canada refused to 
authorize the use of rbST on animal welfare grounds alone, citing po-
tentially increased levels of lameness and infection among treated 
cows, as well as reduced livestock lifespans due to increased herd cull-
ing.280  Similarly, the “compositional analysis method” proposed by the 
USDA to analyze the risks of cloned livestock distinguishes between 
cloned and conventional food products only on physical dimensions.  
Consumers, however, might desire labeling due to a variety of ethical 
and religious concerns regarding the cloning process itself, including 
the fact that cloning may pose health risks to surrogate livestock and 
result in a high frequency of nonviable offspring.281  In short, by as-
suming likeness between novel and conventional organisms based 
solely on physical makeup, both the substantial equivalence doctrine 
and the compositional analysis method invite policymakers to ignore 
the full complexity of the issues raised by new technological processes 
such as genetic engineering and livestock cloning. 
Finally, the limits of the process/product distinction as a conceptual 
device are also apparent in the FDA’s labeling determination with re-
gard to food products that have been treated with irradiation.  In this 
context, in contrast to its decisions on GM food and rbST, the FDA 
chose to require disclosure of the process of irradiation because of its 
potential impact on certain physical properties of the treated product 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
ONE: INTEGRITY AND GROUP CHOICE IN PARADOXICAL CASES (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, Research 
Paper No. 68, 2003; Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, Research Paper No. 55, 2003), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID441466_code030915570.pdf?abstractid=441466&mirid 
=1; Bruce Chapman, More Easily Done than Said: Rules, Reasons and Rational Social Choice, 18 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 293, 312–16 (1998).  Consider in this respect the experience of Switzer-
land, which in 1992 established the contours of its regulatory framework for GM foods through an 
elaborate public discussion and national referendum process.  See Franz Xaver Perrez, Taking 
Consumers Seriously: The Swiss Regulatory Approach to Genetically Modified Food, 8 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 585, 590–91 (2000).  Reflecting the diversity of individual concerns regarding genetic 
engineering, the resulting constitutional amendment required Swiss regulators to “consider not 
only the safety of humans, animals, and the environment, but also the ‘dignity of creation’ when 
regulating genetic engineering and GMOs.”  Id. at 591 (citation omitted). 
 280 See Thornley, supra note 188, at 790–91; Press Release, Health Canada, Health Canada Re-
jects Bovine Growth Hormone in Canada (Jan. 14, 1999), available at http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ 
english/media/releases/1999/99_03e.htm.  A post-approval monitoring program conducted by 
Monsanto scientists confirmed the increased risk of hoof disorders associated with rbST treat-
ment, but found no evidence of elevated levels of mastitis infections.  See R.J. Collier et al., Ef-
fects of Sustained Release Bovine Somatotropin (Sometribove) on Animal Health in Commercial 
Dairy Herds, 84 J. DAIRY SCI. 1098, 1098 (2001). 
 281 See U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., supra note 116, at 11. 
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such as shelf life or nutritional content.282  To the consumer, however, 
such undetectable physical alterations in the end product only scratch 
the surface of concerns over food irradiation.  As in the GM food and 
rbST contexts, consumer demand for labeling of irradiated foods stems 
from a variety of social, economic, and environmental objections re-
garding the consequences of the process itself, rather than merely con-
cern over the personal health and safety risks of treated goods.283  For 
example, given that irradiation enables meat and produce to be 
shipped across greater distances than current handling and processing 
technologies allow, some opponents fear that irradiation will further 
the erosion of local agricultural production and regional food  
security.284 
In many respects contemporary process-related controversies con-
tinue the tradition of publicly oriented consumer activity exemplified 
by Progressive Era campaigns and the civil rights movement.  In each 
of the cases examined in this subsection, consumers appear to be ex-
pressing preferences not merely for the goods that they wish to pur-
chase, but also for the technological and socioeconomic characteristics 
that they wish to encourage in the economy’s productive sphere.  Most 
notably, consumer concerns seem premised on a recognition that, as 
Wendell Berry puts it, “how we eat determines, to a considerable ex-
tent, how the world is used.”285  To that extent, dismissing consumer 
preferences wholesale simply because they pertain to process charac-
teristics seems as unwarranted today as it would have been during ear-
lier periods of consumer activism.  Instead, consistent with the prem-
ises of a liberal market democracy, the default response of the 
government to purportedly unreliable process preferences should not 
be to suppress process information, but rather to expose it to scrutiny 
and counterargument.286 
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 282 See 21 C.F.R. § 179.26(c) (2004); 51 Fed. Reg. 13,376 (Apr. 18, 1986). 
 283 Cf. Fred H. Degnan, Biotechnology and the Food Label: A Legal Perspective, 55 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 301, 306 (2000) (arguing that the FDA “went to rather great lengths to craft a rationale 
for the required disclosure that fell within the literal confines of the agency’s traditional applica-
tion” of its labeling authority, and that other interests surely were at play in the Agency’s irradia-
tion decision). 
 284 See The Food Commission, Position Statement of The Food Commission, Food Irradiation 
— The Problems and Concerns, http://www.foodcomm.org.uk/irradiation_probs.htm (July, 2002) 
(observing that “[i]rradiation supports greater globalisation of food production and supply, threat-
ening local farmers and food processors”). 
 285 WENDELL BERRY, The Pleasures of Eating, in WHAT ARE PEOPLE FOR? 145, 149 (1990). 
 286 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) 
(arguing that government actors should “assume that [commercial] information is not in itself 
harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough informed, 
and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather than to close 
them”).  Consistent with this approach, biotechnology advocates in recent years have pursued 
various public confidence-building measures for GM food products and other genetic engineering 
technologies — in contrast to the industry’s earlier approach, which sought to suppress informa-
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To restore this traditional liberal view, several changes are neces-
sary.  First, rather than rely on an overinclusive proxy for protection-
ism such as the process/product distinction, WTO dispute panels 
should investigate directly the policy purposes driving challenged 
product regulations, accepting those regulations whose nondiscrimina-
tory purpose satisfies some variant of a means-ends rationality test and 
rejecting only those that do not.287  The once-prominent “aims and ef-
fects” test essentially followed this approach.288  Its recent explication 
and attempted revival by Donald Regan should therefore be welcomed 
as an effort to combat the problem of disguised protectionism without 
simultaneously eviscerating a nation’s ability to respond to the firmly 
held convictions of its consumer-citizens.289  Similarly, WTO member 
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tion out of concern that consumers would not comprehend the mix of costs and benefits offered by 
GM agriculture.  See generally Anne R. Kapuscinski et al., Making ‘Safety First’ a Reality for 
Biotechnology Products, 21 NATURE BIOTECH. 599 (2003) (describing a public-private “consulta-
tive and transparent process to incorporate scientific, technical, social and governmental consid-
erations in developing environmental and human health safety standards for genetically engi-
neered products”); Gary E. Marchant, Introduction, 44 JURIMETRICS 1 (2003) (introducing 
symposium issue on the subject).   
 287 See William J. Snape III & Naomi B. Lefkovitz, Searching for GATT’s Environmental 
Miranda: Are “Process Standards” Getting “Due Process?”, 27 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 777, 796 
(1994); see also Joel P. Trachtman, Trade and . . . Problems, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Subsidiar-
ity, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 32, 32 (1998) (including a simple means-end rationality test within a typol-
ogy of “trade-off devices” that dispute panels may employ when faced with a conflict between the 
reduction of trade barriers and the effectuations of other social or environmental interests). 
 288 See Howse & Regan, supra note 58, at 268; Hudec, GATT/WTO Constraints on National 
Regulation, supra note 58, at 626–29.  
 289 See Donald H. Regan, Further Thoughts on the Role of Regulatory Purpose Under Article 
III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: A Tribute to Bob Hudec, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 
737 (2003).  After an extensive textual and functional analysis, Regan concludes that products 
should be regarded as “like” for purposes of Article III under the GATT only if “(a) they are in a 
competitive relationship, and (b) they are not distinguished by any non-protectionist policy which 
actually underlies the challenged regulation.”  Id. at 752; see also Amelia Porges & Joel P. Tracht-
man, Robert Hudec and Domestic Regulation: The Resurrection of Aim and Effects, 37 J. WORLD 
TRADE 783, 794–97 (2003) (arguing that the “aim and effects” test may have been revived by the 
Appellate Body Asbestos Report in the context of deciding whether a measure is applied “so as to 
afford protection” or to confer “less favourable treatment” within the meaning of Article III (quot-
ing Appellate Body Report, Korea — Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen 
Beef para. 100, WT/DS161/AB/R (Jan. 10, 2001)) (internal quotation mark omitted)).  A less defer-
ential approach, but one still superior to the process/product distinction, would require that the 
nondiscriminatory regulation adopt the least trade-restrictive means available to achieve its pur-
pose.  See Alan O. Sykes, Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade, 66 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1999) (excluding from the definition of regulatory protectionism any “nondis-
criminatory” regulation for which “no less restrictive alternative is available”).  The limitation of 
such an approach, however, is the fact that hypothetical alternative regulations often are con-
strained only by the panelists’ imaginations, rather than by the full complexity of political and 
economic reality.  See Robert Howse, Managing the Interface Between International Trade Law 
and the Regulatory State: What Lessons Should (and Should Not) Be Drawn from the Jurispru-
dence of the United States Dormant Commerce Clause, in REGULATORY BARRIERS AND THE 
PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE LAW, supra note 54, at 139–40 (“A legal 
economist can always imagine a hypothetical welfare-maximizing regulatory instrument that 
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nations should clarify the SPS Agreement to ensure that its scientific 
basis requirements are not imposed on regulatory measures that seek 
to effectuate consumer interests other than (or in addition to) concerns 
about the type of health and safety risks that scientific risk assess-
ments can verify.290  For instance, although U.S. opponents of manda-
tory labeling requirements for GM foods argue that such regulations 
are “not scientifically defensible,”291 it should be understood that this 
argument targets only one factor in the evaluation of process-based 
regulations and that Europe remains free to posit other interests in de-
fense of its labeling regime. 
Second, the FDA should abandon the restrictive interpretation of 
its FFDCA labeling authority, which the Agency adopted only amidst 
the politically charged debate over GM regulation and which departed 
significantly from the FDA’s own longstanding practice of requiring 
labeling in a variety of appropriate contexts to aid consumer decision-
making.292  More generally, the FDA and other relevant authorities in 
the GM context should reaffirm that the “substantial equivalence” doc-
trine serves merely as a temporary heuristic device for assessing cer-
tain types of physical risks that might be presented by novel technol-
ogy.  Moreover, these agencies must acknowledge that employing the 
doctrine (or related concepts such as the compositional analysis 
method) beyond this sphere of application risks the incidental exclu-
sion of numerous ethical, cultural, and environmental concerns simply 
as a matter of definition, rather than as a result of reasoned analysis. 
Finally, the presumption that “mere consumer concern” about “pro-
duction methods” is an insufficient basis for state action — a presump-
tion expressed both in the beliefs of many international trade commen-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
achieves a public purpose without resort to trade restrictions.”).  For this reason, among others, 
John McGinnis and Mark Movsesian argue in favor of a test that focuses on procedural features 
of the domestic decisionmaking process that led to adoption of the measure.  See McGinnis & 
Movsesian, supra note 44, at 572–83; see also Jan Bohanes, Risk Regulation in WTO Law: A Pro-
cedure-Based Approach to the Precautionary Principle, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 323, 363–75 
(2002) (proposing an approach to evaluating environmental and human health and safety trade 
measures that focuses similarly on procedures).  McGinnis and Movsesian argue that their “pro-
cedure-oriented jurisprudence . . . would allow the WTO to invalidate covertly protectionist 
measures without supplanting the substance of national regulatory policies.”  McGinnis & Movse-
sian, supra note 44, at 580; see also Bohanes, supra, at 365 (noting that under a procedural ap-
proach, “a national trade-impeding health regulation unsupported by science could be ‘purified by 
a bona fide public risk perception’ and pass muster under WTO dispute settlement” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 290 A separate question concerns the extent to which the SPS Agreement acknowledges the pre-
cautionary principle as a legitimate basis for adopting protective regulation pending development 
of a stronger scientific understanding of health and safety risks.  See Walker, supra note 86, at 
255–63. 
 291 See Recent Developments in Regulation of Genetically Modified Crops, 23 BIOTECH-
NOLOGY L. REP. 55 (2004). 
 292 See supra p. 560. 
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tators regarding GATT/WTO law293 and in the International Dairy 
opinion294 — should be rejected.  By deeming process preferences pre-
sumptively illegitimate, policymakers aim to root out protectionist or 
otherwise ill-founded legislation, yet they neglect to consider the many 
ways in which consumer preferences reflect normatively coherent de-
mands for change with respect to the myriad consequences of produc-
tion.  Indeed, even when consumer process preferences do reflect scien-
tifically unfounded fears, the rejection of “mere consumer concern” as 
a legitimate state interest overlooks both the potentially significant 
welfare effects of fear itself,295 and the more abstract notion that, as 
Martha Nussbaum observes, “there is a distinctive human good ex-
pressed in the freedom we give our fellow citizens to make choices that 
we ourselves may hold to be profoundly wrong.”296 
In sum, the process/product distinction exacts too dear a price in 
exchange for its promised exclusion of socially harmful legislation.  
This price becomes all the more burdensome when it is recalled that 
proponents of regulatory cost-benefit analysis believe government poli-
cies should derive from the preferences that individuals “reveal” while 
acting in their role as private market actors — the same role that the 
process/product distinction constructs as essentially apolitical and un-
worthy of informational enrichment, except to the extent that con-
sumer products might threaten direct personal harm.  In essence, indi-
viduals who are motivated to participate in public debates become 
subjected to a double bind, denied on the one hand an informational 
basis for seeking to incentivize changes through their market behavior, 
yet expected on the other hand to reveal their “vote” in favor of public 
goods while acting in that very capacity.  As this subsection has ar-
gued, attempts to justify these seemingly contradictory policy positions 
with reference to instrumentalist arguments understate the meanings 
of modern technology and its role in a consumer society.  Consumers 
may make ill-informed or otherwise erroneous decisions, but they may 
also make decisions that exhibit a richer value structure than propo-
nents of the process/product distinction generally suppose. 
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 293 See, e.g., Grant E. Isaac & William A. Kerr, Genetically Modified Organisms and Trade 
Rules: Identifying Important Challenges for the WTO, 26 WORLD ECON. 29, 39 (2003) (“[A]c-
cording to the WTO, there are no legitimate uses of mandatory labelling standards based on the 
consumers’ right to know about non–safety-related and non–product-related [processes].”). 
 294 See supra pp. 571–72. 
 295 See MATTHEW D. ADLER, FEAR ASSESSMENT: COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND THE 
PRICING OF FEAR AND ANXIETY 1 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Working 
Paper No. 03-12, 2003) (observing the cognitive reality of fear and arguing in favor of attempts to 
incorporate “fear assessment” into regulatory cost-benefit analysis). 
 296 Martha C. Nussbaum, The Good As Discipline, the Good As Freedom, in ETHICS OF 
CONSUMPTION: THE GOOD LIFE, JUSTICE, AND GLOBAL STEWARDSHIP 312, 336 (David A. 
Crocker & Toby Linden eds., 1998). 
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(b)  Sovereignty of Nations. — Both critics and defenders of proc-
ess-based trade measures tend to assume that the primary, if not the 
exclusive, purpose of such measures is to inspire actual changes in 
production methods or conditions.297  In that sense, process-based 
trade measures appear not only to risk codifying scientific ignorance or 
disguised protectionism, but also to interfere with the sovereignty of 
foreign producer nations.298  After all, “[w]hy should one country be 
able to use its trade laws . . . to enforce its own view of how plant or 
animal life in the oceans beyond its jurisdictional limits of the territo-
rial sea are treated, or how tropical hardwoods are harvested?”299  
These concerns are reflected in the Shrimp/Turtle rulings, which re-
quire process-related trade measures to demonstrate a “sufficient 
nexus” between the regulating nation and the targeted practice.300  
Such concerns also underwrite the views of dispute panelists301 and 
academic commentators302 who argue that a prerequisite to the use of 
process-based trade measures should be a demonstration by the regu-
lating nation that it has pursued multilateral solutions to the problem 
targeted by its trade measure.  By treating nondiscriminatory process-
based trade measures differently from product-based measures in this 
fashion, the process/product distinction serves not only to deter dis-
guised protectionism and other means of trade discrimination, but also 
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 297 See, e.g., Bartenhagen, supra note 74, at 52–53 (“While ecolabeling programs vary widely, 
they all use market incentives to promote ‘green’ products with the ultimate goal of influencing 
behavior among both consumers and producers.”); Schoenbaum, supra note 66, at 294 (“The the-
ory behind eco-labels is that if consumers are informed, the market and consumer choice can be 
relied on to stimulate the production and consumption of environmentally friendly products.”).   
 298 As John Jackson notes, “[t]he term eco-imperialism has been coined for this problem.”  John 
H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?, in TRADE 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 58, at 219, 226–27. 
 299 Id. at 226.  
 300 See Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 64, para. 133 (avoiding “the question of whether there is an 
implied jurisdictional limitation in Article XX(g)” by noting that “in the specific circumstances of 
the case before us, there is a sufficient nexus between the migratory and endangered marine popu-
lations involved and the United States” because the “species here at stake . . . are all known to 
occur in waters over which the United States exercises jurisdiction”). 
 301 See, e.g., id. para. 166 (noting that the United States failed to engage “in serious, across-the-
board negotiations” with other countries before imposing its import ban); Tuna/Dolphin I, supra 
note 46, at 199–200 (same); see also Andrea Bianchi, The Impact of International Trade Law on 
Environmental Law and Process, in ENVIRONMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE 105, 114–16 (Francesco Francioni ed., 2001) (noting that “[r]estraints imposed by interna-
tional trade law on the use of unilateral environmental measures . . . may occasionally act as a 
catalyst for the development of multilateral regimes for the conservation of resources”). 
 302 See, e.g., Cameron & Campbell, supra note 58, at 41–42 (arguing that “if there are global or 
transboundary effects to a PPM, the best response will be international cooperation, the develop-
ment of multilateral agreements, or harmonization”). 
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to eliminate certain effects of trade policy and consumer preference 
that are perceived to be inappropriately coercive.303 
Developing countries in particular have stressed the perceived 
threat to their sovereignty posed by process-based trade measures.  
Accordingly, they have argued strenuously against the legality and ap-
propriateness of such measures, including even voluntary, nongovern-
mental product labeling programs.304  Unlike the instrumental argu-
ment described in the previous subsection, which depicts consumers as 
scientifically naïve,305 the argument of the developing nations depicts 
consumers as morally naïve.  It would be nice, they argue, if sweat-
shop labor could be expunged from the global economy so that no one 
suffers the “moral taint”306 of purchasing an item produced under ex-
ploitative conditions.  Until that utopia arrives, however, these nations 
maintain that it is unduly provincial to condition a foreign manufac-
turer’s access to product markets or to government-conferred competi-
tive advantages on its compliance with domestic labor and environ-
mental standards.307  Assuming that the failure to meet such standards 
tangibly impacts only the workers and environment of the exporting 
nation, greater tolerance of such harm in the developing nation should 
be treated no differently than any other aspect of comparative  
advantage.  Indeed, some might argue that the global trading system 
exists precisely in order to take advantage of such disparities in pro-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 303 See David M. Driesen, What Is Free Trade?: The Real Issue Lurking Behind the Trade and 
Environment Debate, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 279, 312–29 (2001) (distinguishing between nondiscrimi-
nation and noncoercion and arguing that the WTO is most competent as an institution to pursue 
the former). 
 304 The concerns of developing nations certainly are not without merit.  The complexities in-
volved in crafting, satisfying, and enforcing process-based trade measures often mean that such 
measures discriminate in practice against producers who lack the technical expertise and institu-
tional resources necessary to achieve compliance with process standards.  See Gaines, supra note 
62, at 427 (describing the “vociferous opposition by developing countries to PPM-based measures 
and analogous ‘product’ requirements such as environmental packaging and eco-labeling”); 
Veenha Jha & Simonetta Zarrilli, Eco-Labelling Initiatives As Potential Barriers to Trade: A 
Viewpoint from Developing Countries, in ECO-LABELLING, supra note 39, at 277 (discussing the 
concerns of developing nations with respect to product labeling programs); Joshi, supra note 68, at 
72 (detailing market-access complaints of developing nations); René Vossenaar, Eco-Labelling and 
International Trade: The Main Issues, in ECO-LABELLING, supra note 39, at 21, 23–24 (cataloging 
ways in which environmental labeling schemes might practically disadvantage producers in de-
veloping nations). 
 305 See supra pp. 589–95.  
 306 See Howse, supra note 168, at 160 (describing social labeling of products as a way to “en-
able individual consumers to avoid the moral ‘taint’ of themselves consuming [a morally objec-
tionable] product”); see also Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 65 (1st Cir. 1999) 
(describing Massachusetts’s effort to avoid the “moral taint” of associating with entities that do 
business in Burma). 
 307 Cf. sources cited supra note 41. 
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duction costs and capabilities.308  From this perspective, the process 
preferences of affluent Western consumers do indeed seem egregiously 
puritan. 
Naturally, however, there is an opposite extreme: On April 28, 
1939, in an address to the Reichstag, Adolf Hitler criticized a boycott 
of German goods by U.S. consumers in language that is remarkably 
similar to contemporary criticisms of process-based trade measures.309  
Specifically, the Nazi dictator argued that “[i]t is . . . an unbearable 
burden for world economic relations that it should be possible in some 
countries for some ideological reason or other to let loose a wild boy-
cott of agitation against other countries and their goods and so practi-
cally to eliminate them from the market.”310  This example is not, by 
any means, intended to equate current process-related concerns with 
the concerns that motivated U.S. consumer boycotts during the Holo-
caust.  It is instead intended to demonstrate a spectrum of moral ob-
jections to extraterritorial conditions, none of which tangibly impact a 
domestic nation’s environment or threaten physical harm to its citi-
zens, but many of which might viscerally impact the willingness of 
consumers in that nation to accept imported goods.  Obviously, not all 
of these objections can or should be dismissed as “moral militancy.”311 
The view that regards process preferences as extrajurisdictional in 
orientation312 follows naturally from geographically bound, Westpha-
lian notions of sovereignty.313  It does not, however, adequately reflect 
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 308 See Howse & Regan, supra note 58, at 283–84 (arguing that, apart from the use of slave la-
bor and child labor, most labor standards issues are primarily local and redistributive in nature 
and are therefore better understood as aspects of comparative advantage rather than issues that 
should properly concern domestic consumers). 
 309 See Adolf Hitler, Address to the Reichstag (Apr. 28, 1939), quoted in FRIEDMAN, supra note 
254, at 137. 
 310 Id.  Hitler continued by urging President Roosevelt to squelch the boycotts as an essential 
precondition to productive international relations: 
For it is my conviction that if the leaders of nations are not even capable . . . of re-
moving boycotts pursued for ideological reasons which can damage trade relations be-
tween countries to so great an extent, there is much less prospect of achieving by means 
of international agreements any really fruitful step toward improvement of economic  
relations. 
Id. 
 311 The phrase “moral militancy” was coined by Jagdish Bhagwati, a noted trade scholar and 
critic of process-based trade measures.  See Jagdish Bhagwati, Trade and the Environment: The 
False Conflict?, in TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 58, at 159, 170.  Bhagwati does 
acknowledge the existence of some international norms in defense of which process-based trade 
measures might be justified.  Jagdish Bhagwati, The WTO: What Next, Twenty-Fourth Wincott 
Memorial Lecture 26–27 (Oct. 25, 1994) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (“[T]here 
will be nearly universal agreement that if slavery produces competitive advantage, that advantage 
is illegitimate and ought to be rejected.”).   
 312 See, e.g., McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 44, at 587. 
 313 See Eric Engle, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): Market-Based Remedies for Inter-
national Human Rights Violations?, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 103, 107 (2004) (noting that the 
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consumers’ sense of concern and responsibility in a global economy.314  
To the contrary, consumers who express process preferences typically 
care about the nature of the harm being avoided, not the locus of that 
harm.  Thus, the question whether a domestic trade measure seeks to 
alter domestic or extraterritorial conditions is misplaced: “[E]ven if the 
physical effects of the disfavoured processing method occur entirely 
outside the importing country, the importing country may be con-
cerned to avoid the moral discredit . . . of . . . encouraging harm or 
wickedness — and the moral discredit occurs within the importing 
country, regardless of where the physical harm occurs.”315  Any con-
trary view perpetuates the untenable fiction, critiqued by Philip Allott, 
that individuals adhere to wholly separate domestic and international 
ethics systems, in which “one set of moral judgments . . . within our 
own national society” stands in stark contrast to “another set [imposed 
by international law] for everything that happens beyond the frontiers 
of our national society.”316 
The question then becomes how the international community 
should regulate trade measures that support potentially legitimate con-
sumer process preferences.  As Anne-Marie Slaughter has documented, 
the crafters of the Bretton Woods institutions originally expected the 
trade-liberalizing effects of the GATT to occur in conjunction with a 
package of institutions that would promote “economic and social coop-
eration.”317  When the linchpin of that package — the International 
Trade Organization — failed to materialize, however, the GATT sur-
vived in a peculiar and potentially dangerous state, “removed from its 
intended context of global social and economic regulation.”318  The 
questions left unanswered by that failure now confront trade scholars 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Westphalian model depicts “states as isolated from each other and as the princip[al] object of loy-
alty of their subjects”). 
 314 See BECK, supra note 11, at 67 (“Just like poverty or profits, compassion is also becoming 
global.”). 
 315 Howse & Regan, supra note 58, at 279 (emphasis omitted); see also, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, 
Federalism and Environmental Regulation: Lessons for the European Union and the Interna-
tional Community, 83 VA. L. REV. 1331, 1344 (1997) (analogizing the psychological disutility 
caused by extraterritorial environmental harms to “physical spillovers”). 
 316 See Philip Allott, The Josephine Onoh Memorial Lecture (Feb. 21, 1989), reprinted in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE WORLD 16 
(1989).  But see Paul Krugman, What Should Trade Negotiators Negotiate About?, 35 J. ECON. 
LIT. 113, 115 (1997) (contending that trade is no more or less beneficial for an importing nation as 
a consequence of labor or environmental conditions abroad).   
 317 See Anne-Marie Burley, Regulating the World: Multilateralism, International Law, and the 
Projection of the New Deal Regulatory State, in MULTILATERALISM MATTERS: THE THEORY 
AND PRAXIS OF AN INSTITUTIONAL FORM 125, 135–39 (John Gerard Ruggie ed., 1993). 
 318 Robert Howse, Managing the Interface Between International Trade Law and the Regula-
tory State: What Lessons Should (and Should Not) Be Drawn from the Jurisprudence of the 
United States Dormant Commerce Clause, in REGULATORY BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF 
NON-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE LAW, supra note 54, at 139, 143.  
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with unmistakable clarity: What are the appropriate bounds of social 
and moral concern within a global trading system that lacks a mecha-
nism comparable in scope and strength to the GATT/WTO legal appa-
ratus for expressing and evaluating noneconomic interests?  In the ab-
sence of a more comprehensive scheme of social regulation to 
complement the international economic regime, what are the analytical 
guideposts for distinguishing an acceptable aspect of comparative ad-
vantage from an objectionable practice that an importing country can 
properly subject to compensatory trade measures?319  What are the 
risks of promoting a multilateral trading organization that is vigor-
ously committed to the notion of anticoercion when no adequately  
empowered international agencies exist to take up the role presently 
played, however clumsily, by “coercive” process-based trade measures?320 
Even the dramatically evolved WTO, with its numerous substan-
tive agreements and robust adjudicatory procedures, is ill-equipped to 
resolve issues as complex and significant as environmentally or socially 
motivated trade measures.321  These limitations are especially evident 
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 319 Howse and Regan, for instance, attempt to distinguish between competitive advantages that 
are legitimate and those that are better characterized as negative externalities.  Compare Howse & 
Regan, supra note 58, at 283 (stating that greater tolerance of the aesthetic blights caused by strip 
mining operations constitutes a genuine comparative advantage in that consumers should not care 
about the appearance of foreign abandoned strip mines), with id. at 281 (stating that “turtle-
unfriendly” fishing poses externalities that affect the global population of turtles).  But see John 
H. Jackson, Comments on Shrimp/Turtle and the Product/Process Distinction, 11 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 303, 307 (2000) (noting the difficulty of determining “the extent to which a country can force 
another country to internalize ‘externalities’ that the other country may not think are ‘external-
ities’”).  
 320 In part because of this lack of strong international regulatory institutions, numerous schol-
ars have argued that unilateral trade measures can play a constructive role in international deci-
sionmaking under appropriate circumstances.  See, e.g., ESTY, supra note 59, at 144 (“The intrin-
sic difficulty of multilateral decision making and the lack of existing institutional structures for 
effective international environmental policymaking . . . makes unilateral action a necessary, if un-
fortunate, policy option in some circumstances.”); David A. Wirth & Douglas J. Caldwell, Unilat-
eral Trade-Based Measures for Protection of the Marine Environment, in VALUES AT SEA: ETHICS 
FOR THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 147, 160–67 (Dorinda G. Dallmeyer ed., 2003) (describing a 
variety of policy attributes of unilateral trade-based measures and concluding that such measures 
“are almost always understood as a second-best alternative to bilateral or multilateral cooperation 
but [are] at the same time desirable or necessary as an interim juncture in a policy trajectory de-
signed to stimulate greater international cooperation”).  The actual practical significance of unilat-
eral trade measures in the environmental context is the subject of much dispute, however.  Com-
pare Parker, supra note 44, at 25–26 (2001) (“[B]ehind almost any strong, truly effective, 
international environmental agreement . . . in the world today . . . you are likely to find — at 
some key juncture in its past or present — the credible threat of unilateral or small group eco-
nomic leverage.”), with Gaines, supra note 62, at 419–21 (arguing that the actual role of process-
based trade measures in furthering environmental policy thus far has been limited). 
 321 See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 240, at 887 (“The relationship between trade and labor is ex-
actly the sort of policy issue that is ill-suited to the [WTO Appellate Body].”); see also Andrew T. 
Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 303, 305 (2004) (arguing that 
“[t]he WTO . . . must eventually either move forward by finding a way to incorporate more regu-
latory issues within its mandate or move backward and retreat to a narrower focus on trade, leav-
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in the WTO’s continuing, albeit more limited, reliance on the proc-
ess/product distinction.  By subjecting process-based trade measures to 
different, more strict scrutiny than product-based measures, the dis-
tinction seeks to deter disguised protectionism and territorial over-
reaching.  Rather than clarifying discussions about the likelihood of 
disguised protectionism or the appropriateness of unilateral action, 
however, the formalistic — and nearly outcome-determinative — proc-
ess/product distinction prevents such discussions from even occur-
ring.322  To be sure, abandoning the process/product distinction in fa-
vor of less exacting tests for trade discrimination323 leaves the separate 
question of territorial overreaching largely beyond the purview of the 
WTO.324  However, as noted above, restricting the focus of the WTO 
dispute settlement process in this manner may actually be helpful not 
only for furthering consumer sovereignty within the international eco-
nomic system, but also for protecting the embattled WTO itself.325  
The process/product distinction’s contrary approach of requiring non-
discriminatory, origin-neutral product regulations to be justified within 
the narrow and demanding confines of Article XX simply because 
they pertain to processes may be both textually unjustified326 and, in 
the long run, politically unsustainable. 
2.  The Expressive Account. — Extensive evidence indicates that 
consumers are willing to pay a premium for goods derived from cer-
tain production processes, even in the absence of appreciable differ-
ences in the resulting products.  Among other items, such preferences 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
ing controversial topics such as the environment outside of its influence”).  Precisely for this rea-
son, a number of prominent commentators have advocated the creation of new international insti-
tutions to take on regulatory roles complementary to the WTO’s deregulatory agenda.  See San-
ford E. Gaines, The Problem of Enforcing Environmental Norms in the WTO and What To Do 
About It, 26 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 321, 342–51 (2003) (providing an overview and an 
enlightened critique of various proposals for a new global environmental regulatory organization). 
 322 Cf. Hudec, GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation, supra note 58, at 626 (noting 
that under the process/product distinction, “governments must meet . . . high standards to justify 
‘origin-neutral’ regulatory measures which are guilty of nothing more than transgressing certain 
abstract notions of ‘likeness’”). 
 323 For a description of several alternative tests for discrimination and protectionism that do 
not sweep as broadly as the process/product distinction, see pp. 593–95 and sources cited supra 
note 287. 
 324 For an argument that customary international law regarding the extent of jurisdictional au-
thority should be used to resolve charges of territorial overreaching, see Lorand Bartels, Article 
XX of GATT and the Problem of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction — The Case of Trade Measures for 
the Protection of Human Rights, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 353 (2002). 
 325 See supra pp. 568–69. 
 326 See Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy — And Back Again: The Fate of the Mul-
tilateral Trading Regime, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 94, 102 (2002) (noting that “there was no textual basis 
in Article XX . . . that provided a territorial or jurisdictional limitation on the policies or ration-
ales for intervention that could be justified under the individual heads of that article”). 
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have been demonstrated for non-GM foods,327 sustainably harvested 
timber,328 and fairly traded goods.329  These findings create something 
of a puzzle for the instrumental account of consumer process prefer-
ences.  On that account, the goal of consumer activists is to generate a 
sufficient level of collective demand to change production processes in 
pursuit of shared goals such as the improvement of occupational safety 
or the elimination of racial discrimination.  Process preferences there-
fore resemble a public good in that individual consumers may free ride 
on the altruistic expenditures of others, leading ultimately to an un-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 327 See Gregory A. Baker & Thomas A. Burnham, Consumer Response to Genetically Modified 
Foods: Market Segment Analysis and Implications for Producers and Policy Makers, 26 J. AGRIC. 
& RESOURCE ECON. 387, 400 (2001) (finding that the presence of GM ingredients was an impor-
tant concern for approximately 30% of respondents in a study); Wen S. Chern et al., Consumer 
Acceptance and Willingness To Pay for Genetically Modified Vegetable Oil and Salmon: A Multi-
ple-Country Assessment, 5 AGBIOFORUM 105, 108 (2002) (reporting survey evidence of willingness 
to pay price premiums for non-GM vegetable oil ranging from 55–69% premiums for Norwegian 
respondents, 50–62% for American respondents, 33–40% for Japanese respondents, and 17–21% 
for Taiwanese respondents); JILL J. MCCLUSKEY ET AL., CONSUMER RESPONSE TO GENETI-
CALLY MODIFIED FOOD PRODUCTS IN JAPAN 18 (Wash. State Univ., Research Paper TWP-2001-
101, Sept. 21, 2001) (finding that consumers in Japan are willing to pay a premium of approxi-
mately 60% for non-GM noodles and tofu), available at http://impact.wsu.edu/research/twp/01-
101.pdf; Catherine A. Mendenhall & Robert E. Evenson, Estimates of Willingness To Pay a Pre-
mium for Non-GM Foods: A Survey, in MARKET DEVELOPMENT FOR GENETICALLY MODIFIED 
FOODS 55, 58 (Vittorio Santaniello et al. eds., 2002) (reporting that 50% of survey respondents 
stated that they were very likely or somewhat likely to purchase non-GM foods at a premium of 
up to 20%); Charles Noussair et al., Do Consumers Really Refuse To Buy Genetically Modified 
Food?, 114 ECON. J. 102, 112, 117–18 (2004) (reporting that 35% of French consumers are unwill-
ing to purchase GM foods and that 42% demand a price reduction in order to be willing to pur-
chase GM foods); Matthew Rousu et al., Are United States Consumers Tolerant of Genetically 
Modified Foods?, 26 REV. AGRIC. ECON. 19 (2004) (finding reduced consumer willingness to pay 
for food containing genetically modified material); Abebayehu Tegene et al., The Effects of Infor-
mation on Consumer Demand for Biotech Foods: Evidence from Experimental Auctions, USDA 
TECHNICAL BULL. NO. 1903, at 24 (Mar. 2003) (finding that American consumers discount their 
willingness to pay for GM-labeled foods by up to 14% under a variety of information settings). 
 328 See, e.g., Rachel Crossley et al., Is There a Commercial Case for Tropical Timber Certifica-
tion?, in ECO-LABELLING, supra note 39, at 228, 237–38 (summarizing evidence of consumers’ 
willingness to pay price premiums to obtain environmentally friendly timber); Markku Simula, 
Timber Certification Initiatives and Their Implications for Developing Countries, in ECO-
LABELLING, supra note 39, at 206, 220–21 (describing a study in which 68% of consumers ex-
pressed a willingness to pay 1–15% price premiums for furniture made from sustainably har-
vested timber). 
 329 See KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT & RICHARD B. FREEMAN, WHITE HATS OR DON QUIXOTES? 
HUMAN RIGHTS VIGILANTES IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 3–4, 41 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 8102, 2001) (reporting that 81% of consumers were willing to pay 
more for an item if it was made under “good conditions”); Univ. of Md., Program on International 
Policy Attitudes, Americans on Globalization: A Study of US Public Attitudes, http://www.pipa. 
org/OnlineReports/Globalization/global_rep.html (Mar. 28, 2000) (reporting that 76% of respon-
dents indicated willingness to pay a $5.00 premium for shirts made in a “safe and healthy” work-
ing environment over shirts made in a “harsh and unsafe” working environment); PATRICK DE 
PELSMACKER ET AL., ARE FAIR TRADE LABELS GOOD BUSINESS? ETHICS AND COFFEE BUYING 
INTENTIONS 9 (Universiteit Gent, Working Paper No. 2003/165, 2003) (reporting that survey re-
spondents on average were willing to pay a 10% premium for fairly traded coffee).   
2004] PREFERENCES FOR PROCESSES 603 
derprovision of the desired incentives to change production proc-
esses.330  If the instrumental account is to explain consumers’ prefer-
ences for processes, the question then arises: why is there such strong 
evidence of consumer willingness to act on process preferences despite 
the free rider problem?  Why, for instance, did sales of organically 
produced dairy items — which, under organic certification guidelines, 
cannot be derived from rbST-treated cows — grow by more than five 
hundred percent from 1994 to 1999, reaching a total of $600 million in 
the year 2000?331 
One simple answer is that, contrary to the predictions of the self-
interested rational actor model underlying the free rider account, indi-
viduals frequently do exhibit concern for the welfare of others, just as 
consumers appear to do through their demand for goods manufactured 
without the use of processes believed to harm workers, animals, or the 
environment.332  Within cognitive psychology and experimental eco-
nomics, the clearest demonstration of such regard for others comes 
from the Dictator Game, in which one experimental subject (the “pro-
poser”) allocates as he sees fit an endowment between himself and an-
other individual (the “receiver”).333  Despite the clear ability to allocate 
all of the gains to themselves in these experiments, individuals in the 
proposer position almost always allocate a nontrivial amount of money 
to the receiver, often an amount equal to their own share.334  In a simi-
lar fashion, consumers who choose to purchase goods according to 
production processes may do so because they affirmatively desire to 
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 330 See Guzman, supra note 240, at 893 n.31 (noting that “[t]he individual consumer has an in-
centive to purchase lower priced goods produced under poor labor conditions, relying on other 
consumers to bear the cost of the higher priced goods produced under core labor standards”); 
Robert Howse & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Fair Trade–Free Trade Debate: Trade, Labor, and the 
Environment, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 61, 72 (1996) (discussing the collective action problem 
created by process-labeled goods and concluding that “[u]nless she can be sure that most other 
consumers will do likewise, the individual consumer may well not consider it rational to avoid 
buying the product in question”). 
 331 DIMITRI & GREENE, supra note 246, at 2–3.  Again, it bears noting that organic agriculture 
preferences likely represent a cluster of consumer concerns, some of which are product-related 
and others of which focus on process characteristics.  See supra note 246. 
 332 See, e.g., Joseph Henrich et al., In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 
15 Small-Scale Societies, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 73, 77 (2001) (noting, based on experiments con-
ducted in societies representing a wide variety of economic and cultural conditions, that “the ca-
nonical model of the self-interested material payoff-maximizing actor is systematically violated”).  
But see infra p. 628 (describing the view of scholars who believe that other-regarding behavior 
confers a “warm glow” benefit on donors sufficient to render their behavior consistent with the 
predictions of a self-interested utility maximization model). 
 333 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Available? Social Influences and Behavioral Economics, 
97 NW. U. L. REV. 1295, 1312–13 (2003). 
 334 In one classic experiment, for instance, proposers were offered a binary choice between an 
inequitable split ($18, $2) and an even split ($10, $10).  More than three-quarters of the subjects 
chose the even split, despite the apparent sacrifice of self-interest entailed by their choice.  Daniel 
Kahneman et al., Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, 59 J. BUS. S285, S290–91 (1986).   
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improve the welfare of individual producers or otherwise influence 
manufacturing processes, even at the expense of their own economic 
interest and even if the goods that they purchase are physically indis-
tinguishable from substitute offerings. 
This explanation is consistent with the instrumental account de-
scribed in the previous section, in which consumers’ preferences for 
processes appear explicable and evaluable only with regard to the im-
pact that such preferences have on actual conditions in relevant mar-
kets.  An alternative hypothesis explored in this section is that, to the 
extent that consumers believe certain processes provide or support a 
particular public good — if, for instance, consumers believe that 
shade-grown coffee production helps to protect migratory birds335 — 
then process-labeled products provide consumers with a vehicle for 
expressing their belief in the overall public policy significance of the 
public good.  Utility for the consumer on this account is not necessarily 
derived from effecting change in the world — from actually saving 
migratory birds — but from participating in a process whereby one is 
able to express a “vote” in favor of such change, whether or not it ac-
tually occurs.  Support for this hypothesis comes from an extensive 
empirical literature on the importance of procedural characteristics to 
an individual’s evaluation of outcomes and the institutional structures 
within which they occur.336  More generally, this hypothesis is consis-
tent with Lawrence Friedman’s claim that the postwar industrialized 
world is characterized by a strong cultural commitment to “expressive 
individualism.”337  From either perspective, the observed demand for 
process-labeled goods reflects in part the value that individuals place 
on the ability to express their moral and political views through the 
medium of conscientious consumption. 
(a)  The Utility of Process. — Psychologists repeatedly have found 
that the characteristics of adjudicatory processes influence partici-
pants’ willingness to accept the desirability and legitimacy of judg-
ments that result from those processes.338  Other things being equal, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 335 See Holly Doremus, Shaping the Future: The Dialectic of Law and Environmental Values, 
37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 233, 263 (2003) (noting the North American Commission on Environmental 
Cooperation’s proposal to label appropriately produced coffee “bird-friendly”). 
 336 For an important early exposition of the theoretical view underlying later empirical work 
that emphasizes the importance of procedural characteristics of institutions “not only as a means 
to good results, but also as a means of implementing or serving process values such as participa-
tory governance, procedural rationality, and humaneness,” see Robert S. Summers, Evaluating 
and Improving Legal Processes — A Plea for “Process Values”, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4 (1974). 
 337 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE: LAW, AUTHORITY, AND CULTURE 
2–3, 35–47 (1990). 
 338 See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL 
JUSTICE 66–76 (1988) (arguing that individuals value certain procedures not only for their influ-
ence over outcomes, but also for their intrinsic desirability as fair procedures); JOHN THIBAUT & 
LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 13–14, 117–24 (1975) 
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researchers have found that people are more likely to accept a decision 
as normatively desirable and legitimate if they perceive that they had 
an opportunity to express their viewpoint,339 that their input was 
meaningfully considered prior to adoption of the decision,340 that the 
decisionmaker treated them on an even-handed basis vis-à-vis other 
interested parties,341 and that the decisionmaker treated them with 
dignity and respect.342  Individuals apparently value these procedural 
characteristics both because they may afford an avenue for influencing 
the ultimate decision and, more importantly for present purposes, be-
cause they confer their own independent benefit on participants, irre-
spective of outcome.343  Although some scholars have expressed skepti-
cism about this latter possibility,344 such doubts are mitigated in part 
by studies finding that individuals prefer outcomes in which they are 
allowed to voice an opinion on the disputed issue even when they 
know that their opinion will not affect the outcome345 and, indeed, 
even when they know that their opinion will be offered only after the 
decision already has been made.346  In short, “[t]he consistent message 
of this work is that individuals have an independent taste for fair pro-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
(arguing that individuals express preferences for processes that they can control over processes 
controlled by a third party).  Outside of psychology, Amartya Sen has been a leading proponent of 
the view that policymakers must pay attention to the desirability of procedures in addition to the 
outcomes that flow from them.  See Amartya Sen, Maximization and the Act of Choice, 65 
ECONOMETRICA 745, 750–63, 769–73 (1997); Amartya Sen, Rationality and Social Choice, 85 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1, 11–12 (1995).  With regard to distributive equity, for instance, Sen notes that “it is 
hard to be convinced that we can plausibly judge any given utility distribution ignoring altogether 
the process that led to that distribution (attaching, for example, no intrinsic importance whatever 
to whether a particular utility redistribution is caused by charity, or taxation, or torture).”  Id. at 
12. 
 339 See LIND & TYLER, supra note 338, at 101–04.  
 340 See id. at 236.   
 341 See Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Models of the Justice Motive: Antecedents of Distributive 
and Procedural Justice, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 850, 853–54 (1994). 
 342 See LIND & TYLER, supra note 338, at 214; E. ALLAN LIND ET AL., THE PERCEPTION OF 
JUSTICE: TORT LITIGANTS’ VIEWS OF TRIAL, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION, AND JUDICIAL 
SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES 66 (1989).  
 343 See E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, Disputing, and Reactions to Legal Authorities, in 
EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 177, 189–92 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1998). 
 344 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 
1212–14 n.613 (2001). 
 345 See Tom R. Tyler et al., Influence of Voice on Satisfaction with Leaders: Exploring the 
Meaning of Process Control, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 72, 80 (1985). 
 346 See E. Allan Lind et al., Voice, Control, and Procedural Justice: Instrumental and Nonin-
strumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 952, 957 
(1990).  Of course, these studies do not adequately respond to Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell’s 
complaint that “most prior empirical work does not seem to have been designed in a manner that 
could . . . quantify actual tastes for procedures.”  Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 344, at 1212 n.613.  
Further empirical work responding to this practical objection is desirable.  For purposes of the 
argument made in this Article, it is sufficient to assume that the value of procedural utility is large 
enough to render the process/product distinction unreliable as an assumption about the determi-
nants of consumer welfare.   
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cedures, which is primarily defined as having a voice in the decision-
making process.”347 
Further evidence of procedural utility exists in behavioral economic 
investigations of fairness norms in market interactions.  Researchers 
have demonstrated, for instance, that individuals are far less likely to 
accept price increases that they perceive to be exploitative, such as 
those that occur during hurricanes, snowstorms, or other excess de-
mand situations.348  Richard Thaler provides an especially elegant ex-
ample of such fairness norms: individuals are willing to pay more to 
have their “favorite brand of beer” brought to them on the beach by a 
friend when they perceive the beer to originate from a “fancy resort 
hotel,” as opposed to a “run-down grocery store.”349  This study sug-
gests that identical bottles of beer have different values for individuals 
depending on the bottles’ perceived origin, even when the individuals 
themselves have no experiential connection with that origin.350  In ad-
dition, procedural characteristics also appear to affect worker well-
being; for instance, researchers have shown that self-employed people 
report higher satisfaction from their work than employed laborers, 
holding constant other important variables such as income and 
hours.351  Similarly, job satisfaction among a nationally representative 
sample of over 28,000 British employees correlates significantly with 
the existence and frequency of opportunities for workers to express 
their views on compensation issues to superiors.352 
Finally, evidence of procedural utility has been found in people’s 
reactions to political institutions, particularly with regard to the scope 
and nature of possibilities for individual participation in collective de-
cisionmaking.  As a recent literature review summarizes, “[c]itizens 
may gain procedural utility from such participation rights over and 
above the outcome generated in the political process, because they 
provide a feeling of being involved and having political influence, as 
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 347 David A. Hoffman & Michael P. O’Shea, Can Law and Economics Be Both Practical and 
Principled?, 53 ALA. L. REV. 335, 384 (2002).  
 348 See Kahneman et al., supra note 334, at S297–98.  A formal model that incorporates indi-
viduals’ concern for the manner in which other market participants treat them is available in 
Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 
1281 (1993). 
 349 See RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF 
ECONOMIC LIFE 31–32 (1992). 
 350 See id. 
 351 See BRUNO S. FREY & MATTHIAS BENZ, BEING INDEPENDENT IS A GREAT THING: 
SUBJECTIVE EVALUATIONS OF SELF-EMPLOYMENT AND HIERARCHY (Inst. for Empirical Re-
search in Econ., Univ. of Zurich, Working Paper No. 135, 2003). 
 352 See MATTHIAS BENZ & ALOIS STUTZER, DO WORKERS ENJOY PROCEDURAL UTILITY? 
(Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Univ. of Zurich, Working Paper No. 127, 2002).   
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well as a notion of inclusion, identity and self-determination.”353  In 
one revealing study, Bruno Frey and Alois Stutzer surveyed 6000 resi-
dents of Switzerland whose opportunities for political involvement 
varied considerably among the country’s twenty-six cantons, which are 
subnational government districts with significant legislative author-
ity.354  Controlling for a large number of determinants and correlates 
of subjective well-being, the researchers found that political participa-
tion rights, separate from any effect such rights entailed for desired po-
litical outcomes, had a significant effect on reported well-being.355 
The lesson from this research for the process/product distinction 
seems plain: just as people derive utility from feeling as if they partici-
pate in certain types of labor or political decisionmaking processes, so 
too might consumers derive utility from participating in a marketplace 
that is rich with information about the consequences of consumption.  
Such a marketplace enables consumers to feel as if their purchasing 
behavior expresses a viewpoint on critical aspects of the global econ-
omy, even apart from consideration of any instrumental impact that 
such purchasing behavior might have on manufacturing processes.356  
From this perspective, the determinative question for the proc-
ess/product distinction is no longer simply whether consumer process 
preferences are ill-informed or misguided.  Instead, theorists also must 
consider the existence and magnitude of procedural utility that con-
sumers might derive from participating in a marketplace that affords 
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 353 BRUNO S. FREY ET AL., INTRODUCING PROCEDURAL UTILITY: NOT ONLY WHAT, BUT 
ALSO HOW MATTERS 13–14 (Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Univ. of Zurich, Working Pa-
per No. 10, 2003).   
 354 See BRUNO S. FREY & ALOIS STUTZER, BEYOND OUTCOMES: MEASURING PROCEDURAL 
UTILITY (Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 63, 2002).   
 355 The researchers found that subjective well-being was higher in districts that afforded more 
substantial political participation rights.  This positive effect occurred among both Swiss citizens 
and, to a smaller extent, foreign residents.  Because foreign residents cannot avail themselves of 
participation rights, the researchers surmised that the disparity in the size of the positive impact 
reflected two different components of procedural utility: “People may have a preference for par-
ticipation as an activity as well as a characteristic of an institution.”  Id. at 16.  In other words, 
for noncitizens — who could not value participation rights as an activity — the difference in per-
ceived well-being must reflect in large part simply the value of living within a highly participa-
tory political structure.  See BRUNO S. FREY & ALOIS STUTZER, HAPPINESS AND ECONOMICS: 
HOW THE ECONOMY AND INSTITUTIONS AFFECT WELL-BEING 153–67 (2002) (providing an ex-
tensive analysis of this issue and related research). 
 356 Cf. Alan Strudler & Eleonora Curlo, Consumption As Culture: A Desert Example, in ETHICS 
OF CONSUMPTION: THE GOOD LIFE, JUSTICE, AND GLOBAL STEWARDSHIP, supra note 296, at 
269, 277 (claiming “first, that the expressive function of goods is often important for understand-
ing their appeal; second, that this expressive function is partly determined by the commercial 
process, which helps fix the images that we associate with goods; and third, that the expressive 
function of a good is ordinarily tied to its history”).   
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the opportunity to “vote” through private consumption on important 
matters of public policy.357 
Despite its departure from conventional understandings, this ac-
count of process preferences may capture important aspects of con-
sumer behavior: after all, an explanation similar to this one provides 
the best account of experimentally derived estimates of individual de-
mand for public goods, including the type of environmental and social 
goods that frequently are threatened by harmful production processes 
and that motivate consumer process preferences.  Beginning in the late 
1970s, economists pioneered a contingent valuation method for pricing 
public goods in which survey respondents are asked to state their will-
ingness to pay to preserve an increment of a public good, such as an-
nual protection for one population of migratory birds.358  As Ilana Ri-
tov and Daniel Kahneman note, however, the estimates derived from 
such surveys are best understood as expressing an attitude regarding 
“the perceived severity of an unsolved problem or unsatisfied need,” 
rather than actually being “motivated by the good that is to be ac-
quired.”359  That is, individuals seem to adopt a voting mentality 
within the market medium of the contingent valuation survey.  In a 
similar fashion, consumers who purchase shade-grown coffee may do 
so not because they are revealing their willingness to pay for the public 
good of migratory bird protection, but rather because they are at-
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 357 Cf. Robert Howse, Democracy, Science, and Free Trade: Risk Regulation on Trial at the 
World Trade Organization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2329, 2333 (2000) (“[I]f citizens place a value on the 
capacity for self-government, paternalistic or technocratic responses even to admitted defects in 
the democratic process may well not result in overall gains to democratic welfare.”).   
 358 See Frank B. Cross, Natural Resource Damage Valuation, 42 VAND. L. REV. 269, 315–20 
(1989).  For overviews of the contingent valuation methodology, see ECONOMIC VALUATION WITH 
STATED PREFERENCE TECHNIQUES: A MANUAL (Ian J. Bateman et al. eds., 2002); and ROBERT 
CAMERON MITCHELL & RICHARD T. CARSON, USING SURVEYS TO VALUE PUBLIC GOODS: THE 
CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD (1989). 
 359 Ilana Ritov & Daniel Kahneman, How People Value the Environment: Attitudes Versus 
Economic Values, in ENVIRONMENT, ETHICS, AND BEHAVIOR 33, 37–39 (Max H. Bazerman et al. 
eds., 1997); see also HOWARD MARGOLIS, SELFISHNESS, ALTRUISM, AND RATIONALITY: A 
THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE (1982) (arguing that individual contributions to public goods provide 
utility through the act of contribution, not through benefits flowing as a consequence of the con-
tribution as in the case of an ordinary consumer purchase); Daniel Kahneman & Jack Knetsch, 
Valuing Public Goods: The Purchase of Moral Satisfaction, 22 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 57 
(1992) (concluding that contributions to public goods provide a sense of moral satisfaction, rather 
than more tangible benefits to the contributor); Daniel Kahneman & Ilana Ritov, Determinants of 
Stated Willingness To Pay for Public Goods: A Study in the Headline Method, 9 J. RISK & 
UNCERTAINTY 5 (1994) (finding that willingness to pay for public goods correlates with other re-
sponses, including moral satisfaction, judgments of the importance of a public issue, and state-
ments of political support for government action).  But see David A. Dana, Existence Value and 
Federal Preservation Regulation, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 343, 368–72 (2004) (describing meth-
odological advances in contingent valuation research that attempt to overcome earlier identified 
limitations). 
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tempting to express the strength of their conviction that such protec-
tion constitutes sound public policy.360 
Somewhat ironically, an FDA research team discovered the impor-
tance of this procedural interest to consumers after informing focus 
group participants about the full extent of the use of GM ingredients 
in the U.S. food market.  According to the researchers, “[t]he typical 
reaction of participants was not one of great concern about the imme-
diate health and safety effects of unknowingly eating bioengineered 
foods, but rather outrage that such a change in the food supply could 
happen without them knowing about it.”361  The FDA researchers 
found that “[v]irtually all participants” desired mandatory labeling of 
GM food products not because of any “compositional effect of the 
process on the food product,” but rather because of the simple fact of 
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 360 In this respect, the expressive account of process preferences may suggest important new 
data sources for theorists who seek monetary measures of willingness to pay for public goods.  
Because consumers act on process preferences within a marketplace context that forces compari-
son of their expenditures to an enormous range of possible alternative uses of funds, the “vote” 
revealed by their behavior seems to avoid some of the chief conceptual complaints that have been 
raised against contingent valuation studies and other hypothetical means by which individuals are 
asked to translate their views into dollar amounts for policymaking purposes.  See Murray B. 
Rutherford et al., Assessing Environmental Losses: Judgments of Importance and Damage Sched-
ules, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 51, 63–69 (1998) (providing an overview of limitations of conven-
tional economic measurement techniques for valuing environmental goods); MATTHEW D. ADLER, 
FEAR ASSESSMENT: COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND THE PRICING OF FEAR AND ANXIETY 46 
(AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 03-12, 2003) (describing the 
occasional anomalous finding in the contingent valuation literature that survey responses are in-
sensitive to scope, such that individuals express nearly identical willingness-to-pay valuations re-
gardless of the amount or size of the public good being acquired); cf. Cass R. Sunstein et al., Pre-
dictably Incoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1153, 1167–70 (2002) (noting a “translation 
problem” whereby individuals have difficulty predictably translating “the intention to punish 
. . . onto a scale that can be used by the legal system, such as dollars of fine or months in jail”).  
Moreover, unlike most revealed-preference valuation methodologies, which attempt to infer the 
value that individuals place on nonmarketed goods from behavior that is merely assumed to in-
clude consideration of the good at issue, see Kysar, supra note 10, at 574–78 (noting that many 
observers have questioned the empirical foundation of wage-risk premium studies that attempt to 
provide an indirect measure of the monetary amount by which workers are voluntarily willing to 
risk their lives), process-distinguished goods make social or environmental policy goals an explicit 
and integral component of the purchasing decision.  Cf. Lisa Heinzerling, Markets for Arsenic, 90 
GEO. L.J. 2311, 2311–12 (2002) (suggesting that market evidence of willingness to pay for clean 
water could be inferred from the strong consumer rejection of Perrier bottled water following  
disclosure of benzene contamination in a shipment of the company’s products).  Thus, to the  
extent that one seeks market expressions of individuals’ commitment to public goods, process 
preferences may represent an underutilized but promising source of evidence.  See, e.g., infra  
p. 635 (describing a study by EPA economists that utilized organic food purchasing behavior as  
an indirect measure of parents’ willingness to invest resources in the prevention of harm to their 
children). 
 361 ALAN S. LEVY & BRENDA M. DERBY, OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS & SUPPORT, FOOD 
& DRUG ADMIN. CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & APPLIED NUTRITION, REPORT ON CONSUMER 
FOCUS GROUPS ON BIOTECHNOLOGY (emphasis added), http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~comm/biorpt. 
html (Oct. 20, 2000). 
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GM processing itself.362  Seemingly puzzled by this response, the re-
searchers later learned from participants that “[t]hey felt [GM product] 
labeling gave them an opportunity to register their view about the 
wisdom of food biotechnology, i.e., to support or not support the dis-
semination of the technology, apart from their views about the health 
and safety characteristics of the individual product.”363  In the focus 
group participants’ words, they wanted to “send a message” to bio-
technology companies.364 
(b)  The Market for Expression. — The foregoing account of con-
sumer process preferences sheds some light on the important constitu-
tional questions presented by the Kasky litigation.  Specifically, it 
demonstrates that when producers make process information available 
to consumers for use in their purchasing decisions, the transactions 
implicate the speech interests of both producers and consumers — and 
not merely as speaker and listener, but as speakers both.  On the sur-
face, Nike appears to be the only party speaking about significant pub-
lic issues, such as developing-world labor standards, through its rele-
vant advertisements and other communications.  If one accepts the 
expressive account of process preferences, however, then Nike’s state-
ments appear designed in significant part to attract consumers with 
process preferences and, as a result, to provide consumers with an op-
portunity to engage in purposeful, expressive activity through the me-
dium of conscientious consumption.365  By purchasing sweatshop-free 
clothing or cruelty-free cosmetics, consumers signal that they are will-
ing to expend resources to project an opinion or belief about the merits 
of certain production processes, even if the clothing or cosmetics that 
they acquire are otherwise indistinguishable from substitute wares.  
Manufacturers of process-distinguished goods, in essence, are selling 
consumers a voice. 
Cultural studies accounts of consumer behavior hold that most 
modern consumption in wealthy industrialized nations serves this 
communicative function.366  Thus, just as the Nike “swoosh” logo is 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 362 Id. 
 363 Id. 
 364 Id. 
 365 See Reply Brief for the Petitioners, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003) (No. 02-575), 
available in 2003 WL 1922453, at *7–8 (“[A]lthough a purchasing decision that reflects an ethical 
assessment of the seller based on the seller’s speech results in ‘commerce,’ what such speech in-
duces is, in essence, further speech by the consumer about the entities with which he or she wishes 
to associate and the activities of which he or she wishes to signal approval or disapproval . . . .”); 
cf. Harper, supra note 261, at 415 (“A refusal to buy non-union [products] gains significance as 
self-definition, as well as expression, when that decision is associated with the decisions of oth-
ers.”).  
 366 See, e.g., JEAN BAUDRILLARD, Consumer Society, in JEAN BAUDRILLARD: SELECTED 
WRITINGS 32, 49 (Mark Poster ed., 2d ed. 2001) (“Consumer behavior, which appears to be fo-
cused and directed at the object and at pleasure, in fact responds to quite different objectives: the 
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understood to signify an identity that consumers acquire by purchasing 
Nike products,367 process representations may signify political, social, 
or environmental viewpoints that consumers can express by buying, 
wearing, and using the represented goods.  In that respect, process rep-
resentations by manufacturers function quite similarly to trademarks, 
logos, brands, and other conventional product emblems that typically 
do not affect the compositional features of the product, but that never-
theless exert great influence over consumer decisionmaking.368  Signifi-
cantly, scholars have long recognized that trademarks and other iden-
tity claims are difficult for consumers to verify and that, consequently, 
governments can help to maintain the integrity of the trademark’s sig-
naling function by preventing unauthorized trademark use.369  By po-
licing the accuracy of manufacturer process representations, govern-
ments similarly can help to preserve the integrity of consumer “voting” 
in a marketplace where such claims would be equally, if not more, dif-
ficult for consumers to verify. 
From this perspective, the asymmetric constitutional framework 
that attracted Nike’s complaint — that is, a framework in which con-
sumers receive core First Amendment protection but manufacturers do 
not, even when both are discussing issues related to manufacturing 
processes370 — may be more defensible than it initially appears.  The 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
metaphoric or displaced expression of desire, and the production of a code of social values 
through the use of differentiating signs.”).   
 367 See, e.g., PETER K. LUNT & SONIA M. LIVINGSTONE, MASS CONSUMPTION AND PERSONAL 
IDENTITY: EVERYDAY ECONOMIC EXPERIENCE 166–71 (1992).   
 368 The precise factors motivating consumer interest in product marks are subject to continuing 
debate.  See Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621 
(2004) (arguing that a semiotic analysis of trademark function provides more robust analysis than 
an economic analysis).  In contrast to cultural studies depictions, economists believe that con-
sumer responsiveness to brands reflects a rational choice by consumers to use manufacturer iden-
tity as a proxy for product quality or other salient product features that otherwise would entail 
significant search costs.  See Kysar, supra note 274, at 1755–56.  Both the cultural studies and 
economic accounts of trademark function are supported by Justice Harlan’s consideration of the 
legitimacy of price premiums commanded by a product, Clorox Bleach, that was chemically indis-
tinguishable from nonbranded alternatives.  See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 572 
(1967).  Justice Harlan rejected the FTC’s argument that such premiums constituted strong evi-
dence of anticompetitive behavior in the market for household goods, reasoning that brand names 
such as Clorox might serve legitimate functions that the FTC had failed to recognize and that 
such functions could justify price premiums even for physically indistinguishable products.  As 
Justice Harlan wrote, “[i]t is not the [government’s] function to decide which lawful elements of 
the ‘product’ offered the consumer should be considered useful and which should be considered 
the symptoms of industrial ‘sickness.’  It is the consumer who must make that election through 
the exercise of his purchasing power.”  Id. at 604 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 369 Indeed, laws against such unauthorized use date back to the Middle Ages.  See Sidney A. 
Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 65 TRADEMARK REP. 265, 277–80 (1975). 
 370 See Brief for the Petitioners, Kasky (No. 02-575), available in 2003 WL 898993, at *28 (“If 
the full protections of the First Amendment apply to the allegations of [Nike’s critics], so too they 
apply when Nike responds to those allegations.”  (internal citations omitted)); Reply Brief for the 
Petitioners, Kasky (No. 02-575), available in 2003 WL 1922453, at *7 (describing the California 
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reason to monitor corporate process speech through false and decep-
tive advertising regulation is to ensure that misleading corporate rep-
resentations do not subvert the consumers’ free speech and associa-
tional interests.  Importantly, it is not necessary to categorize the 
respective activities of manufacturers and consumers within these 
transactions as both commercial or both noncommercial speech.371  In-
stead, goods that are labeled or advertised according to their manufac-
turing characteristics may simultaneously implicate commercial speech 
activities by product makers, and core expressive and associational ac-
tivities by product purchasers.372  On this view, the government’s 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
consumer protection scheme as “underinclusive . . . because it excludes accusations calculated to 
discourage consumers from purchasing a particular manufacturer’s products”). 
 371 The Court has acknowledged that the First Amendment’s protections extend “to the com-
munication, to its source and to its recipients both.”  Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens 
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976).  The Court also has noted that “component parts of 
a single speech [may be] inextricably intertwined.”  Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, Inc., 487 
U.S. 781, 796 (1988).  It has not, however, entertained in depth the possibility that the same trans-
action or activity could implicate different categories of speech depending on who is identified as 
the relevant speaker. 
 372 Indeed, assuming that it abides by corporate law duties of fidelity to shareholder welfare, 
the corporation arguably must speak only in pursuit of the commercial goal of economic profit 
maximization.  As Daniel Greenwood has written, “[w]hile real people must balance competing 
values, compare their own needs and those of others important to them, and make difficult 
choices between various aspects of our too-finite lives, corporations (or the role-constrained man-
agers who decide for them) just maximize shareholder value.”  Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Essential 
Speech: Why Corporate Speech Is Not Free, 83 IOWA L. REV. 995, 1049 (1998).  In light of this 
qualitative difference between corporate and noncorporate speech, Greenwood argues that the 
distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech should give way to a distinction be-
tween deliberative, volitional speakers and those speakers whose ends are predetermined by the 
dictates of corporate and agency law.  See id. at 1055–66; see also Randall P. Bezanson, Institu-
tional Speech, 80 IOWA L. REV. 735, 738–39 (1995) (arguing that abstracted speech that has no 
speaker, including commercial speech, should be conceived of as “institutional speech” rather than 
speech flowing from a human agent); Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders’ 
Rights Under the First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235 (1981) (exploring in depth the institutional 
features of corporate speakers and arguing that states should have constitutional latitude to condi-
tion certain kinds of corporate speech on shareholder consent); Carl E. Schneider, Free Speech 
and Corporate Freedom: A Comment on First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 59 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1227, 1259–61 (1986) (noting distinctions between “corporate speech” and “human speech”). 
  In many respects, Greenwood’s analysis follows an earlier suggestion by Steven Shiffrin that 
C. Edwin Baker’s prominent argument against the constitutional protection of commercial speech 
could be improved through an emphasis on “the structure of the corporation rather than the mar-
ket structure in which the corporation participates.”  Shiffrin, supra note 233, at 1246; see C. 
EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 219 (1989) (asserting that corporate 
speech cannot “be attributed to the choice of a free agent”); C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: 
A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 (1976) (arguing that “unlike the broad 
categories of protected speech, commercial speech does not represent an attempt to create or affect 
the world in a way which can be expected to represent anyone’s private or personal wishes”); C. 
Edwin Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and Redish’s The 
Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 646, 652 (1982) (arguing that political speech by corpora-
tions “[does] not derive from the values or political commitments of any individuals”).  In contrast 
to Greenwood, Baker, and other commentators, Martin Redish and Howard Wasserman argue 
that, “[v]iewed from [a] more complete social and economic perspective, the corporate form per-
 
2004] PREFERENCES FOR PROCESSES 613 
monitoring of the accuracy of process representations would impinge 
only on the commercial speech of product manufacturers, and it would 
do so only in order to enable and support fundamental First Amend-
ment activity by consumers.373 
Acknowledging this state interest complicates significantly the ef-
fort to create a process/product distinction within commercial speech 
doctrine.  A central pillar of Nike’s support for such a distinction was 
the claim that, in the absence of heightened constitutional protection 
from liability, product manufacturers would be reluctant to divulge in-
formation regarding labor conditions and other processes voluntar-
ily.374  This chilling argument, however, must be weighed against the 
complementary chilling of consumer demand that would occur if indi-
viduals no longer could depend on the veracity of process representa-
tions in a heavily manipulated marketplace.  If individuals came to re-
gard the process representations of manufacturers with substantial 
cynicism and distrust, such that their willingness to pay premiums for 
process-labeled goods diminished, then the economic motivation for 
manufacturers such as Nike to disclose process information would di-
minish as well.375  In that sense, it is not merely a question whether 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
forms an important democratic function in facilitating the personal self-realization of the indi-
viduals who have made the voluntary choice to make use of it.”  Martin H. Redish & Howard M. 
Wasserman, What’s Good for General Motors: Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expres-
sion, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 237 (1998); see also The Supreme Court, 1977 Term—Leading 
Cases, 92 HARV. L. REV. 57, 165 (1978) (“[C]orporate political expression should be protected as 
the speech and associational activity of the individual owners.”). 
 373 From this perspective, the International Dairy court similarly should have respected Ver-
mont’s attempt to effectuate the expressive and associational interests that consumers hold in be-
ing able to choose among controversial dairy processes.  After all, the Supreme Court has ob-
served that “because disclosure requirements trench much more narrowly on an advertiser’s 
interests than do flat prohibitions on speech, ‘warning[s] or disclaimer[s] might be appropriately 
required . . . in order to dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or deception.’”  Zauderer 
v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (alterations in original) (quoting In re 
R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 201 (1982)).  When such disclosure requirements are seen as being deployed 
in service of an affirmative speech interest on the part of consumers, the case for disclosure be-
comes stronger. 
 374 Indeed, in a possibly strategic illustration of this point, Nike refused to issue the company’s 
social responsibility report during the pendency of the Kasky appeal, citing concerns about poten-
tial lawsuits.  See Allan Jenkins, What Would You Do? Nike v. Kasky Case Puts Public Relations 
Campaigns Under New Scrutiny, 20 COMM. WORLD, Apr.–May 2003, at 14; see also Reply Brief 
for the Petitioners, Kasky (No. 02-575), available in 2003 WL 1922453, at *14 (objecting to “the 
profound chilling effect” of the California court’s decision and noting that “consumers might 
‘care’ about virtually every aspect of corporate operations — however divorced from the qualities 
of the products being sold”); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Kasky (No. 02-575), available in 2003 WL 899100, at *25–26 (arguing that substantial monetary 
liability “may cause even a company of Nike’s size to refrain from presenting its side of the story, 
or to do so only in vague — and far less informative — generalities”). 
 375 See infra pp. 625–27 (describing the classic economic justification for government regulation 
of “lemons markets” to prevent market unraveling when consumers lack ready means to verify 
product claims). 
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the threat of deceptive advertising liability would deter manufacturer 
disclosure of process information, but whether the threat of liability 
would have a more pronounced effect than the drying-up of consumer 
demand that would be wrought by a marketplace rife with false and 
deceptive process claims.376 
Regardless of how this question is resolved, the Court at a mini-
mum should acknowledge the expressive and associational interests 
that consumers exert through the act of purchasing products based on 
process characteristics.377  To do so, the Court must modify its unten-
able view that, on the one hand, companies “enjoy the full panoply of 
First Amendment protections for their direct comments on public is-
sues,”378 while, on the other hand, “advertising which ‘links a product 
to a current public debate’ is not thereby entitled to the constitutional 
protection afforded noncommercial speech.”379  In the case of easily 
recognizable consumer product firms such as Nike, these simultaneous 
contentions cannot stand: speech by consumer product firms is qualita-
tively different from other speech in that it comes paired with a steady 
flow of retail offerings whose social meanings are inextricably bound 
up with the identity and communications of the firm that offers 
them.380  Thus, the most significant question raised by a case such as 
Kasky may not be whether corporate process claims concern a com-
mercial or a noncommercial subject, but instead whether they are ac-
companied by a trademark, brand, or similar signifier that is indelibly 
linked to specific commercial products in the mind of the consumer 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 376 In this respect, it may be highly relevant that the Court in previous cases has described ad-
vertising as especially durable.  See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977) (“Since advertis-
ing is linked to commercial well-being, it seems unlikely that such speech is particularly suscepti-
ble to being crushed by overbroad regulation.”); Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 
772 n.24 (1976) (“[T]he greater . . . hardiness of commercial speech[] may make it less necessary to 
tolerate inaccurate statements for fear of silencing the speaker.”). 
 377 The Court has emphasized that “[a]dvertising, though entirely commercial, may often carry 
information of import to significant issues of the day.”  Bates, 433 U.S. at 364.  Beyond these spare 
statements, however, the Court has not examined in depth the specific consumer interests served 
by advertising and marketing. 
 378 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 n.5 (1980) (citing 
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 530 (1980)). 
 379 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 n.7 (1985) (quoting Central 
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 n.5).  
 380 Compare the Court’s famous assertion that “[t]he inherent worth of . . . speech in terms of 
its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether cor-
poration, association, union, or individual.”  First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 
777 (1978); see also Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 193–94 
(1999) (noting that “[e]ven under the degree of scrutiny that we have applied in commercial speech 
cases, decisions that select among speakers conveying virtually identical messages are in serious 
tension with the principles undergirding the First Amendment”).  For an examination of how the 
Court’s acceptance of corporate identity as a relevant distinguishing feature in electoral speech 
cases might have been incorporated into an analysis of Kasky had the case not been dismissed, see 
Developments in the Law—Corporations and Society, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2169, 2289–90 (2004).  
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and that becomes a part of her effort to shape and project images, 
ideas, and attitudes through purposeful consumption choices. 
3.  The Ethical Account. — Just as food products made from GM 
ingredients have permeated the U.S. market without widespread con-
sumer awareness, an unknown but potentially substantial percentage 
of chocolate purchased in the United States derives from cocoa beans 
harvested by enslaved children in West Africa.381  Growing numbers of 
consumers and activist organizations are seeking to raise awareness of 
this connection between the chocolate trade and child slavery, as well 
as to identify alternative confectionary manufacturers that do not ob-
tain cocoa beans from farms using exploited child labor.382  Individuals 
who seek to avoid purchasing or consuming “slavery chocolate” in this 
manner (or “conflict diamonds,”383 to take another salient example) 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 381 See Brian S. Woods & Kate Blewett, Slavery: The Ivory Coast, West Africa, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. 
J. HUM. RTS. 869, 872 (2001) (speculating based on interviews with West African cocoa producers 
that “the hands of slaves have touched almost half the world’s chocolate”).  In its 2001 human 
rights report, the U.S. State Department cited an international agency’s estimate that some 15,000 
children between the ages of nine and twelve had been sold into forced labor in the Ivory Coast.  
See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 1 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2001, at 
209 (2002), available at http://www.house.gov/international_relations/107/78290b/pdf.  A subse-
quent study by the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture found that, although the major-
ity of children working in West African cocoa plantations were either paid by or related to farm-
ers, up to 12,000 remaining children were at high risk of forced labor.  See INT’L INST. OF 
TROPICAL AGRIC., CHILD LABOR IN THE COCOA SECTOR OF WEST AFRICA: A SYNTHESIS OF 
FINDINGS IN CAMEROON, CÔTE D’IVOIRE, GHANA, AND NIGERIA (Aug. 2002), available at 
http://www.iita.org/news/cocoa.pdf.  For an analysis of the complexities posed by child labor 
within international trade law, including the difficulty of defining forced labor, see Federico 
Lenzerini, International Trade and Child Labour Standards, in ENVIRONMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 301, at 287, 290–95.  For a discussion of slave labor in 
the global economy generally, see Tobias Barrington Wolff, The Thirteenth Amendment and Slav-
ery in the Global Economy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 973 (2002). 
 382 See Encouraging Sustainable, Responsible Cocoa Farming, at http://www.fhidc.com/cocoa/ 
index.asp (last modified July 9, 2003).  Their efforts have resulted in media coverage and, more 
importantly, an industry-wide commitment to eliminate child slavery and other abuses of child 
laborers from the global chocolate trade by the year 2005.  Id.  In addition, the Sanders Amend-
ment, an appropriations rider adopted in 1997, forbids border officials from allowing importation 
of products made by forced or indentured child labor.  See Treasury and General Government 
Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-61, § 634, 111 Stat. 1272, 1316 (1997).  The Interna-
tional Labor Rights Fund filed a petition with the U.S. Customs Service on May 30, 2002, charg-
ing that customs officials were failing to prohibit the importation of cocoa harvested by enslaved 
children.  See Int’l Labor Rights Fund, Child Labor in the Cocoa Industry, at http://www. 
laborrights.org/projects/childlab/cocoa.htm (June 2003).  In 2003, after officials had failed to act 
on the petition, the group brought suit in federal court along with two fair trade organizations as 
additional named plaintiffs.  See First Amended Complaint, Int’l Labor Rights Fund v. Bush, 
Civ. No. 03-1316 (D.D.C. July 2003), available at http://www.laborrights.org/projects/childlab/ 
cocoa%20complaint%20amended.pdf.  The complaint was dismissed in 2004 on the ground that 
the Court of International Trade held exclusive jurisdiction over the controversy.  See Int’l Labor 
Rights Fund v. Bush, Civ. No. 03-1316 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 2004). 
 383 See Tracey Michelle Price, The Kimberley Process: Conflict Diamonds, WTO Obligations, 
and the Universality Debate, 12 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 1 (2003) (“At the hands of rebels, 
dictators, and terrorists, diamonds have crystallized into a source of financing for conflict and 
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may do so because they actively desire to aid child laborers or simply 
because they wish to project an opinion or belief through their pur-
chasing behavior about this lamentable aspect of the global economy.  
On the other hand, consumers may accept that their actions — 
whether understood instrumentally or expressively — can exert only 
limited influence in a world of six billion individuals, but nevertheless 
seek resigned solace in the knowledge that they are not complicit with 
practices that they regard as immoral.  As Howse and Regan observe, 
“[s]ome people do not want to benefit from or be associated with what 
they regard as wickedness even if they are unable to prevent it.”384 
This inward orientation of process preferences is particularly well-
demonstrated by consumers of kosher products, whose aim is not to 
avoid complicity with evil but to promote association with good.  By 
seeking out kosher food products, observant individuals are not at-
tempting to influence changes in the way that food is produced or even 
to express an attitude about kosher food as a public matter.  Rather, 
their behavior seems directed toward personal moral practice: “[E]ating 
only kosher food is seen as a way of elevating oneself spiritually.”385  In 
a similar fashion, the coalition of litigants who challenged the FDA’s 
decision not to label GM food products included individuals who sim-
ply “believe that their religion forbids consumption of foods produced 
through rDNA technology.”386  Vegetarian consumers likewise have 
expressed concern over their inability, in the absence of mandatory la-
beling, to discern whether genetic material derived from animals has 
been inserted into GM plants.387  In addition, although still fairly early 
in its development, the process of cloning livestock for human con-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
civil wars, which have caused the deaths of more than two million people.”).  In May 2003, the 
WTO granted a waiver allowing nations that are participating in the Kimberley Certification 
Scheme — a multilateral attempt to eliminate the trade in conflict diamonds — to impose trade 
restrictions on nonparticipating nations.  As Joost Pauwelyn notes, the WTO’s grant of a “waiver” 
carries the negative implication that other process-based trade measures, including even those 
adopted multilaterally, are suspect under the GATT.  See Joost Pauwelyn, WTO Compassion or 
Superiority Complex?: What To Make of the WTO Waiver for “Conflict Diamonds”, 24 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 1177, 1198–99 (2003). 
 384 Howse & Regan, supra note 58, at 275; see also Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Repara-
tions for Slavery and Other Historical Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 709 (2003) (“People 
suffering from moral taint are not blamed for the conduct that produced it . . . because they had 
no control over the conduct . . . .  But people often feel shame, and are stigmatized by others, as a 
result of their association with the wrongful conduct.”).  
 385 Benjamin N. Gutman, Ethical Eating: Applying the Kosher Food Regulatory Regime to Or-
ganic Food, 108 YALE L.J. 2351, 2363 (1999). 
 386 Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 170 (D.D.C. 2000). 
 387 See Kim JoDene Donat, Note, Engineering Akerlof Lemons: Information Asymmetry, Exter-
nalities, and Market Intervention in the Genetically Modified Food Market, 12 MINN. J. GLOBAL 
TRADE 417, 427 (2003). 
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sumption is likely to attract a considerable degree of religious and 
ethical objection if it becomes significantly commercialized.388 
As these examples demonstrate, consumer process preferences can 
be understood not from the standpoint of their effect on the external 
world or their utility as mechanisms for public expression, but rather 
simply from the premise that consumption often is an intensely per-
sonal activity with significant moral consequences.  As Eric Freyfogle 
notes: “To buy a product is inevitably to become tied to its history and 
to accept a level of responsibility for its future.”389  Many consumers 
seem to share this view, such that their own sense of moral well-being 
is affected by the nature and degree of knowledge that they hold re-
garding product processes, irrespective of the impact that such proc-
esses, or indeed their own behavior, may have.  Like the expressive ac-
count of consumer process preferences, this ethical account provides an 
independent basis for regarding such preferences as worthy of respect 
by policymakers.  That is, even if instrumental concerns do not justify 
support of process preferences according to a regulator’s technical or 
scientific assessment, one still must acknowledge the intrinsically per-
sonal nature of the act of purchasing and the conventional liberal re-
fusal to scrutinize or judge such inwardly directed behaviors.390 
Some forms of liberalism, however, deny the legitimacy of process 
preferences on the basis that they are not purely internal, but rather 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 388 See Alexandra Hawkins, Protecting Human Dignity and Individuality: The Need for Uni-
formity in International Cloning Legislation, 14 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 243, 255–56, 268–80 (2001) 
(describing the process of livestock cloning and providing an overview of legal and political re-
sponses to the controversy provoked by cloning technologies). 
 389 ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE COMMON 
GOOD 194 (2003). 
 390 See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 55 (1980) (noting 
that the liberal principle of neutrality “does not distinguish the merits of competing conceptions of 
the good”); RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 191 (1985) (“[Liberalism] supposes that 
political decisions must be, so far as is possible, independent of any particular conception of the 
good life, or of what gives value to life.”); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272–
73 (1977) (observing that the liberal conception of equality mandates that government “must not 
constrain liberty on the ground that one citizen’s conception of the good life of one group is nobler 
or superior to another’s”); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 303–04 (1993) (“A crucial as-
sumption of liberalism is that equal citizens have different and indeed incommensurable and ir-
reconcilable conceptions of the good. . . . [L]iberalism . . . tries to show both that a plurality of 
conceptions of the good is desirable and how a regime of liberty can accommodate this plurality 
so as to achieve the many benefits of human diversity.”).  Of course, the coherence and desirability 
of this traditional liberal view has been the subject of much debate.  See, e.g., Larry Alexander, 
Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 763, 793 (1993) (argu-
ing that liberals who endorse neutrality overlook the fact that “no neutral principle for selecting 
the baseline that defines neutrality has been established”); Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, De-
terminacy, Objectivity, and Authority, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 550 (1993) (noting that “[a]lthough 
liberalism is sometimes associated with neutrality regarding alternative conceptions of the good 
. . . the status of neutrality as a defining characteristic of liberalism is quite contestable — even 
among liberals”).  
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frequently hinge on the characteristics or conditions of other individu-
als.391  Of particular concern is the possibility that individuals will act 
on process information in ways that serve discriminatory purposes, 
such as avoiding goods because of a producer’s support for civil 
rights392 or even using nominally neutral process-based distinctions to 
further racially prejudicial aims.393  In part for this reason, some view 
the process/product distinction itself as an important component of the 
liberal market’s approach to combating prejudice.  As Gail Heriot 
writes, “liberalism postulates a preference structure in its citizens that 
may or may not exist: that citizens generally derive utility from the 
physical properties of the goods they purchase, not from the religious 
preference or any other private data about the producer or vendor.”394  
Even the economist William Hutt, whose expansive view of consumer 
sovereignty provides an important element of the normative case in 
favor of market liberalism,395 nevertheless believed that the imperson-
ality of market relations was essential to the attainment of liberty and 
tolerance.396 
The danger that process information may serve discriminatory or 
otherwise illicit purposes is, of course, real.  Thus, like the various 
GATT/WTO tools that attempt to ferret out disguised discrimination 
against nations, legal controls still must ensure that process preferences 
do not discriminate against producers based on a protected status, as 
opposed to a social or environmental production decision that the 
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 391 Many scholars, for instance, have argued that it is difficult to exclude sadistic or otherwise 
antisocial preferences once one admits any form of other-regarding preference.  Cf. Hausman & 
McPherson, supra note 22, at 690 n.31 (noting that “[t]he satisfaction of some preferences . . .  
seem[s] to have nothing to do with an individual’s own well-being” and that many have argued 
that these preferences should be excluded from one’s understanding of individual well-being).  
But see Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 344, at 1339–50 (arguing in principle against the notion of 
excluding other-regarding preferences from welfare analysis, but concluding that many objection-
able other-regarding preferences will in practice be denied satisfaction under such an analysis); 
Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Objectivity of Well-Being and the Objectives of Property Law, 78 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1681–83 (2003) (describing the attempt to exclude objectionable preferences 
in this manner and concluding that “[i]t seems both impossible and undesirable to separate be-
tween self-regarding and other-regarding preferences”). 
 392 For instance, during the civil rights struggle, white supremacists greeted black consumer 
campaigns with commercial activism of their own: “By the mid-1960s white supremacists were 
countering black consumer boycotts with ‘buy-ins’ designed to support spurned merchants and 
their own boycotts of white retail businesses owned by those considered race traitors.”  COHEN, 
supra note 2, at 187–88. 
 393 See Marion Crain, Colorblind Unionism, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1313, 1322 (2002) (describing 
use of union-made labeling campaigns to exclude and harm nonwhite workers). 
 394 Gail L. Heriot, The New Feudalism: The Unintended Destination of Contemporary Trends 
in Employment Law, 28 GA. L. REV. 167, 181–82 (1993).  
 395 See supra p. 584. 
 396 See Joseph Persky, Retrospectives: Consumer Sovereignty, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 183, 187–88 
(1993).   
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manufacturer has made and — significantly — can unmake.397  How-
ever, it bears stating the obvious point that racially discriminatory 
preferences are objectionable not because they concern processes, but 
because they concern race.  In that sense, the process/product distinc-
tion sweeps too broadly as a tool for tolerance, threatening to under-
mine not only discriminatory behavior, but also longstanding and 
firmly held practices of ethical consumption.  For instance, kosher food 
standards include process-based rules concerning acceptable handlers, 
methods of preparation, and other practices that do not affect the nu-
trition, taste, or other tangible aspects of the food products them-
selves.398  Thus, in a legal environment that fully embraced the proc-
ess/product distinction, government efforts to support kosher 
certification programs399 would become vulnerable to challenge on 
grounds in addition to the Establishment Clause complaints that have 
proven formidable thus far.400 
Moreover, many observers believe that the liberating anonymity of 
product markets has become too liberating in the present global era.  
Transnational production chains shield individuals from far more than 
merely the demographic identity of producers.  They also shield indi-
viduals from much of the social and environmental impact of private 
consumer decisionmaking, fostering an “institutionalized ignorance”401 
within the product marketplace at the very moment that government 
officials are urging individuals to regard consumer expenditure as their 
central function as citizens and, moreover, that proponents of cost-
benefit analysis are urging regulators to rely on individual market be-
havior in order to infer the determinants of public policy.  Proponents 
of labeling and other efforts to ensure consumer access to process in-
formation seek to counterbalance this constitutive anonymity of mar-
kets by making transparent to consumers the relationships that their 
decisions have with distant actors and distant places.  These propo-
nents seek to recontextualize consumption within specific communities 
and ecologies, hoping ultimately that individual purchasing decisions 
will begin to approximate the conceptual and rhetorical significance 
that “voting with one’s dollars” has been given within the framework 
of market liberalism.402 
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 397 See Harper, supra note 261, at 426–34 (providing a detailed analysis of the appropriate lim-
its of a consumer’s right to boycott).   
 398 See Gutman, supra note 385, at 2363–65.   
 399 See id. at 2369 (“At least twenty-two states have statutes prohibiting the fraudulent repre-
sentation of non-kosher food as kosher.”).   
 400 See Commack Self-Serv. Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Weiss, 294 F.3d 415, 416 (2d Cir. 2002); 
Barghout v. Bureau of Kosher Meat & Food Control, 66 F.3d 1337, 1337 (4th Cir. 1995); Ran-
Dav’s County Kosher, Inc. v. State, 608 A.2d 1353, 1353 (N.J. 1992).  
 401 See supra p. 536. 
 402 See supra p. 527. 
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In addition to associating process preferences with class- or status-
based distinctions, proponents of the process/product distinction also 
more directly attack contemporary process preferences by attempting 
to discredit or trivialize their basis as ethically coherent and significant 
actions.  For instance, a federal district court described the FDA’s fail-
ure to require GM food labeling as merely a “potential inconven-
ience”403 to “religious leaders” who feared that their anti-GM convic-
tions would become impossible to maintain in a marketplace saturated 
with unlabeled GM ingredients.404  More subtly, prominent consumer 
law commentator Howard Beales discounts the interest of vegetarians 
in GM labeling by arguing that a plant modified to include genetic 
material from animals “does not acquire ‘animal-like’ characteristics 
any more than a plant fertilized with manure does.”405  He neglects to 
consider, however, the fact that animals undoubtedly were bred, caged, 
and handled during development of the genetically altered product — 
a fact that may matter significantly to vegetarians who are motivated 
by animal welfare concerns.  More fundamentally, by resting the defi-
nition of “animal” purely on functional characteristics of the modified 
organism, Beales usurps the authority of individuals to determine for 
themselves how newly extant life forms should be treated for religious 
and moral purposes. 
Other critics charge that process preferences do not reflect an ethi-
cally defensible vision of consumer behavior when viewed in light of 
the diversity of values and conditions that prevail among foreign na-
tions.  Robert Hudec, for instance, notes that accepting the legitimacy 
of process preferences within international trade law might allow 
product regulation to be overcome by “an excess of zeal” from the “es-
sentially moral claims” of consumers.406  Other scholars more strongly 
regard advocates of linking consumption to process characteristics as 
“irrational moral fanatics, prepared to sacrifice global economic wel-
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 403 Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 181 (D.D.C. 2000) (“While the 
Court recognizes the potential inconvenience the lack of labeling presents for Plaintiffs, Defen-
dant’s decision [not] to mandate labeling of genetically modified foods does not ‘substantially’ 
burden Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs.”). 
 404 Id. at 170. 
 405 Beales, supra note 36, at 110.  Less credible individuals also have attempted to discredit the 
ethical basis of process preferences.  A spokesperson for the American Forest and Paper Associa-
tion, for instance, described consumer demand for sustainably harvested timber products as 
“blackmail” and an “extortion campaign.”  Greg Winter, Timber Company Reduces Cutting of Old-
Growth Trees, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2002, at A14. 
 406 Robert E. Hudec, GATT Legal Restraints on the Use of Trade Measures Against Foreign 
Environmental Practices, in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE 
TRADE? 95, 149 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996). 
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fare and the pressing needs of the developing countries for trivial, elu-
sive, or purely sentimental goals.”407 
One frequent version of this concern holds that, by seeking to avoid 
the fruits of exploited labor, consumers may contribute to market dy-
namics that ultimately leave developing world workers with an even 
worse fate than they currently endure.408  In part for this reason, Law-
rence Summers questions the desire of consumers to avoid purchasing 
sweatshop goods: 
[M]any believe that it is wrong to buy imported products produced by 
workers who are paid less than a specified minimum wage of some sort.  
We all deplore the conditions in which so many on this planet work and 
the paltry compensation they receive.  And yet there is surely some moral 
force to the concern that as long as the workers are voluntarily employed, 
they have chosen to work because they are working to their best alterna-
tive.  Is narrowing an individual’s set of choices an act of respect, of char-
ity, even of concern?409 
Summers strikes upon an insightful way of posing the ethical dilem-
mas created by a world of great economic integration and inequity.  
The difficulty, however, is that by eliminating a consumer’s informa-
tional basis for evaluating these complex dynamics and deciding for 
herself, the process/product distinction also narrows an individual’s set 
of choices.  By itself, the aim of maximizing individual choice simply 
will not resolve these dilemmas.410 
Moreover, despite the potential unintended consequences of proc-
ess-based purchasing decisions, individual consumers can maintain 
consistency in their moral selfhood by simultaneously supporting for-
eign aid, human rights treaties, international labor agreements, and 
other mechanisms whereby the lives of workers in the developing 
world are improved.  Critics of process preferences instead try to force 
on consumers an unwarranted catch-22: either purchase a product 
whose production processes consumers oppose, or implicitly adopt a 
position that they equally abhor.  The dichotomy is misleading because 
it conflates the individual consumer’s ethical responsibility with the 
variety of historical, political, and economic circumstances that have 
combined to place developing world laborers in a position of great 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 407 Howse & Trebilcock, supra note 330, at 61 (characterizing critiques of the connection be-
tween free trade and environmental and labor interests). 
 408 See sources cited supra note 41; see also BROWN ET AL., supra note 41, at 41–51 (observing 
that multinational firms tend to provide higher wages and better working conditions in develop-
ing nations than local counterpart firms).   
 409 Economics and Moral Questions, HARV. MAG., Nov.–Dec. 2003, at 63, 64.   
 410 Cf. Amartya Sen, The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, 78 J. POL. ECON. 152, 157  
(1970) (using other-regarding preferences to demonstrate a fundamental inconsistency between 
certain notions of individual freedom of choice and the welfare-maximizing paradigm of Pareto 
optimality). 
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need and vulnerability.  Yet consumers do not adopt anemic foreign 
assistance programs; nations do.  Thus, individual consumers may seek 
to avoid slavery-tainted chocolate even as they support multilateral ac-
tion to stop the trade in children and the conditions of abject poverty 
that give rise to it.  Compelling consumers instead to purchase slavery 
chocolate on pain of abandoning children to starvation charges con-
sumers with consequences that they neither condone nor support.  It 
stretches the bounds of complicity beyond fact or reason.411 
When, on the other hand, individual consumers’ ethical preferences 
are reflected in national policies, such as through unilateral trade 
measures, a further moral objection must be addressed.  Specifically, 
noted trade scholar Jagdish Bhagwati argues that if developed nations 
and their consumers insist on “impos[ing] [their] ethical preferences on 
other communities and nations”412 through mandatory process-based 
trade measures, then they generally should pay compensation to the 
affected producers: “[i]f it is right in the Christian tradition to buy in-
dulgences to pay for one’s vice, perhaps one should not object to a 
proposal to pay for one’s virtue.”413  Despite its appeal, Bhagwati’s ar-
gument confuses the obligation to aid poor nations with an obligation 
to do so specifically by importing goods from poor nations.  If there 
were an independent duty to purchase cocoa from West Africa, then 
consumers might be under an obligation to pay producers for the right 
to avoid eating slavery chocolate, as Bhagwati suggests.414  Such a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 411 Similarly misleading is the United States’s attempt to convert the GM food dispute into a 
binary choice between accepting GM products and relegating billions to poverty and starvation.  
See supra p. 564.  Currently, experts generally agree that there is enough agricultural capacity to 
feed the world without GM food technologies, and that hunger and malnourishment are instead 
primarily attributable to poverty, dislocation, corruption, and other political and economic causes.  
See, e.g., Ellen Messer, Food Systems and Dietary Perspective: Are Genetically Modified Organ-
isms the Best Way To Ensure Nutritionally Adequate Food?, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 65, 
68 (2001).  Thus, a decision to avoid supporting GM foods is not necessarily tantamount to a deci-
sion to prolong starvation, particularly if the consumer seeks to support the elimination of world 
hunger through other means. 
 412 Bhagwati, Trade and the Environment: The False Conflict?, supra note 311, at 170, 174–75; 
see also JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION 157–58 (2004) (arguing that “the 
rich and powerful countries that wish to propagate their moral preferences, whether widely held 
or idiosyncratic, should proceed to subsidize the PPMs that they advocate . . . , putting their own 
resources where they claim their moral preferences are”). 
 413 Bhagwati, Trade and the Environment: The False Conflict?, supra note 311, at 175.  
 414 Bhagwati’s argument parallels the view of trade scholars who regard the GATT as creating 
a general right of market access, as opposed to a negative right to be free from discriminatory 
treatment.  Compare Bartels, supra note 324, at 383 (positing that “under the law of the WTO 
there is a right to trade”) with Howse & Regan, supra note 58, at 276 (defending the view that 
“[s]o far as its general purpose and structure are concerned, GATT creates only a negative right of 
non-discrimination”).  Reflecting the former conception, Michael Strauss argues in an unpublished 
paper that process-based trade measures may constitute “efficient breaches,” whereby nations in-
tentionally violate their contractual commitments under GATT in order to promote welfare-
maximizing internalization of the social and environmental externalities of production.  Strauss 
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conception, however, upsets the normative argument in favor of free 
trade, which, after all, presumes that consumers make purchases in 
order to improve their welfare and that expanding opportunities for 
such trading in turn will increase overall welfare.  Bhagwati’s argu-
ment instead turns the trading system into a wealth transfer device  
in which consumers must make resource contributions to developing 
nations in order to avoid purchasing products that they regard as  
objectionable.415 
As this section has attempted to demonstrate, often lurking within 
process-related disputes are personal convictions of a nature and mag-
nitude that liberal societies traditionally have regarded as sacrosanct.  
Moreover, notwithstanding the occasional critiques advanced by pro-
ponents of the process/product distinction, the ethical coherence and 
legitimacy of these grounds for process preferences are not easily dis-
credited.  Therefore, particularly at a time when consumption occupies 
such a strong position of influence over culture and identity,416 ana-
lysts should be hesitant to discount the importance of religious or ethi-
cal grounds for consumer decisionmaking.  To be sure, as proponents 
of the process/product distinction sometimes press, the historical pro-
gression from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft417 did help to obscure a va-
riety of racial, ethnic, and religious characteristics of producers that 
now are recognized as inappropriate bases for consumer distinction.418  
Nevertheless, the anonymity of today’s global product markets also 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
argues that such breaches should be accompanied by compensation to the developing nation, at 
least until multilateral consensus is achieved that the externality is indeed a cost or a market fail-
ure that should be redressed through regulation rather than regarded as a legitimate aspect of 
comparative advantage.  See Strauss, supra note 63 (manuscript at 35–37); see also Candice Ste-
vens, Trade and the Environment: The PPMs Debate, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 239, 246–47 (Winfried Lang ed., 1995) (proposing a compensation principle 
by which regulating nations must pair unilateral process-based trade measures with technical and 
financial assistance to help ensure compliance by developing nations). 
 415 Moreover, as Howard Chang notes, such an approach might create perverse incentives for 
nations to increase their level of an offensive activity in order to maximize the payments that they 
receive.  See Howard F. Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures To Protect the Global 
Environment, 83 GEO. L.J. 2131, 2154–56 (1995); Howard F. Chang, Carrots, Sticks, and Interna-
tional Externalities, 17 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 309, 314 (1997) (noting that states may adopt bad 
policies to extract concessions). 
 416 Cf. Bruce Ledewitz, Corporate Advertising’s Democracy, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 389, 460 
(2003) (“The great American debate of the twenty-first century . . . is going to be about the rela-
tionship of our consumption lifestyle to everything else — nature, population, wealth, our own 
happiness, and the divine.”). 
 417 See FERDINAND TÖNNIES, COMMUNITY & SOCIETY 33–35 (Charles P. Loomis ed. & trans., 
Mich. State Univ. Press 1957) (1887) (describing the transition from traditional agrarian “Gemein-
schaft” to modern industrialized “Gesellschaft”). 
 418 See Heriot, supra note 394, at 182 (noting that the “multiplicity of relationships [in modern 
market societies] makes it a bit easier to buy into the liberal notion that one should be indifferent 
to the religious or other private preferences of the persons from whom one purchases otherwise 
identical goods”). 
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threatens to exclude any basis for expressing communal awareness or 
concern through consumer action, an exclusion that will become ever 
more glaring as individuals are urged to define and assert themselves 
nearly exclusively through the market. 
B.  Process Preferences in Global Civil Society 
Rather than being scientifically unfounded, nakedly protectionist, 
or ethically inconsistent, consumer process preferences instead offer an 
important vehicle through which individuals influence the world, ex-
press their views on public issues, and fashion their moral identity in 
an era of extraordinary interconnectedness, complexity, and dynamism 
in the market.  Although consumers undoubtedly suffer from some in-
formational deficiencies with regard to the meaning and significance of 
various manufacturing practices, the case for wholesale irrationality or 
unreliability of process preferences is unpersuasive.  Policymakers 
therefore should grapple with purportedly unreliable preferences by 
seeking to inform and educate consumers openly, rather than by cate-
gorically eliminating processes as a basis for consumer distinction or 
regulatory decisionmaking.  Similarly, although the reality of building 
political constituencies frequently means that process-based trade re-
strictions are fashioned or implemented in discriminatory ways, inter-
national trade law should combat such efforts by examining trade re-
strictions for discriminatory aims and effects directly, not by using a 
restriction’s focus on manufacturing processes as a rudimentary proxy 
for protectionism.  The process/product distinction, in short, should be 
discarded as a conceptual device within law and policy. 
Jettisoning the process/product distinction, however, does not re-
solve underlying questions regarding the proper role of process prefer-
ences within policymaking, particularly at the international level.  As a 
theoretical matter, such preferences do not fit comfortably within the 
framework of market liberalism, which tends to assume that consumer 
desires are private and self-interested.  In contrast, process preferences 
often appear both public and other-regarding.  Nor do process prefer-
ences enter smoothly into the project of regulatory cost-benefit analy-
sis, which seeks to replace valuations that occur through collective 
processes with information gleaned from the privately undertaken 
tradeoffs of market actors.  Unlike the traditional view, which holds 
that “[m]arket processes evoke self-interested choices whereas political 
processes encourage other-regarding ones,”419 process preferences in-
stead implicate all four categories: the market, politics, consumerism, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 419 Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 4, at 382. 
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and citizenship all are present when athletic shoe purchases raise sali-
ent issues of economic justice and human rights.420 
Instead of denying this convergence through an artificial distinction 
between processes and products, policymakers should grapple directly 
with the interests at stake in process-related disputes.  Toward that 
end, this section begins by describing the standard framework for jus-
tifying and evaluating government intervention in the market for con-
sumer information.  Through an analogy to an ingenious recent study 
of altruistic preferences, it then argues that consumer process prefer-
ences are highly context-dependent.  Regulation of process information 
therefore cannot be a straightforward effort to maximize existing pref-
erences, but rather must reflect a choice between competing preference 
orderings that exist within many individuals and that, at least in part, 
can be enabled or disabled by alteration of the relevant decisionmak-
ing context.  This section concludes by arguing in favor of respecting, 
rather than suppressing, preferences that evince concern for other 
populations, other generations, and other life forms.421  The case for 
such process preferences is based not on their simplistic veneer of vir-
tue,422 but rather on the belief that process preferences capture the 
displaced moral and political sentiments of individuals acting in a 
world fixated on consumption. 
1.  The Inevitability of Regulation. — In its rejection of Vermont’s 
effort to ensure consumer access to information regarding the use of 
rbST by dairy producers, the International Dairy court argued that 
“those consumers interested in such information should exercise the 
power of their purses by buying products from manufacturers who 
voluntarily reveal it.”423  Although rhetorically powerful, the court’s 
viewpoint overlooks the conventional economic explanation for prod-
uct labeling regulation, which emphasizes the fact that manufacturers 
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 420 Cf. Carol M. Rose, Environmental Faust Succumbs to Temptations of Economic Mephi-
stopheles, or, Value by Any Other Name Is Preference, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1631, 1635–39 (1989) 
(noting the theoretical limitations of a citizen/consumer dichotomy that rigidly associates public-
regarding and private-regarding preferences, respectively, with the two categories). 
 421 In a context analogous to the regulator’s choice of whether to encourage process preferences, 
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein argue in favor of “libertarian benevolence” by regulators in the 
construction of choice settings that impact the welfare of third parties.  Specifically, Thaler and 
Sunstein detail wide differences in organ donation rates depending on whether nations adopt 
“opt-in” or “opt-out” donation schemes, and argue that policymakers “can often deliver significant 
benefits to third parties simply by switching the default rule.”  Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. 
Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1192–93 (2003). 
 422 See supra pp. 617–18 (describing moral arguments against recognition of other-regarding 
preferences). 
 423 Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1996).  Similarly, by endorsing 
the United States’s labeling guidelines while simultaneously rejecting the MMPA import ban, the 
Tuna/Dolphin panel seemed to endorse the view that the market activity of consumers provides a 
more legitimate source of influence over foreign production practices than the political activity of 
citizens and their representatives.  See supra pp. 540–47. 
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often lack strong incentives to make such voluntary product-related 
disclosures424 and that consumers often do not have sufficient means to 
verify manufacturer claims that are made.425  As George Akerlof fa-
mously demonstrated, under such conditions a market unraveling may 
occur in which consumer doubt over manufacturer claims leads to 
suboptimal product standards.426  Government regulation can effec-
tively respond to such situations by mandating minimum product 
quality levels or policing the veracity of manufacturer disclosures.427 
When demand is sufficiently high, voluntary third-party certifica-
tion schemes may develop to guarantee the accuracy of manufacturer 
processing claims, as was the case with organic labeling prior to the 
promulgation of federal standards.428  Economic modeling suggests, 
however, that voluntary disclosure schemes along these lines will not 
be forthcoming when an insufficient proportion of consumers compre-
hend the significance of the disclosed information,429 a market struc-
ture that may be likely to accompany the early reception by consumers 
of goods with technologically complex characteristics.  On the other 
hand, where consumer interest is sufficiently widespread to spur the 
development of voluntary certification schemes, the very proliferation 
of such schemes may give rise to conflicting standards and consumer 
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 424 See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: A Response to 
Market Manipulation, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 259, 325 (2000) (describing market condi-
tions under which manufacturers might not disclose product information that consumers would 
desire to know). 
 425 See W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 781–85 (2d ed. 
1995) (noting that “[o]ne of the rationales for market failure is that consumers do not have perfect 
information regarding the safety of the products they purchase,” and that product labeling regula-
tions can play a constructive role in remedying information deficits).  For this reason, economists 
refer to products that express nonverifiable attributes as “credence goods.”  See Russell Korobkin, 
The Efficiency of Managed Care “Patient Protection” Laws: Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Ra-
tionality, and Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 27–28 (1999). 
 426 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 488–90 (1970). 
 427 VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 425, at 781–83.  For instance, environmental marketing guide-
lines issued by the Federal Trade Commission were designed to respond to consumer complaints 
that product manufacturers were making dubious environmental claims.  In essence, the market 
for environmentally benign production processes had become one of Akerlof’s “lemons markets,” 
characterized not by legitimate, accurate process information, but rather by rampant environ-
mental “greenwash.”  See David Hoch & Robert Franz, Eco-Porn Versus the Constitution: Com-
mercial Speech and the Regulation of Environmental Advertising, 58 ALB. L. REV. 441, 441–44 
(1994). 
 428 See Elise Golan et al., Economics of Food Labeling, 24 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 117, 161–62 
(2001). 
 429 See Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure in 
Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 45, 45 (2003). 
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confusion, ultimately raising a new ground for government interven-
tion, as was the case, again, with respect to organic agriculture.430 
Even in a situation where these types of market failures justify 
government regulation as a theoretical matter, one still may ask 
whether the benefits of labeling outweigh its administrative and other 
costs.  Consumer advocates tend to think of labeling as an essentially 
costless alternative to more elaborate means of product regulation.  In 
actuality, however, labeling entails significant costs, both direct431 and 
indirect.432  Indeed, in light of the magnitude of such costs and the 
purported absence of health or safety dangers from processes such as 
genetic engineering, some commentators have described process label-
ing as simply a matter of wealth distribution between concerned and 
nonconcerned consumers.  On this account, mandatory labeling 
schemes provide an implicit subsidy to concerned consumers because 
all market participants share labeling costs, rather than only consum-
ers who express a preference for labeling.  “With voluntary labeling,” 
in contrast, “consumers who value the information are the ones who 
must pay the costs associated with it.”433 
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 430 See Golan et al., supra note 428, at 162 (describing support for federal organic standards 
among organic food producers and processors in light of potentially conflicting third-party  
standards). 
 431 For instance, according to a meta-analysis of cost studies conducted by the European Com-
mission, mandatory segregation and labeling of GM food products might increase the cost of grain 
by 6–17%.  See EUROPEAN COMM’N, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR AGRICULTURE, ECONOMIC 
IMPACTS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS ON THE AGRI-FOOD SECTOR: A FIRST REVIEW 82 
(2000).  For that reason, a major plank of the United States’s argument against Europe’s GM 
regulations has been that the labeling requirement would cost U.S. companies an estimated four 
billion dollars per year.  See Michelle K. McDonald, Note, International Trade Law and the U.S.-
EU GMO Debate: Can Africa Weather This Storm?, 32 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 501, 508 (2004). 
 432 A principal indirect cost of labeling is the risk that additional labeling requirements will 
undermine the effectiveness of existing product warnings and instructions.  See Noah, supra note 
35, at 314 (suggesting that “[p]erhaps public education campaigns should be used in instances 
where consumers need to understand the environmental consequences of their choices,” rather 
than mandatory imposition of product labels that might interfere with more traditional types of 
product warnings); W. Kip Viscusi, Individual Rationality, Hazard Warnings, and the Founda-
tions of Tort Law, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 625, 661–66 (1996) (classifying such problems under the 
headings of “label clutter,” in which a single product bears an excessive amount of warnings and 
information, and “label proliferation,” in which labels of varying severity and importance appear 
on numerous products).  The risk of such problems in the context of process preferences may be 
especially strong given that, as the court in International Dairy emphasized, “there is no end to 
the information that states could require manufacturers to disclose about their production meth-
ods.”  Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1996).  It seems more likely, 
however, that states would require disclosure only of information in which consumers had ex-
pressed sufficient interest to galvanize public support for mandatory labeling legislation.  The 
view that such laws would differ significantly in scope from the class of disclosure requirements 
that could be defended by states on traditional police power grounds presumes that consumer 
concerns are especially likely to be scientifically unfounded or to be manipulated by interest 
groups for socially harmful purposes.  As section II.A argued, however, the case for the categorical 
unreliability of process preferences is unpersuasive. 
 433 Beales, supra note 36, at 112–13. 
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The problem with this analysis is that it treats concerned and non-
concerned citizens as ossified categories, rather than as categories that 
are partially constituted by the very governmental decision whether to 
require labeling.  If consumers do not have stable preferences for proc-
esses — if, for instance, consumer choices are partially contingent on 
prior labeling decisions by regulators — then costs and benefits alone 
will not determine whether to mandate labeling.  Recent experimental 
work in psychology suggests that this may well be the case.  As noted 
above, consumer willingness to differentiate among products based 
solely on processes seems consistent both with the view that consumers 
are attempting to shift resources to an “other” that is affected by the 
relevant process,434 and with the view that consumers are attempting 
to express the strength of their viewpoint or attitude regarding the 
process-related issue through the medium of consumption.435  In a 
parallel fashion, researchers have disagreed whether observed altruistic 
behavior in psychological experiments truly stems from a regard for 
others or whether individuals obtain a psychological benefit from  
giving that is of sufficient magnitude to render their behavior consis-
tent with the predictions of self-interested utility maximization.436  To 
theorists of the latter viewpoint, altruism is best understood as simply 
another consumption good from which individuals derive utility, 
rather than as a violation of the premise that individuals seek to 
maximize their personal welfare by satisfying well-behaved, self-
interested preferences.437 
A fascinating recent study, however, seriously challenges the notion 
that individuals have stable preferences for either fairness or “warm 
glow” sentimentality.438  The study used new variations of the Dictator 
Game439 to demonstrate that individuals’ propensity to engage in al-
truistic behavior is context-dependent and, critically, seems to be a 
function of how directly and unambiguously their actions are related 
to the welfare of others.440  In classic Dictator Game experiments, in-
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 434 See supra section II.A.1, pp. 582–601. 
 435 See supra section II.A.2, pp. 601–14. 
 436 See James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-
Glow Giving, 100 ECON. J. 464, 464–65 (1990) (contrasting “pure altruism” that is motivated only 
by a desire to alter another’s outcomes with “warm glow” altruism that is motivated in part by 
psychological effects from giving); Robyn M. Dawes & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Coopera-
tion, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 187, 192 (1988) (describing “impure altruism” as a “satisfaction of con-
science, or of noninstrumental ethical mandates”). 
 437 See James Andreoni & John Miller, Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the 
Consistency of Preferences for Altruism, 70 ECONOMETRICA 737, 737 (2002). 
 438 See Jason Dana et al., Exploiting Moral Wriggle Room: Behavior Inconsistent with a Pref-
erence for Fair Outcomes (June 24, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law 
School Library), available at http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/webfac/dellavigna/e218_f03/Fair.pdf. 
 439 See supra pp. 603–04. 
 440 See Dana et al., supra note 438, at 5. 
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dividuals in the role of proposer know that the split chosen will affect 
the outcome experienced by the receiver because the payments are 
known and immediate.  In the new experiments, however, researchers 
introduced uncertainty regarding outcomes in order to demonstrate 
that people’s willingness to engage in altruistic behavior is related to 
their ability to avoid apparent responsibility for the well-being of oth-
ers, a cognitive outlet that the researchers aptly term “moral wriggle 
room.”441 
In one experimental variation, for instance, subjects faced with a 
binary choice between equitable and inequitable divisions behaved 
consistently with previous results (almost three-quarters selected the 
equitable division).442  Additional subjects, however, were presented 
with a choice setting in which only their own payoffs and not those of 
the receiver were revealed.443  Experimenters told subjects that the 
payoff choice they faced would either match the classic condition (a 
choice between $6 for themselves and $1 for the receiver, or $5 for 
both the proposer and the receiver), or would be a reversal of the stan-
dard receiver payoffs such that the $6 proposer payoff became strictly 
dominant (($6, $5) or ($5, $1)).444  Given this uncertainty about the re-
ceiver’s payoff, subjects in the partially blind condition did not know 
whether selecting $5 for themselves would lead to an equitable result.  
The catch, however, was that subjects could reveal the receiver’s pay-
offs simply by pressing a computer button.445  In other words, subjects 
could — without cost — place themselves in the position of knowing 
whether their choice would lead to equity or inequity. 
Consistent with the researchers’ hypothesis that significant num-
bers of individuals would take advantage of this “moral wriggle room” 
to behave self-interestedly, nearly half of the subjects chose to remain 
ignorant of the payoffs they faced.446  Of those subjects who chose to 
reveal the payoffs, behavior was consistent with the levels of altruism 
demonstrated in classic Dictator Games (seventy-five percent chose the 
equitable payoff as between ($6, $1) and ($5, $5)).447  Of those who 
chose to remain ignorant, however, subjects overwhelmingly selected 
the self-interested allocation.448  Even when viewed together, the re-
vealing and nonrevealing subjects demonstrated a significantly lower 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 441 Id. at 5–6. 
 442 Id. at 12. 
 443 Id. at 8. 
 444 Id. at 8–9. 
 445 Id. at 9. 
 446 Id. at 12. 
 447 See id. at 12, 13 tbl.2. 
 448 See id. at 13 tbl.2. 
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willingness to engage in altruistic behavior than subjects in the classic 
choice setting.449 
This study has important implications for the process/product dis-
cussion.  First, it helps to explain why the delivery and control of 
process information has become such a contested issue in domestic and 
international product regulation.  Absent some bridging device such as 
labeling, the degree of attenuation between acts and consequences in 
modern consumer product settings is typically severe.  For the ordi-
nary consumer, “[a]s commodity chains grow longer and more com-
plex, and production systems more dynamic, it becomes harder to con-
textualize production in terms of its social and ecological 
ramifications.”450  Therefore, even if consumers know on some level 
that their purchases might contribute to a social or environmental out-
come that they do not desire, the consumer marketplace generously of-
fers them a cognitive alibi by obscuring such information from imme-
diate view.451  Vermont’s blue dot labeling scheme sought to eliminate 
precisely this kind of “moral wriggle room” by making salient — at the 
point of purchase — the connection between consumer choice and the 
welfare of animals and small dairy producers.452 
The second, and related, lesson of the recent Dictator Game study 
is that policymakers cannot choose the degree of process information 
to make available to consumer decisionmakers by examining existing 
preferences, for such preferences cannot be evaluated without refer-
ence to some prior specification of consumers’ informational context.  
Importantly, without adopting normative criteria beyond the maxim of 
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 449 See id. at 14. 
 450 Ken Conca, Consumption and Environment in a Global Economy, in CONFRONTING 
CONSUMPTION 133, 145 (Thomas Princen et al. eds., 2002). 
 451 See MATTHEW RABIN, MORAL PREFERENCES, MORAL CONSTRAINTS, AND SELF-SERVING 
BIASES 3 (Berkeley Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 95-241, Aug. 16, 1995) (noting that con-
sumers may avoid even costless knowledge acquisition regarding worker conditions to avoid being 
put in a position of moral constraint: “[w]hen her beliefs tell her it is morally okay to engage in an 
enjoyable activity, an agent will avoid gathering further information that might jeapordize [sic] 
her moral green light”), available at http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/rabin/Moral.Preferences.pdf. 
 452 Conversely, the biotech industry may correctly fear that mandatory labeling would spell the 
end of GM food products.  See Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Delays Suing Europe over Ban on Modi-
fied Food, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2003, at A6 (quoting the U.S. Agriculture Department undersecre-
tary for food safety as stating that labeling “implies that there is something wrong with genetically 
modified food”); Elizabeth Becker & David Barboza, Battle over Biotechnology Intensifies Trade 
War, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2003, at C1 (quoting a spokesperson for the American Soybean Asso-
ciation as saying that labeling is “the equivalent of putting a skull and crossbones on the pack-
ages, saying these things are bad”); Paul Elias, Labels for Genetically Modified Food Are a Politi-
cal Hot Potato in the U.S., MIAMI HERALD, July 5, 2003, at 6B (quoting spokesperson for the 
Grocery Manufacturers of America as viewing required GM ingredient disclosure as “a black la-
bel”).  In one study of European consumers, for instance, willingness to pay for GM foods de-
clined by approximately 30% when subjects’ attention was drawn to a product ingredient list dis-
closing the use of GM ingredients.  See Charles Noussair et al., Do Consumers Not Care About 
Biotech Foods or Do They Just Not Read the Labels?, 75 ECON. LETTERS 47, 48 (2002). 
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individual utility maximization, policymakers have no agreed-upon 
method for making these analytically prior decisions.453  The proc-
ess/product distinction has been offered as a bright line rule for limit-
ing the consumer’s information set exclusively to product-related char-
acteristics that threaten personal harm to the consumer, but such 
personal physical and economic risks hardly exhaust the universe of 
information about which consumers express strong interest.  Nor can 
scientific evidence requirements of the sort contained in the SPS 
Agreement454 provide an adequate decisionmaking tool, given that 
consumer demand for process information encompasses a much wider 
and richer range of considerations than merely those consequences of 
consumption that are scientifically demonstrable. 
These lessons are not lost on participants in process-related dis-
putes.  By discrediting process information as a legitimate ground for 
consumer decisionmaking, proponents of the process/product distinc-
tion advocate a marketplace in which consumers satisfy their personal 
interests unimpeded by concern for the welfare of others.455  In con-
trast, by downstreaming process information, environmentalists, labor 
activists, and other “availability entrepreneurs”456 advocate a market-
place in which consumers behave in accordance with the altruistic ide-
als that the entrepreneurs themselves hold and that consumers also ex-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 453 Thus, governments cannot easily follow the suggestion of two international trade scholars 
that, in order to comply with GATT Article III, process-based trade measures should be adopted 
only when “market perception comes first,” such that “government regulation cannot be deemed 
to anticipate or guide consumer perceptions.”  Marco Bronckers & Natalie McNelis, Rethinking 
the “Like Product” Definition in GATT 1994: Anti-Dumping and Environmental Protection, in 
REGULATORY BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE LAW 
345, 376 (Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2000); see also Frieder Roessler, Beyond the 
Ostensible: A Tribute to Professor Robert Hudec’s Insights on the Determination of the Likeness of 
Products Under the National Treatment Provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
37 J. WORLD TRADE 771, 776–777 (2003) (arguing that the WTO’s Appellate Body Asbestos Re-
port, supra note 54, permits nontangible product characteristics to enter into GATT Article III 
analysis only if the market differentiates products on the basis of these characteristics in the ab-
sence of government regulation). 
 454 See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 455 This aim need not be viewed as anti-welfarist, given the discomfort that some individuals 
appear to experience from being put in a position of explicit moral responsibility.  In fact, one 
reading of the psychological experiments described in this section is that many individuals experi-
ence greater well-being when they avoid cognitive awareness of the implications of their choices 
for others.  Supporting this reading, a subsequent study found that individuals were willing to 
incur an immediate cost in order to avoid the position of proposer in a Dictator Game.  Subjects 
were given a choice between distributing $10 betweeen themselves and a receiver or “exiting” the 
game and receiving $9, in which case the receiver would never know that there was a game being 
played.  Thirty percent of subjects chose to accept this $9 offer in order to avoid making a choice, 
despite the fact that a rational self-interested actor would have stayed in the game to capture all 
$10.  See JASON DANA ET AL., WHAT YOU DON’T KNOW WON’T HURT ME: COSTLY (BUT 
QUIET) EXIT IN DICTATOR GAMES 9 (Carnegie Mellon Univ. Dep’t of Social and Decision Sci., 
Working Paper, Aug. 24, 2004).   
 456 See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 43, at 687–88. 
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press in alternative choice settings.  Neither set of behaviors can be 
said to reveal “true” preferences; rather, the capacity to behave in al-
truistic ways is a function of context and the degree to which deci-
sionmaking environments make it clear that consumers’ choices will 
impact the well-being of others.  When regulating process information, 
therefore, policymakers must make openly normative judgments about 
the types of consumer behavior that they wish to inspire.457  In es-
sence, they must choose between encouraging consumers to behave as 
purely self-interested purchasers or, as the next section describes, as 
citizen-consumers who approach their role with the burdens of the 
world in mind. 
2.  The Heroic Consumer. — Any society of a sufficient magnitude 
must confront the following three basic tasks: allocating resources 
among competing uses, distributing wealth among citizens, and setting 
an aggregate level or scale of human impact within the environ-
ment.458  Economists and political scientists acknowledge the funda-
mental nature of the first two tasks.  The third, however, typically is 
disaggregated into a host of technical market failure concepts such as 
public goods problems, negative externalities, information asymme-
tries, and so on.  Such concepts in the environmental context essen-
tially function as surrogates for the more basic question that tends not 
to be asked directly: how much of the ecological superstructure upon 
which all life and activity depends does a society wish to divert for 
human use?459  The international salience of the concept of sustain-
ability indicates that this scale aspect of collective governance is be-
coming more widely recognized and appreciated.  A society that main-
tains a sustainable scale is understood to be one that does not threaten 
the welfare of future generations by excessively drawing down natural 
resource stocks, by overtaxing the assimilative capacity of pollution 
sinks, or by otherwise impairing the viability of ecological support sys-
tems.460 
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 457 Cf. McCluskey, supra note 3, at 876 (concluding that contemporary political debates should 
focus “on the underlying question of which individuals and what kinds of communities our mar-
kets should be structured to protect and to benefit”). 
 458 See HERMAN E. DALY, BEYOND GROWTH: THE ECONOMICS OF SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT 50–51 (1996) (“The term ‘scale’ is shorthand for ‘the physical scale or size of the 
human presence in the ecosystem . . . .’”). 
 459 One also may think of the scale question as posing unique distributional questions — 
namely, how should natural resources be distributed to other life forms and other generations?  
Indeed, it is primarily this aspect of the scale question that prevents conventional concepts of 
market failure from adequately fulfilling the role served by the concept of scale.  See Douglas A. 
Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 675, 688–91 (2003); Douglas A. Kysar, 
Sustainability, Distribution, and the Macroeconomic Analysis of Law, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1, 40–44 
(2001) [hereinafter Kysar, Sustainability]. 
 460 See DALY, supra note 458, at 52 (“Sustainability is probably the characteristic of optimal 
scale on which there is most consensus.”).   
2004] PREFERENCES FOR PROCESSES 633 
In simplified terms, the post–World War II policy consensus in 
America has been to focus government effort on the maximization of 
allocative efficiency and the support of economic growth.461  This pol-
icy is thought to reduce pressure on the government to engage in large-
scale redistributive efforts because individuals have the opportunity of 
upward mobility in a constantly burgeoning economy.462  By implica-
tion, therefore, the optimal scale of the economy has always been 
taken to be “bigger.”463  Through a steady drumbeat of market rhetoric 
and defining episodes such as the 1959 “kitchen” debate between Rich-
ard Nixon and Nikita Khruschev, this consensus eventually acquired 
more than a purely instrumentalist cast.  As historian Lizabeth Cohen 
describes, “[f]aith in a mass consumption postwar economy . . . stood 
for an elaborate, integrated ideal of economic abundance and democ-
ratic political freedom, both equitably distributed, that became almost 
a national civil religion from the late 1940s into the 1970s.”464  Charles 
McGovern locates the emergence of this “civil religion” even earlier, 
arguing that by 1940 “American people fitfully but firmly [had come] 
to equate the consumer with the citizen, a consumer standard of living 
with democracy, and the full participation in such an economy of 
spending and accumulation with being an American.”465 
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 461 See COHEN, supra note 2, at 11 (using the term “Consumers’ Republic” to describe “a strat-
egy that emerged after the Second World War for reconstructing the nation’s economy and reaf-
firming its democratic values through promoting the expansion of mass consumption”). 
 462 See Lizabeth Cohen, The New Deal State and the Making of Citizen Consumers, in 
GETTING AND SPENDING: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN CONSUMER SOCIETIES IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra note 253, at 111, 123 (noting that “the participation of the mass of 
Americans in purchasing goods not only became the ideal route to capitalist prosperity for the 
nation, but also seemed to promise a citizenry of economic equals, without necessitating a direct 
attack on inequality”).   
 463 For a classic exception, see E.F. SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL: A STUDY OF 
ECONOMICS AS IF PEOPLE MATTERED 17–18 (1973). 
 464 COHEN, supra note 2, at 127.  The consumer movement of the 1970s did not change this 
basic outlook, but instead reinforced it by continuing a trend away from public-regarding aspects 
of consumer behavior, such as concern for the welfare of workers, and toward more private issues, 
such as product safety and fair pricing.  See id. at 359.  Nor did the civil rights movement ulti-
mately threaten the premises of the postwar consensus: “Despite the radical potential of consumer 
organizing appreciated by the Ella Bakers of the civil rights movement, attention to democratiz-
ing the marketplace reinforced the Consumers’ Republic’s orientation toward ‘expanding the pie’ 
to make it larger and more encompassing, and disinterest in redistributing economic resources to 
achieve more fundamental socioeconomic equity.”  Id. at 190.  
 465 Charles McGovern, Consumption and Citizenship in the United States, 1900–1940, in 
GETTING AND SPENDING: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN CONSUMER SOCIETIES IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra note 253, at 37, 37.  As McGovern notes, advertising and market-
ing executives consciously played a key role in furthering these developments: “In metaphors 
equating consumers with citizens and purchasing with voting, admen portrayed consumption as 
the true exercise of the individual’s civic role and public identity; consumption was the ritual 
means of affirming one’s nationality as an American.”  Id. at 43. 
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Regardless of the precise timeline, the “citizen-consumer,” exempli-
fied by the Consumers’ White Label Campaign and the civil rights 
consumer activism of the twentieth century,466 gave way to a vision 
that Cohen calls the “purchaser as citizen.”467  Individuals could still 
desire to benefit the general good through their purchasing activities, 
but now, almost miraculously, the goal required no sacrifice of personal 
interests: “Out of the wartime conflict between citizen consumers, who 
reoriented their personal consumption to serve the general good, and 
purchaser consumers, who pursued private gain regardless of it, 
emerged a new postwar ideal of the purchaser as citizen who simulta-
neously fulfilled personal desire and civic obligation by consuming.”468  
The continuing influence of this purchaser-as-citizen vision is evident 
in omnipresent media invocations of consumer confidence and con-
sumer spending as indicators of national welfare.  As noted at the out-
set of this Article, it also was especially palpable during the effort to 
equate national recovery from the events of September 11, 2001 with 
increased consumer spending.469  As one major automaker’s advertis-
ing campaign put it, the way to “Keep America Rolling” was through 
commodified purchase.470  And lots of it. 
During the last two decades, however, Cohen argues that the con-
cept of “a new combined consumer/citizen/taxpayer/voter has gained 
influence,” such that “self-interested citizens increasingly view [even] 
government policies like other market transactions, judging them by 
how well served they feel personally.”471  Instead of equating private 
consumer spending with the general good, Cohen argues that the new 
American individual has abandoned entirely the notion of a general 
good and instead views all of social interaction as a competitive game 
in which the individual’s role is simply to satisfy her own interests.472  
The government’s role, on this account, is merely to offer goods and 
services like any other retail seller.473  According to Cohen, politicians 
have reacted to these developments by speaking of themselves and 
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 466 See supra pp. 584–86 & note 262. 
 467 COHEN, supra note 2, at 8–9. 
 468 Id. at 119.  As an instructive example of this shift, consider the monthly program of the 
Consumer Conference of Greater Cincinnati, which in 1946–47 included topics such as “Your 
Country’s Welfare Needs Your Wise Buying” and “Consumer’s [sic] Responsibility to Themselves 
and Other Consumers,” while in 1947–48 pertinent topics became “Do You Have Drycleaning 
Troubles?,” “Know Your Plastics,” and “Oh Lady Does Your Dress Fit?”  Id. at 135. 
 469 See supra pp. 526–27. 
 470 See David Teather, Motor City Kingpin Who Kept America Rolling: Interview, Richard 
Wagoner, CEO, General Motors, GUARDIAN, July 20, 2002, at 30. 
 471 COHEN, supra note 2, at 9. 
 472 Id. at 396–97.  
 473 Cf. AMAN, supra note 13 (manuscript at ch. 1, at 33–36, 54–59) (describing the emergence of 
a self-conscious “government as business” model during the last four U.S. presidential administra-
tions).  
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their policies exclusively in market terms.  Rather than offer a coher-
ent vision of collective welfare, contemporary politicians instead as-
semble a package of issues targeted to attract a collection of distinct 
segments of the voting population.474  Previously public or social sub-
jects such as education, health care, and social security become merely 
another market in which politicians ask consumers whether they are 
getting their dollar’s worth from government services.475 
This latter trope dovetails nicely with the academic risk reform lit-
erature, which repeatedly emphasizes the possibility that Americans 
could be getting more “bang for their buck” from environmental, 
health, and safety expenditures.476  Indeed, the ascendance of cost-
benefit analysis can be seen as a further entrenchment of the consumer 
at the center of public policy, given that it seeks to hinge government 
provision of public goods on preferences that are revealed by individu-
als acting in their capacity as market actors, whatever those individu-
als might express when acting as voters or in other social roles.  To 
give just one concrete example, EPA economists have examined a par-
ent’s willingness to pay premium prices for organic baby food as an 
indirect measure of the monetary value of an infant’s life — a value 
that regulators may then use to set government health and safety stan-
dards that aim to protect children more generally.477  The heroic role 
of the consumer, then, is becoming even more heroic.  Long understood 
to include a patriotic obligation continually to increase expenditure on 
material goods, the consumer’s role also is being cast as an unwitting 
mechanism for collective valuation. 
The resurgence of process preferences provides a curious footnote 
to this apparent triumph of market liberalism.  Specifically, if the cur-
rent consensus approach to collective governance focuses on the pur-
suit of individual welfare maximization in order to increase continually 
the size of the aggregate pie — while letting distributive equity and 
sustainable scale be achieved on a more ad hoc, ex post basis — then 
consumers in many respects seem to be resisting this neoliberal view of 
the world.  Because consumption is now a principal vehicle by which 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 474 See COHEN, supra note 2, at 342 (arguing that politicians “at best construct a composite vi-
sion out of the specialized interests of their distinct constituencies, and at worst avoid discussing 
any common good at all”). 
 475 See id. at 397 (“Whereas from the 1930s to as late as the 1970s, to refer to the consumer in-
terest was also to appeal to some larger public good beyond the individual’s self-interest, the 
ubiquitous invocation of the consumer today — as patient, as parent, as social security recipient 
— often means satisfying the private interest of the paying customer, the combined con-
sumer/citizen/taxpayer/voter whose greatest concern is, ‘Am I getting my money’s worth?’”). 
 476 See Thomas O. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 39–40 (1998). 
 477 See KELLY B. MACGUIRE ET AL., WILLINGNESS TO PAY TO REDUCE A CHILD’S PESTICIDE 
EXPOSURE: EVIDENCE FROM THE BABY FOOD MARKET 3 (Nat’l Ctr. for Envtl. Econ., Working 
Paper No. 02-03, 2002), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/EE/epa/eed.nsf/ffb05b5f4a2cf40985 
256d2d00740681/8bd3cacb5bdb7be185256bb300492be9/$FILE/2002-03.pdf. 
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individuals are connected to a globalized world that includes social in-
justice and ecological fragility, it is also through consumption that 
those individuals’ hesitancies and objections are becoming most ap-
parent.  Thus, rather than waiting for post-market wealth transfers 
and ameliorative environmental, health, and safety regulations, con-
sumers of process-distinguished products instead express preferences 
for sustainable, equitable outcomes through their market purchases ab 
initio.478  Just as individuals do not evaluate GM foods in the com-
partmentalized fashion of federal regulators,479 they also do not evalu-
ate market transactions, wealth distribution, and environmental qual-
ity as wholly separable concepts requiring wholly separate methods of 
satisfaction and control. 
This resurgence of process preferences also stands in tension with 
the long-held view of scholars that individuals are more likely to ex-
press public-regarding values while acting in their role as citizens than 
as consumers.480  In contrast to this traditional view, political scientist 
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 478 For instance, consumers purchase organically produced, fairly traded goods at least in part 
because they desire a society where producers receive a “fair” return for the fruits of “sustainable” 
production practices.  Similarly, the decisions to oppose rbST, GM foods, and sweatshop clothing 
all can be construed as decisions about the levels of wealth inequality and/or ecological risk that 
individuals believe are appropriate, not as a matter of personal welfare, but as a matter of social 
policy.  Marketing researchers already are devising a vocabulary for these developments, even as 
many academics resist them on a theoretical level.  Compare Imkamp, supra note 13, at 200 (not-
ing based on survey results that “[t]he ecological perspective on consumer products seems to have 
broadened” to include concerns about production and distribution impacts on the environment, as 
well as concerns about the absolute level of consumption that individuals undertake), and A.W. 
Browne et al., Organic Production and Ethical Trade: Definition, Practice and Links, 25 FOOD 
POL’Y 69, 71 (2000) (noting that “ethical trading, reinforced by organic concepts of production, 
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trade”), with Kysar, Sustainability, supra note 459, at 22–28 (describing a debate between conven-
tional and ecological economists regarding the proper analytical treatment within economics of 
sustainability and notions of environmental limits to growth). 
 479 See supra p. 590.   
 480 See Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 4, at 378–79.  This traditional view is premised on the fact 
that, unlike the market, which requires individuals to make contributions to public goods without 
guaranteeing equal levels of contributions from other beneficiaries, the ballot box ensures that 
individuals will have to contribute only if their peers do as well.  After all, as Amartya Sen has 
put it, “it would be amazing if the payment I am ready to make to save nature is totally independ-
ent of what others are ready to pay for it, since it is specifically a social concern.  The ‘lone 
ranger’ model of environmental evaluation confounds the nature of the problem at hand.”  Cass 
R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 925 n.78 (1996) (citing 
Amartya Sen, Environmental Evaluation and Social Choice: Contingent Valuation and the Mar-
ket Analogy, 46 JAPANESE ECON. REV. 23, 29 (1995)).  In addition to this perceived failure of mar-
kets to provide an appropriate framework for the pursuit of collective goals, some theorists argue 
that markets also actively undermine other potential frameworks: “The market enhances the lib-
erty of people to act as individual consumers; it undercuts severely their liberty to act otherwise.”  
FREYFOGLE, supra note 389, at 197.  On this view, fostering a greater role for process preferences 
may have the unintended effect of encouraging consumer behavior to function merely as a pallia-
tive act that distracts individuals from more meaningful and collective responses to social and 
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Deborah Lynn Guber’s recent review of environmental beliefs and be-
haviors finds a “paradox of marketplace success and ballot-box failure” 
for environmental issues over the last decade.481  Citing James Bu-
chanan’s classic work on individual choice,482 Guber argues that a 
critical component of an individual’s willingness to engage in activity 
designed to support environmental causes or other public goods hinges 
upon the perceived efficacy of that activity.483  Significantly, the ap-
parent rise of apathy in the public sphere has been accompanied by a 
contrasting rise of faith in the power of markets to satisfy individual 
wants.484  In an era of substantial skepticism regarding the effective-
ness of political action, therefore, individuals may now regard the 
market as a more promising route to public-regarding change than the 
government.   
From this perspective, making process information available to 
consumers through product labels and other means constitutes an ef-
fort to enable and coordinate behavior among individuals who wish to 
express regard for the welfare of others, but who lack confidence in al-
ternative mechanisms for public expression.485  As Dan Kahan has 
noted, individuals’ willingness to contribute to public goods is in part 
a function of their perceptions regarding the behavior of others: if one 
believes that shirking is widespread, one will be less inclined to con-
tribute; if one believes that contributions are widespread, one will be 
more inclined to contribute.486  In the case of process-labeled products, 
the mere existence of such products on store shelves signals to the con-
sumer that a sufficient number of other individuals are purchasing the 
goods to support their commercial availability, a signal that in turn en-
courages purchases by those individuals who are inclined to recipro-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
environmental conditions.  See Michael Maniates, Individualization: Plant a Tree, Buy a Bike, 
Save the World?, in CONFRONTING CONSUMPTION, supra note 450, at 58–59. 
 481 DEBORAH LYNN GUBER, THE GRASSROOTS OF A GREEN REVOLUTION: POLLING AMERICA 
ON THE ENVIRONMENT 155 (2003). 
 482 James M. Buchanan, Individual Choice in Voting and the Market, 62 J. POL. ECON. 334 
(1954). 
 483 See GUBER, supra note 481, at 160. 
 484 See Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
1285, 1292–93 (2003) (“At least in the United States, the last few decades have been marked by an 
increased faith in markets and a corresponding decrease in support for public institutions.”).  
 485 Cf. Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 4, at 404 (“If . . . individuals are generally other-regarding 
in their views on public goods, efforts to reduce feelings of hopelessness and facilitate cooperation 
in the private sphere may be fruitful.”). 
 486 See Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. 
L. REV. 71, 72 (2003); see also Bruno S. Frey & Stephan Meier, Pro-Social Behavior in a Natural 
Setting, 54 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 65, 66–67 (2004) (finding evidence of “conditional coopera-
tion” among a sample of students deciding whether to contribute to social funds administered by a 
university). 
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cate the other-regarding gestures of their fellow consumers.487  Natu-
rally, this ability to overcome “hopelessness”488 in the consumer mar-
ketplace should increase in strength as individuals continue to embrace 
the view that the market is an efficacious and reliable mechanism for 
change — even collective change.489 
Evidence also suggests that the process-inflected nature of contem-
porary consumer product markets should increase in significance as 
income levels rise.  Through numerous empirical studies, economists 
have identified a suggestive statistical relationship between per capita 
income levels and the stringency of environmental standards that are 
chosen by different nations.  Although this literature is not without 
important exceptions and ambiguities, scholars have widely interpreted 
it to support the proposition that “only when we get sufficiently rich 
can we afford the relative luxury of caring about the environment.”490  
On an individual level, evidence similarly suggests that income is a 
strong determinant of one’s willingness to pay for products such as or-
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 487 Cf. Valerie S. Folkes, Recent Attribution Research in Consumer Behavior: A Review and 
New Directions, 14 J. CONSUMER RES. 548, 551 (1988) (noting that “[c]onsumers prefer to believe 
that others share the same preferences and consumption habits,” and describing a study in which 
“nonconservationists justify their irresponsible behavior by believing that most others waste en-
ergy”); John Thøgersen, Psychological Determinants of Paying Attention to Eco-Labels in Pur-
chase Decisions: Model Development and Multinational Validation, 23 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 285, 
307 (2000) (noting that “it is likely that consumer belief in the environmental significance of re-
sponsible purchase behaviour is strengthened by a strong prevalence because it makes it more 
credible that consumers can make a difference by choosing such products”); KARINE NYBORG ET 
AL., GREEN CONSUMERS AND PUBLIC POLICY: ON SOCIALLY CONTINGENT MORAL 
MOTIVATION 17–18 (Univ. of Oslo Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper Memorandum No. 31/2003, ) 
2003 (reporting results of a modeling exercise demonstrating that “[h]igh adoption 
rates . . . influence consumers’ propensity to interpret product adoption as a matter of moral re-
sponsibility”). 
 488 Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 4, at 379 (using this term to describe the collective action di-
lemma that accompanies the pursuit of public goods in market settings). 
 489 One specific reason such an increase might occur is that process preferences appeal to a 
broader range of citizens than does more conventional government environmental regulation.  
Thus, although political ideology correlates strongly with willingness to vote for a political candi-
date primarily because the candidate took strong environmental positions, no correlation appears 
to exist between ideology and willingness to purchase environmentally safe or biodegradable 
products.  “Consumer choice, in this sense, does seem to transcend ideology and in doing so allows 
environmental products to appeal to a wider audience.”  GUBER, supra note 481, at 168; see also 
James A. Roberts, Will the Real Socially Responsible Consumer Please Step Forward?, BUS. 
HORIZONS, Mar.–Apr. 1996, at 79, 79, 82 (developing a scale measuring “responsible consumer 
behavior” and finding little variance in individual responses due to demographic variables). 
 490 BJØRN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING THE REAL STATE 
OF THE WORLD 33 (2001).  For a discussion of the limitations and complications of the literature, 
see Douglas A. Kysar, Some Realism About Environmental Skepticism: The Implications of Bjørn 
Lomborg’s The Skeptical Environmentalist for Environmental Law and Policy, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
223, 249–52 (2003). 
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ganic food and fairly traded goods.491  Perhaps, then, consistent with 
the environmental protection narrative on a national level, consumers 
will begin to express ever more concern regarding the processes that lie 
behind products as they become better able to afford the “luxury” of 
ethical or environmental purchasing. 
As Susan Strange writes, the “shift away from states and towards 
markets is probably the biggest change in the international political 
economy to take place in the last half of the twentieth century.”492  
Paired with the global integration of economies, this shift has left in its 
wake a variety of “democracy deficits,”493 perhaps best typified by the 
lack of an international labor or environmental regulatory organization 
comparable in scope and authority to the WTO.  To the extent, there-
fore, that process preferences reflect the moral and political desires of 
individuals who lack more direct means of effectuating their beliefs, 
such preferences may represent a significant vehicle for countering the 
distortions wrought by these deficits of democracy.  To be sure, the ul-
timate impact that consumers may exert through process preferences is 
limited by the nature of market activity,494 and thus, advocates of 
process reforms can only view consumer activity as a complement to, 
rather than a substitute for, more direct regulatory efforts to achieve 
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 491 Cf. Arnab K. Basu et al., Eco-Labeling and Stages of Development, 7 REV. DEV. ECON. 228, 
228–29 (2003) (finding a relationship between national income and eco-friendly purchasing like an 
Environmental Kuznets Curve). 
 492 SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE: THE DIFFUSION OF POWER IN THE 
WORLD ECONOMY 43 (1996). 
 493 AMAN, supra note 13 (manuscript at ch. 4, at 1). 
 494 See, e.g., id. (manuscript at introduction, 17–18) (noting that “enhancing a person’s power as 
a consumer” is limited as a democratic enhancement tool because consumer activities “are inevi-
tably reactive” and do not involve “deliberative . . . participat[ion] in the creation of new op-
tions”); Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, supra note 459, at 716–27 (noting that some deter-
minants of environmental impact, including, most critically, consumption and population levels, 
are not redressed by technological advances in resource efficiency alone); Barton H. Thompson, 
Jr., What Good Is Economics?, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 175, 186–90 (2003) (arguing that “ethical 
beliefs . . . frequently fall victim to personal convenience or cost considerations” and should there-
fore be complemented by regulatory tools that alter economic incentives).  The threat of deception 
by manufacturers poses an especially serious challenge to the efficacy of consumer activity as a 
regulatory tool.  See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some 
Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1425–27 (1999); Jon D. Hanson & 
Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 724–43 (1999).  Indeed, famed conservationist Aldo Leopold offered an un-
easy endorsement of consumer activism for precisely this reason, warning that “hitching conserva-
tion directly to the producer-consumer relation instead of to the government . . . would present the 
professional advertiser with an opportunity for euphemized deception and equivocation vastly 
larger than cigarettes.  The more complex the product or process, the wider the field for the 
trained hoodwinker.”  ALDO LEOPOLD, Land-Use and Democracy, in THE RIVER OF THE 
MOTHER OF GOD AND OTHER ESSAYS BY ALDO LEOPOLD 295, 300 (Susan L. Flader & J. Baird 
Callicott eds., 1991).  Such opportunities for deception underscore the need to reject Nike’s argu-
ments, which, if accepted, would impair the ability of states and litigants to police manufacturer 
process claims.  See supra pp. 610–14. 
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their policy goals.  Nevertheless, in an era that increasingly regards the 
consumer and her pursuit of individual welfare as a central orienting 
concept of law, politics, and culture, outlets for public-regarding con-
sumer expression should not be dismissed out of hand. 
As this Part has attempted to demonstrate, process preferences can-
not be easily dismissed as erroneous or inappropriate; indeed, they 
provide a legitimate, important determinant of consumers’ hedonic 
and moral well-being.  Moreover, because they appeal to individuals’ 
strong identification as consumers,495 because they provide a sensation 
of personal autonomy and influence that seems to be lacking in con-
temporary political spheres,496 and because, more broadly, they fit well 
alongside a conglomeration of forces that have placed the market and 
the consumer unequivocally at the center of twenty-first-century 
life,497 process preferences also may provide one of democracy’s best 
hopes for public engagement in the new century.  For this reason 
alone, policymakers should reject the process/product distinction in its 
various guises and instead become sensitive to the notion that process 
preferences provide an answer — partial and unsatisfying, but in 
many respects inescapable — to the vexing question, “how is political 
activity possible in the global age.”498 
CONCLUSION 
By fostering ever greater market connections and economic oppor-
tunities, globalization helps to catalyze the expansion of commercial 
relations and commercial activities within public life.  Previously dis-
tanced market actors become linked not only by commodity chains, 
but also by social and ecological feedback mechanisms of potentially 
devastating magnitude.  As Peter Singer observes, both the events of 
September 11, 2001, and the problem of climate change are manifesta-
tions of the same underlying economic, cultural, and environmental 
forces — forces that have bound all of humanity, in essence, into “one 
world.”499  Accordingly, many consumers have come to view them-
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 495 See COHEN, supra note 2, at 410. 
 496 See GUBER, supra note 481, at 169 (“In short, while scholars have long suspected that low 
perceptions of efficacy are an ‘effective deterrent’ to environmental behavior, evidence 
. . . suggests that actions taken in the marketplace might help Americans to feel better about their 
own ability to effect environmental change.”). 
 497 See Freeman, supra note 484, at 1292 (“Privatization coincides with other political and eco-
nomic developments — including globalization, free trade, market integration, and deregulation 
— that similarly reinforce an ideological preference for private over public ordering and market 
over noneconomic values.”). 
 498 BECK, supra note 11, at 132. 
 499 See PETER SINGER, ONE WORLD: THE ETHICS OF GLOBALIZATION 1 (2002).  Although 
Singer’s observation is particularly poignant in present times, it does not express a dramatically 
new idea.  In 1795, Immanuel Kant wrote that “[t]he peoples of the earth have thus entered in 
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selves as purchasing with their disposable dollars not only products, 
but also shares of responsibility in the moral and ecological economy 
that produces them.  On their surface, the fluorescent aisles of modern 
retail environments tell only tales of abundance.  Globalization, how-
ever, has enhanced the flow of information, not merely goods, and in-
formation regarding processes increasingly is finding its way down-
stream.  Consumers are responding accordingly. 
As consumer awareness and demand for process information in-
creases, however, the impetus to regulate access to such information 
grows as well.  As this Article describes, in a number of areas of law 
and policy, the mechanism being employed to engage in such regula-
tion is a fairly rigid conceptual distinction between processes and 
products.  This process/product distinction has been invoked to ques-
tion the authority of an importing nation to ban or label products that 
are developed using processes deemed objectionable by its citizens; to 
rationalize ignoring overwhelming consumer support for mandatory 
labeling of food products that contain genetically engineered ingredi-
ents; and to narrow the constitutional conditions under which states 
may force manufacturers to disclose process information or to face le-
gal challenges for disclosing false or misleading process information. 
These efforts to restrict the informational environment of consum-
ers exist uncomfortably within a global political climate that increas-
ingly embraces market liberalism and the rhetoric of consumer choice 
as its fundamental guideposts.  Although this tension currently encom-
passes only a handful of legal policy disputes concerning a few salient 
process-related issues, it nevertheless seems likely to grow in signifi-
cance.  If civic life reduces to market life — if individuals come to 
agree with Secretary Evans that going “back to the stores” constitutes 
the most important “sacrifice” that they can make for the well-being of 
the nation500 — then private consumer activities will become an even 
more critical vehicle for public-regarding expression.  Similarly, if the 
trend toward a “cost-benefit state”501 continues to grow — if private 
market behavior displaces other, more traditional means for determin-
ing government environmental, health, and safety standards — then 
the struggle for control over the consumer’s decisionmaking environ-
ment only will intensify in scope and severity.  In that regard, dolphin-
safe tuna, GM foods, rbST, and Kasky may represent only the opening 
shots in an emerging battle to determine the degree of “moral wriggle 
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varying degrees into a universal community, and it has developed to the point where a violation 
of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere.”  IMMANUEL KANT, Perpetual Peace: A Phi-
losophical Sketch, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 93, 107–08 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 2d ed. 
1991). 
 500 See supra pp. 526–27. 
 501 See supra p. 527. 
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room” that governments and producers will afford their consumers.  
Although the eventual outcome of such a battle is unknown, one thing 
at present does seem clear: the process/product distinction is far too 
meager of a conceptual device to bear the weight of these controversies. 
